Finn v. Porter's Pharmacy

• Decision Date: 31 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-661
• Parties: DIANE E. FINN, Plaintiff, v. PORTER'S PHARMACY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DIANE E. FINN, Plaintiff, v. PORTER'S PHARMACY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-661

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 31, 2015

Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 2

OPINION AND ORDER

KELLY, Chief Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Diane E. Finn ("Plaintiff") has brought this civil action against Defendant Porter's Pharmacy ("Defendant") alleging that she was discriminated against because of her gender when Defendant terminated her employment in March of 2014.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement submitted by on behalf of Defendant. ECF No. 2. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, and the Motion for a More Definite Statement will be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a Pharmacy Technician on February 28, 2014, and placed on a 90-day probationary period. ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 9, 11. Plaintiff worked approximately 30 hours per week from February 28, 2014, until March 21, 2014, at which time she went on a pre-paid and pre-approved family vacation. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 19. Plaintiff alleges that she and Defendant agreed that she would begin a permanent schedule upon her return from vacation and that, based upon Defendant's promise in this regard, she quit a part-time job she had with a different employer. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 21, 22. Plaintiff apparently returned from vacation on March 28, 2014, and was scheduled to work on March 31, 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 23,24. On March 30, 2014, however, Defendant telephoned Plaintiff and terminated her employment purportedly "due to '[Plaintiff's] schedule and hours.'" Id. at ¶ 24.

Plaintiff alleges that, although she was unable to perform many of the tasks she was hired to complete because Defendant refused to train her, her performance as a probationary employee was good and that she was qualified to be a Pharmacy Technician. Id. at ¶¶ 16-18, 27. Plaintiff also alleges that after her employment was terminated the position was filled by a male. Id. at ¶ 28.

Plaintiff filed the instant two-count Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on April 29, 2015, and on May 20, 2015, Defendant removed the case to this Court. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brings a claim for sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") at Count I, and a claim for sex discrimination pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") at Count II. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement and an accompanying Brief on May 28, 2015. ECF Nos. 2, 3. Plaintiff filed a Response and accompanying Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement on June 1, 2015. ECF Nos. 6, 7. Plaintiff also filed a supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement on June 14, 2015, in which she concedes that she is not entitled to punitive damages for her claims brought pursuant to the PHRA. ECF No. 9. As such, Defendant's Motions are ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable tothe plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice but, rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Title VII and PHRA Claims¹

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Title VII and PHRA claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimination andbecause Defendant could nevertheless terminate Plaintiff's employment at any time and for no reason because she was an at-will employee.

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she is qualified for the position; (3) that she was subject to an adverse employment action such as being fired from that position; (4) under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when the position is filled by a person not of the protected class.² Glenn v. Raymour & Flanigan, 832 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (E.D. Pa. 2011), quoting Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). "As an alternative to the fourth prong, a plaintiff may show 'that similarly situated individuals outside the plaintiff's class were treated more favorably . . . .'" Id., quoting Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 273-74 (3d Cir. 2010). "By establishing a prima facie case the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination." Rocco v. Am. Longwall Corp., 965 F. Supp. 709, 713 (W.D. Pa. 1997), citing Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See Doe v. C.A.R.S Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 2008), quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) ("[t]he prima faciephase of discrimination litigation 'merely serves to raise a rebuttable presumption of discrimination . . .'").³

Here, Plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint that she is female and thus is a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for the position as a Pharmacy Technician; that she was fired from that position; and was replaced by a man. ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 1, 24, 26-28. Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination.

Defendant acknowledges that establishing the fourth prong of the prima facie case is an easy burden and may be satisfied by showing that Plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class, but nevertheless argues that the disparate treatment of a single member of the non-protected class is insufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination and that Plaintiff's failure to discuss the comparator's qualifications, as compared to Plaintiff's qualifications, is particularly fatal to her claims. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002-04 (1988), quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("[t]he plaintiff's initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is 'not onerous'"). Defendant's argument is misplaced.

To support its theory that a single comparator is insufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination, Defendant relies on Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999) (Pivirotto"). The issue in Pivirotto, however, was whether the plaintiff, who was notimmediately replaced by anyone -- male or female -- after she was terminated, was required to prove she was replaced by a male in order to meet her prima facie burden as the district court had instructed the jury she must. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the plaintiff was not required to show she was replaced by a male but could demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination through other evidence as long as it was adequate to create an inference that the employment decision was based on illegal criteria. Id. at 355. Privirotto attempted to satisfy that burden by pointing to a single male employee who was inexperienced and had difficulty taking instruction and/or fulfilling the requirements of his position but had no disciplinary action taken against him. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that this evidence satisfied her burden noting that the male employee had very different responsibilities than the plaintiff and that "evidence of a differential treatment of 'a single member of the non-protected class is insufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination.'" Id., quoting Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998).

In this case, however, unlike in Pivirotto, Plaintiff was replaced by a man, which by itself creates an inference of discrimination and satisfies the fourth prong of the prima facie case. Plaintiff therefore need not allege additional facts or compare herself to anyone else in order to meet her burden as did the plaintiff in Pivirotto.⁴ See Glenn v. Raymour...