Finley v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Missoula Cnty.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1916
• Docket Number: No. 3578.,3578.
• Citation: 51 Mont. 411
• Parties: FINLEY v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 OF MISSOULA COUNTY.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

51 Mont. 411

FINLEY

v.SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 OF MISSOULA COUNTY.

No. 3578.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Dec. 4, 1915.

On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 7, 1916.

Appeal from District Court, Missoula County; A. S. Duncan, Judge.

Action by Phœbe Finley against School District No. 1 of Missoula County, Montana. Judgment for plaintiff for part of her claim, and, from an order denying her a new trial, she appeals. Reversed and remanded.

W. L. Murphy and Tolan & Gaines, all of Missoula, for appellant.

Henry C. Stiff, of Missoula, for respondent.

HOLLOWAY, J.

In June, 1911, Miss Phœbe Finley was employed as a grade teacher in the Missoula public schools for the ensuing school year, at a salary of $900. She taught from the opening of the term in September, 1911, until April, 1912, when she voluntarily resigned. A controversy arose over the amount of compensation to which she was entitled, and she brought this action to recover $162.60, which she alleged was the balance due her. The trial court found in her favor for $18.75, the amount admitted by the school board. From an order denying her a new trial, plaintiff appealed.

There is not any disputed question of fact presented. The contract of employment was in writing and by reference made the rules of the school board a part of it. The school term commenced in September and continued for 190 school days. From the close of one term in June, to the opening of the next term in September, there was a summer vacation period of approximately 2 1/2 months during which time the teachers were not required to be in Missoula, did not render any services to the district, and were not under the direction or control of the school board. Plaintiff taught for 145 school days and insists that her salary for that time should bear the same proportion to $900 as 145 bears to 190.

The contract of employment was entered into before the adoption of the new school code, and is governed by the Revised Codes and amendments thereto made prior to June, 1911. A school year, as defined by section 915, Revised Codes, commences on September 1st and ends on August 31st following. A school month consists of 20 school days, or 4 weeks of 5 days each. Laws 1909, p. 33. Certain of the board rules to which reference will be made are arranged and numbered by us for convenience. Rule 1 provides:

“(1) Teachers, principals and supervisors shall be paid in twelve equal payments, one at the end of each calendar month except the August salary which shall be paid September 15th.”

The authority of the board to employ teachers and order their salaries paid is conferred by section 875, Revised Codes. The manner of their payment, whether monthly, quarterly, or otherwise, is not prescribed; but the subject is reserved for disposition by agreement of the parties, with a single exception not important here. It was therefore competent for the board to provide that plaintiff's salary should be paid in twelve monthly installments; and it was likewise within the authority of the parties to agree, as they did in rule 2, that:

“A teacher who is dismissed or resigns her position before the close of the school shall receive pay only for the actual time in service.”

This controversy arises over the meaning of the phrase “for the actual time in service,” when invoked, as it must be, to determine the amount of compensation to which plaintiff was entitled. If this rule be divorced from the others, the meaning of this phrase is most obscure. The language of the rule is that of the school board, and the uncertainty will be construed most strongly against the party responsible for it. Section 5043, Rev. Codes; Lyon v. Daily Copper Co., 46 Mont. 108, 126 Pac. 931.

If it was the intention of the school board that the salary allowed to plaintiff should constitute compensation for the full period of 12 months, during 2 1/2 months of which time she was not expected to render any services whatever and was free to engage in other remunerative employment, then the contract was void; for, however liberal the individual members of the board might be with their own private funds, they were without authority to make a donation of the public funds of the district under the pretext of compensating for services which were never to be rendered. Case v. School District, 14 Mont. 138, 35 Pac. 906. A school district is a public corporation (Rev. Codes, § 848), but with very limited powers. It may, through its board, exercise only such authority as is conferred by law, either expressly or by necessary implication. Jay v. School District, 24 Mont. 219, 61 Pac. 250. By section 949, Revised Codes, and section 904 as amended (Laws 1909, p. 33), a teacher may be paid for the time consumed in attending institute and for legal holidays which fall on school days, but this grant of authority to compensate for time not actually devoted to school work excludes the exercise of it in any other instance. However, if of two constructions one will render a contract valid and the other void, the former will be adopted if it can be done without violence to the ascertained intention of the parties. Section 5032, Rev. Codes. It is our judgment that the contract in question is fairly susceptible of a construction which will preserve its validity.

If it was the intention of the parties that the compensation fixed by the agreement should constitute the salary for plaintiff's services as a teacher for the term to be taught during the school year 1911–1912, and...