Finn v. United States
Decision Date | 31 October 1887 |
Citation | 123 U.S. 227,31 L.Ed. 128,8 S.Ct. 82 |
Parties | FINN v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The plaintiff seeks judgment in this case against the United States for the sum of $15,678 as the value of certain horses and mules which he claims to have purchased for, and delivered to, the United States, at their special instance and request, on or about October 14, 1863. He also asks interest from that date on said sum at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, until his demand is paid. The claim was never presented to any executive department of the government until July 3, 1874, on which day it was filed in the office of the quartermaster general. That officer decided adversely to it, and transmitted it to the accounting officers of the treasury. It was disallowed by the third auditor of the treasury, June 14, 1879, and in that ruling the second comptroller concurred. But on the twentieth of July, 1886, the second comptroller ordered the case to be opened for newly-discovered evidence produced by the claimant; and, on the thirteenth of August, 1886, the claim, with all the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, was transmitted by the secretary of the treasury to the court of claims, under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes. The petition in the present suit was filed in that court on the thirteenth of October, 1886; and, after a hearing upon the merits, it was dismissed.
The government contends here that the judgment should be affirmed, because it appears that the claim was not put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, within six years after it first accrued, nor presented at the proper department within six years after suit could have been commenced thereon in the court of claims.
The act of February 24, 1855, establishing the court of claims, invested it with authority to 'hear and determine all claims founded upon any law of congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, which may be suggested to it by a petition filed therein; and also all claims which may be referred to said court by either house of congress.' 10 St. 612, § 1. This act did not authorize judgment to be entered against the United States, nor fix a period within which parties must assert their claims against the government. The court was, however, required to report to con- gress the cases upon which it acted, stating the material facts established by the evidence, with its opinion thereon, Section 7. But the act of March 3, 1863, (12 St. 765,) enlarged the jurisdiction of the court, and, among other things, provided for an appeal from its final judgment, in certain cases, to this court, and 'that in all cases of final judgments by said court, or on appeal by the said supreme court, where the same shall be affirmed in favor of the claimant, the sum due thereby shall be paid out of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims, on presentation to the secretary of the treasury of a copy of said judgment,' etc. The tenth section of that act is in these words: Rev. St. § 1069.
By an act of congress, approved June 25, 1868, (15 St. 76,) it was made lawful ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Nager Electric Company, Inc. v. United States
......See, e. g., Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125, 2 S.Ct. 277, 27 L.Ed. 437 (1882) (plaintiff unable to sue by reason of aid he gave to the Confederate side); Finn v. United States, 123 368 F.2d 858 U.S. 227, 232-233, 8 S.Ct. 82, 31 L.Ed. 128 (1887) (court must notice limitations even though not pleaded as a defense); United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 602, 17 S.Ct. 701, 41 L.Ed. 1130 (1897) (Tucker Act did not repeal statutory tolling provisions); ......
-
Kerby v. Mortgage Funding Corp., CIV.A. CCB-97-1509.
...32 L.Ed. 1029 (1889); United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48, 52, 19 S.Ct. 86, 88, 43 L.Ed. 360 (1898); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 229, 8 S.Ct. 82, 83-84, 31 L.Ed. 128 (1887). In the only case among these that the court undertook to analyze, Finn, it explained that there the Supre......
-
Allison v. United States
...U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra; Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 58 S.Ct. 421, 82 L.Ed. 633 (1938); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 88 S.Ct. 82, 31 L.Ed. 128 (1887); and Jones v. Tower Production Co., 120 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1941). Only Congress has the power to waive soverei......
-
Chambers v. United States
...such suit on the court. See also, Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 58 S.Ct. 421, 82 L.Ed. 633 (1938); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 233, 8 S.Ct. 82, 31 L.Ed. 128 (1887); and Jones v. Tower Production Co., 120 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1941). We must conclude, therefore, that E.O. ......
-
Under John R. Sand & Gravel Co., May Lower Courts Apply Their Own Precedent in Determining Whether a Statute Waiving Sovereign Immunity Is Jurisdictional?
...claim asserted against the United States and thus invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims once again. Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887). 32. Id. at 232-33. 33. For non-government defendants, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that will be waived if not rai......
-
Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent
...F.3d at 1352. 258. Id. at 1346, 1352, 1353. 259. Id. at 1354-55. 260. Id. at 1355 (citing among other decisions, Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 233 (1887)) (explaining that predecessor statutory time limit cannot be waived). 261. Id. The dissent contends that the statutory deadline is......