Finley v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 12 July 1924
• Docket Number: 6541.
• Citation: 300 F. 972
• Parties: FINLEY et al. v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

300 F. 972

FINLEY et al. v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.

No. 6541.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 12, 1924

Henry S. Drinker, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa. (James B. McDonough, of Ft. Smith, Ark., and Edwin A. Lucas, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

William A. Glasgow, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa. (G. L. Grant, of Ft Smith, Ark., and Henry Warrum, of Indianapolis, Ind., on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before SANBORN, LEWIS, and KENYON, Circuit Judges.

KENYON Circuit Judge.

This is the third appearance here of this case. The first time the correctness of the ruling of the United States District Court, Western District of Arkansas, in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint was challenged. Dowd v. United Mine Workers of America et al., 235 F. 1, 148 C.C.A. 495.

The second time the case was brought to this court it was upon writ of error to review the proceedings of the District Court resulting in a judgment against the present defendants in error. United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Coronado Coal Co. et al., 258 F. 829, 169 C.C.A. 549. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, outside of a question of interest.

The case then proceeded on its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was reversed and remanded to the District Court. United Mine Workers of America et al. v Coronado Coal Co. et al., 259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup.Ct. 570 66 L.Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762.

On the second trial of the case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas no new pleadings were filed. The issues were the same, and at the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict for the defendants in error, holding that the evidence did not show that the direct purpose of the alleged conspiracy was to interfere with or monopolize interstate commerce, that the interference with such commerce was incidental, and hence that plaintiffs in error could not recover under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. Sec. 8820 et seq.).

The Coronado Coal Company is now in the hands of a receiver Clyde H. Finley. Plaintiffs in error bring writ to this court and ask for a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.

I. The facts giving rise to this cause of action are set out fully in the previous decision of this court in 258 F. 829, 169 C.C.A. 549, and in United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Coronado Coal Co. et al., 259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762. They need not be repeated here. They relate to the alleged actions of defendants in error in destroying plaintiffs in error's property.

It is the well-established doctrine of the federal courts that questions of law determined on a writ of error or appeal are the law of the case both for the trial court and this court on a second writ of error or appeal, provided the facts remain substantially the same. Thatcher v. Gottlieb, 59 F. 872, 8 C.C.A. 334; Guarantee Company of North America v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, N.Y., 124 F. 170, 59 C.C.A. 376; National Surety Co. v. Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 182 F. 54, 104 C.C.A. 494; Town of Fletcher v. Hickman, 208 F. 118, 125 C.C.A. 346; Meyer & Chapman State Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Cody (C.C.A.) 291 F. 42.

The Supreme Court of the United States, passing on the former record, held as to the international union that the strike involved was a local one, declared by officers of district No. 21, which embraced Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas; that the circumstances were ample to supply a full local motive for the same; that the international board was not shown to have authorized the strike or participated therein; that the acts of President White of the international union, consisting of certain speeches, extracts from which are set forth in the Supreme Court opinion, did not amount to a ratification by the international board, saying:

'It would be going very far to consider such acts of the president alone a ratification by the international board creating liability for a past tort. The president had not authority to order or ratify a local strike. Only the board could do this.'

Again on this question the Supreme Court said:

'It is a mere question of actual agency, which the constitutions of the two bodies settle conclusively. If the international body had interfered, or if it had assumed liability by ratification, different questions would have arisen.'

It decided that a verdict should have been instructed by the trial court for the international union, the United Mine Workers of America, its president, and other officers.

As to district No. 21 and its liability, the holding in brief was that, to make a case against the district under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, it must be shown that the conspiracy to attack the Bache-Denman property and stop the nonunion employment there was with the intent to restrain interstate commerce and to monopolize the same, and to subject it to the control of the union; that the intent to injure, obstruct, or restrain interstate commerce must appear as an obvious consequence of what was to be done, or be shown by direct evidence or other circumstances. The court expressed itself on this subject as follows:

'And so, in the case at bar, coal mining is not interstate commerce, and obstruction of coal mining, though it may prevent coal from going into interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that commerce, unless the obstruction to mining is intended to restrain commerce in it, or has necessarily such a direct, material, and substantial effect to restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred.'

And it held that, while the evidence might be sufficient to show a common-law liability as to district No. 21 for the acts of its members, it did not show a direct intent to restrain interstate commerce, nor that a sufficient amount of coal production was affected, to supply the inference of an attempt to restrain such commerce, and concluded with the statement:

'The result of our consideration of the entire record is that there was no evidence submitted to the jury upon which they properly could find that the outrages, felonies, and murders of district 21 and its companions in crime were committed by them in a conspiracy to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce. The motion to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendants should have been granted.'

II. Is there such substantial change in the evidence in the present record as to make this a new case from the one decided by the Supreme Court? The trial court evidently concluded there was not. Plaintiffs in error urgently insist there is, and that the link missing in the former trial to make the local situation a step in an actionable conspiracy to restrain the freedom of interstate commerce, which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was intended to prevent, has been supplied.

We refer first to some of the matters in this record, not in the former one, claimed to create a different case from that passed on by the Supreme Court as to the responsibility of the international organization. It is urged that the present record shows the international organization to be a co-conspirator. While the same language may not appear in the former record bearing on this question, the same thing in effect was urged. The Supreme Court discussed whether or not the international organization was shown to have initiated, participated in or ratified the interference with plaintiffs in error's business, and held it was not. The broad proposition of the international organization co-operating with the alleged conspirators and as a part thereof was before the Supreme Court. Indeed, all the various theories of liability of the international organization were there considered. There are a few extracts from the proceedings of district No. 21 appearing in this record and not in the former one. Some of them relate to speeches of National Secretary-Treasurer Green, and National Vice President Hayes, but these extracts are not different from other speeches appearing in the record of members of the organization.

The claim is also made by plaintiffs in error that the present record shows the plan for destruction of plaintiffs in error's business and property was originated by National President White, and carried out pursuant to his express order, and the White speech at the special convention of district No. 21 held May 8, 1914, is referred to in extenso to sustain this claim. Extracts from this speech were before the Supreme Court when it considered the former case. It is claimed, however, that the testimony of the witness McNamara, who is a new witness, supplements this speech in a way to show active participation of White. The main new evidence in the present record is concededly the evidence of witness McNamara. A part of his testimony is as to a conversation at Ft. Smith with District President Stewart, some time after the speech of White, before referred to. McNamara testifies that Stewart told him 'that he had been up to Kansas City and had a talk with White, and that they had arranged a 'plan' up there to prevent Bache from producing coal. ' McNamara also testifies to a conversation with White in which he said:

'We must prevent that coal from getting into the market, because, if Bache coal, scab-dug coal, got into the market, it would only be a matter of time until every union operator in that country would have to close down his mine or scab it, because the union operators could not meet Bache competition.' Further in the same conversation White said:

'He didn't want the national organization mixed up in this case; * * * we have West Virginia and Colorado on our hands, and we cannot bear any more fights.'

The Supreme Court...