Finn v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation

• Decision Date: 30 September 1946
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5058.
• Citation: 68 F. Supp. 423
• Parties: FINN v. CARNEGIE-ILLINOIS STEEL CORPORATION (F. H. McGRAW & CO., Third-Party Defendant).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

68 F. Supp. 423

FINN v. CARNEGIE-ILLINOIS STEEL CORPORATION (F. H. McGRAW & CO., Third-Party Defendant).

Civil Action No. 5058.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

September 30, 1946.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James A. Wright, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, by Ira R. Hill, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant and third-party plaintiff.

John M. Reed, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for third-party defendant.

GOURLEY, District Judge.

In this case Raymond P. Finn filed an action to recover damages against the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, a corporation of New Jersey, as a result of injuries sustained while working for an independent contractor on the premises of the Defendant Company. The Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, the original defendant, by appropriate legal procedure, brought upon the record as a third party defendant the employer of Raymond P. Finn, which was the F. H. McGraw & Company, a corporation. At the completion of plaintiff's case, the Court dismissed the cause of action as far as the F. H. McGraw and Company is concerned, and the case was submitted to the jury as to the right of recovery of the plaintiff against the original defendant, Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation.

Several days were consumed in the trial of the case, and the charge to the jury was completed about 11:00 A.M., on May 15, 1946. The jury immediately retired to consider its verdict, and about 3:45 P.M., on the same day, the Court was notified by the bailiff that the jury had reached a verdict and was ready to return the same to the Court. Arrangements were then made by the Court, through the proper court officers, to receive the verdict, and in the courtroom were present the official court stenographer, deputy clerk of courts, the bailiff, the crier of the Court, the law clerk of the Court, and the members of the jury. The Court made inquiry of the deputy clerk of courts as to whether or not counsel had made any request to be present and the deputy clerk of courts advised the Court that he had no knowledge of such a request being made, and that it had been the practice in this Court for a long period of time for a verdict of a jury to be taken without counsel being present. The Court then made inquiry to the foreman of the jury if the jury had agreed upon a verdict and with the answer expressed in the affirmative, the Court requested the foreman to submit his verdict slip to the deputy clerk of courts. The verdict slip was in an envelope which was sealed; the Court opened the envelope, read the verdict, and, finding it proper as to form, requested the deputy clerk of courts to read the verdict to the jury, said verdict being as follows:

"And now, to wit: May 15th, 1946, we, the Jurors empaneled in the above-entitled case, find no evidence of negligence on the part of the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co. therefore render a verdict in favor of the defendant, Carnegie-Illinois Steel Company."

In addition to each of the members of the jury stating that the verdict read was as set forth on the verdict slip, as is the practice in this District Court, each of the members of the jury signed the verdict slip. Following the reading of the verdict of the jury in open court, the Court discharged the jury from further consideration of the case and instructed them to return the following morning for the purpose of considering any other matter of business of the Court for which they might be required. Since the Court ceased its official business at 4:00 P.M., after the jury was discharged no further responsibility existed on the part of any of the jurors to remain at or near the jury room and, as a result thereof, the jurors left for their respective homes or places of business.

Counsel representing the parties in said action were not present in Court at the time the verdict was received for the reason that they had gone to their respective offices and, no doubt, were involved in other matters of business which required their time or attention. No request was made to the Court by any of the counsel involved in the trial of said case to be called at the time the jury had reached a verdict. Furthermore no request was made to the Court of the desire of counsel to poll the jury at the time said verdict was received. Within ten minutes after the Court had returned to its chambers, counsel representing the plaintiff called the Court by telephone and stated that he had requested the crier of the Court and an employee in the office of the Clerk of Courts to call him before the verdict was returned to the Court, and that counsel for the plaintiff had made said request for the reason that in the event said verdict was adverse to his claim, he desired to poll the jury. As a result of the information communicated to the Court, the Court immediately called the office of the Clerk of Courts and directed the Clerk of Courts to have the jury return to their places in the jury box the following morning at the time that Court convened in order that an opportunity could be given the counsel for the plaintiff to poll said jury. In addition thereto, counsel for the plaintiff had called the office of the Clerk of Courts on one or two occasions during the time that the jury was deliberating, and had made inquiry as to whether or not the jury had reached a verdict, and restated his request that he desired to be present when the verdict was received and asked the employee in the office of the Clerk of Courts to call him.

When the Court convened on the morning of May 16, 1946, the first matter of business which the Court considered was the request of counsel for the plaintiff for leave to poll the jury. During the polling of the jury one of the members of the jury stated that although she had signed the verdict slip, it was done because the other members of the jury talked her out of it but she held out "as a lone wolf" for a long time and she thought that probably the men knew more about the cables than she did and that she may have been unduly stubborn. Said juror further stated that she had not been intimidated, coerced or subject to force in any way whatsoever, and that her signature to the verdict slip was her own free will and that if she had not signed the verdict slip, the jury would have been still involved in deliberation. Commenting further, the juror stated that it was her opinion, sound conviction and belief that the plaintiff did have a right of recovery, that the defendant was negligent, and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence; that she believed the defendant negligent for the reason that a proper amount of signals or signs to attract attention were not maintained by the defendant, but the juror signed the verdict slip for the reason that she felt that the men on the jury understood the machinery which contributed to the accident in a better way than the juror did, and that the juror did not understand that she had the right to withhold her verdict where the other eleven members of the jury had agreed contrary to the belief of said juror. It was further stated that no one had talked with her in connection with the case, that she was not related, either by marriage or blood, to the attorney representing the plaintiff, or to any of the witnesses called in behalf of the plaintiff.

In view of the statement of the juror and the rule of law being predominant in the mind of the Court "that a good and valid verdict is not dependent on what the jury agrees to in the jury room but what the juror agrees to when the jury returns to the court to give a verdict," on motion being made by counsel for the plaintiff to direct a mistrial or disagreement, the Court orally informed counsel involved in the proceeding that the Court would consider the motion to declare a mistrial on May 22, 1946. At the time of said hearing, the Court directed a mistrial and after reconsideration thereof, on the 23rd day of May, 1946, the Court revoked the oral Order of Court which directed a mistrial on May 22, 1946, and ordered a re-argument on the question involved to be held on May 31, 1946. It must be remembered that the Court was greatly burdened with the trial of other civil actions during this period of time, and every possible effort was extended by the Court to have the matter fully and completely heard at the earliest possible date. Counsel representing the plaintiff excepted to the Order of Court made on May 23, 1946, which revoked the previous order of May 22, 1946, directing a mistrial. This action was taken by the Court for the reason that under the provisions of Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, the Court is empowered on its own initiative within ten days after the entry of judgment to direct a new trial for any reason, and the question presented in this case was so involved that the Court believed a duty existed to extend counsel involved an opportunity to present briefs in support of their respective contentions, and the Court desired an opportunity, as soon as time could be made available after the completion of the civil trial list, to individually make an exhaustive research of the law.

The matter was, therefore, argued in detail by counsel representing the plaintiff, original defendant, and third-party defendant. Briefs have been filed by the respective parties, careful consideration has been given thereto by the Court, and, in addition, the Court has separately made a complete, thorough and exhaustive research of all the law which it is humanly possible to find which will shed any light, one way or the other, on the problem which exists.

The question for consideration of the Court is: May the Court direct a mistrial or award a new trial to the plaintiff in a proceeding where counsel for the plaintiff voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom during the deliberation of the jury, and before the discharge of the jury from its consideration of ...