Finnegan v. State

Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 24S-MI-68
Decision Date05 September 2024
Citation240 N.E.3d 1265
PartiesRussell G. FINNEGAN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellees (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Appeal from the Pulaski Circuit Court, No. 66C01-2110-MC-168, The Honorable David Chidester, Special Judge

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT RUSSELL FINNEGAN: Kay A. Beehler, Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES STATE OF INDIANA: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 23A-MI-442

Massa, Justice.

A judge held Russell Finnegan in indirect contempt for sending vulgar communications to the court. During the proceedings, Finnegan’s counsel requested a mental-health evaluation pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-36-2-2(b), which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals found the denial to be error and reversed. While a court can certainly consider a defendant’s mental health, and even order an evaluation when weighing a contempt decision, we hold that the statutory procedures for asserting the insanity defense in criminal proceedings do not apply in an indirect criminal contempt action because it is not a "criminal case" as the relevant statute uses that phrase.

Facts and Procedural History

In August 2021, Special Judge John Potter held Russell Finnegan in contempt of court for sending potentially "contumacious" material to Judge Kim Hall. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 12–15. Following the contempt finding, Finnegan mailed to Judge Potter a copy of the contempt order with the words "F*** U HARRY POTTER" and "VOID" written across the pages. Id. at 15–17. Finnegan then sent the judge two letters. In his first letter, Finnegan wrote, "You can shove this back in your c*** craver, whatever orifice that may be of yours or all of them. You sir are a f****** pervert and a very stupid man." Id. at 18. In his second letter, Finnegan opened with, "Jonny, I want my liver back!" and closed with, "Ketch you on the flip, peace out c*********!" Id. at 20. After receiving these letters, Judge Potter issued a "Rule to Show Cause for Indirect Criminal Contempt" alleging Finnegan’s correspondence "show[ed] the continuing contumacious behavior" and "his blatant and continuing disrespect and flagrant disregard for the Court’s authority, the Judge, and Attorneys who are officers of this Court." Id. at 12–13.

[1] During the contempt hearing, Finnegan’s counsel informed the trial court that Finnegan was undergoing mental health evaluations in an unrelated criminal case. Following that hearing, Finnegan filed a notice of intent to raise an insanity defense under Indiana Code section 35-36-2-1 and requested the appointment of psychiatrists or psychologists to evaluate him and testify at the contempt hearing. Finnegan’s counsel also moved for a continuance for mental-health evaluations. The trial court denied Finnegan’s continuance motion but took no action on his request to appoint experts for an evaluation.1 Following the final contempt hearing, the trial court found Finnegan in contempt under Indiana Code section 34-47-3-1 and ordered him to serve 170 days in jail.

Finnegan appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to appoint experts to conduct mental health evaluations. Finnegan v. State, 221 N.E.3d 1232, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The Court of Appeals determined a criminal contempt proceeding was a "trial of a criminal case" subject to Indiana Code section 35-36-2-2, and therefore Finnegan was "entitled to the same statutory protections afforded other criminal defendants, including the right to file a notice of insanity defense and obtain the appointment of appropriate experts to testify at the contempt proceedings." Id.

The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, 230 N.E.3d 892 (Ind. 2024), thus vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. App. R. 58(A).

Standard of Review

[2, 3] The trial court has the inherent power to "punish unseemly behavior" and hold a party in contempt. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (cleaned up). We review the trial court’s judgment for an abuse of discretion and will reverse a contempt finding "only if there is no evidence or inference" to support the finding. Id. (quotations omitted).

[4–8] Whether a finding of indirect contempt entitles the same statutory safeguards afforded criminal defendants under the Indiana Code is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to "determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Id. at 1196. We start with the statute’s text and afford "its words their plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole." Id. at 1195. We are mindful of what a statute says and does not say. Id. (quotations omitted). "[W]e do not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result." Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015) (quoting City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Regu’l. Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2005)).

Discussion and Decision

[9, 10] "[C]ontempt of court involves disobedience" that "undermines the court’s authority, justice, and dignity." City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005). Contempt is neither a criminal offense nor a civil offense. State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1990). It is instead a sui generis proceeding making it a unique proceeding that is divided into two categories: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Id. at 33–34.

[11–13] Direct contempt involves acts that "are committed in the presence of the court or in such close proximity to it so as to disrupt its proceedings while in session." Id. at 34 (citing 6 Ind. Law Encyc. Contempt § 2 (1958)). When actions occur near or within the presence of a court, the court has the authority to summarily find a person in direct contempt of court and sanction that individual for their conduct without holding a hearing. In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95 (Ind. 1994). "[T]his power is to enable the court to protect itself against ‘gross violations of decency and decorum.’ " Id. (quoting Brown v. Brown, 4 Ind. 627, 627 (1853)).

[14, 15] Indirect contempt involves acts that are "committed outside the presence of the court ‘which nevertheless tend[ ] to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.’ " Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d at 34 (quoting 6 Ind. Law Encyc. Contempt § 2). These acts often "undermine the activities of the court but fail to satisfy one of the other direct contempt requirements." Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 95 (quoting Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ind. 1994)). Unlike direct proceedings, indirect contempt proceedings involve statutory procedures to afford due process protections. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 832–33.2

[16–18] The trial court found Finnegan in indirect contempt of court because of his vulgar letters, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding alleged indirect contempt defendants are "entitled to the same statutory protections afforded other criminal defendants." Finnegan, 221 N.E.3d at 1238. The State argues Finnegan cannot assert an insanity defense because the criminal procedural statutes do not apply in indirect contempt proceedings. We affirm the trial court on the narrow ground that the insanity defense statutes, as codified in Indiana Code chapter 35-36-2, et seq., do not apply to indirect contempt proceedings.3 While an alleged contemnor is always free to argue his mental state to excuse, explain, or mitigate his contemptuous behavior, the statutes simply do not compel a judge to treat him precisely like a criminal defendant.4

[19] Looking to the statutory text, the insanity defense statutes use the phrase "criminal case" to describe a defendant or trial, demonstrating the General Assembly’s intent to limit the affirmative defense to criminal cases. See I.C. § 35-36-2-1 (informing a "defendant in a criminal case" on the timeliness of inserting an insanity defense); id. § -2(a) (stating a defendant can provide evidence when asserting an insanity defense "[a]t the trial of a criminal case"). Yet the phrase "criminal case" does not appear in the indirect contempt procedure statutes. ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1195 ("[W]e are mindful of both what [a statute] does say and what it does not say." (quotations omitted)). Instead, the statutes tie the defense to "the offense charged in the indictment or information." I.C. § 35-36-2-2(a) (emphasis added). And the Legislature has determined that indirect contempt is neither a "crime" nor a "criminal offense" as defined by the Code. See id. § 35-31.5-2-75 (" ‘[C]rime’ means a felony or a misdemeanor"); see also Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d at 33 (stating that contempt is not a criminal offense); Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind. 688, 51 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1943) ("Contempt of court is not a crime."), overruled on other grounds by Ashton v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210 (1972)). The Statute defines "offense" as a "crime," I.C. § 35-31.5-2-215, and "crime" is defined as "a felony or a misdemeanor," id. § -75(a). Because indirect contempt is neither, it is not an "offense" for which the statutory insanity defense applies. Additionally, in the indirect contempt statutes, the General Assembly calls an individual a singular "person," id. §§ 34-47-3-1, -2, -3, "the defendant," id. § -6, or "the person charged with indirect contempt," id. § -5. These linguistic statutory differences reveal the General Assembly’s intent to limit the procedural protections of the insanity defense to criminal cases.

[20] The General Assembly also distinguished the procedures governing indirect contempt by placing it under Title 34, which governs civil...

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