Finney v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 07 September 1949 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3501. |
| Citation | 189 Va. 878 |
| Parties | CLAUDE F. FINNEY, ET AL. v. HARLEY A. HAWKINS. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Present, Hudgins, C.J., and Gregory, Eggleston, Spratley, Buchanan and Miller, JJ.
(1) Master and Servant — "Right to Work Statute" — Held Constitutional.
(2) Master and Servant — "Right to Work Statute" — Conforms to Section 1 of Virginia Constitution and Is in Aid of it.
(3) Constitutional Law — Powers of Legislature — Plenary Unless Restrained.
(4) Master and Servant — Right of State to Prohibit Contracts Forbidding Nonunion Labor Not Interfered with by Federal Legislation.
(5) Master and Servant — "Right to Work Statute" — Evils Corrected by Statute Could Not Be Corrected by Union Regulation.
(6) Master and Servant — "Right to Work Statute" — Not Excessive or Arbitrary Legislation.
1. Plaintiff was dismissed from his employment by defendant employer, who had entered into a contract requiring that he employ only union labor, because plaintiff did not belong to a labor union. The only defense to his action for damages pursuant to the "Right to Work Statute" (sections 1887(113)-1887(119) of the 1948 Supplement to the Code of 1942 (Michie)), was that the statute, which provides that neither membership nor nonmembership in a labor union shall be made a condition of employment and that contracts limiting employment to union members is against public policy, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and sections 1, 11 and 12 of the Virginia Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of assembly and speech, freedom of contract, equal protection of the law and due process of law. But the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected as invalid the contention that laws having the purpose and effect of this statute infringe any provision of the Federal Constitution, and for the same reasons the statute does not offend the Virginia Constitution, since the challenged provisions of the two Constitutions are similar.
2. The "Right to Work Statute" (sections 1887(113)-1887(119) of the 1948 Supplement to the Code of 1942 (Michie)) does not in any manner violate section 1 of the Virginia Constitution, which asserts the inherent right of all men to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire property and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, but is in keeping with and in aid of both the letter and spirit of it, preserving the liberty of men to work and earn their living without having that inherent right limited or destroyed by the condition of belonging or not belonging to some particular labor organization.
3. The power of the General Assembly to enact statutes is limited only by the provisions of the Federal Constitution and the restraints imposed by theConstitution of Virginia. Within constitutional limitations the legislature may, in the exercise of the police power, restrict personal and property rights in the interest of public health, public safety, public morals, and for the promotion of the general welfare, and that power extends to so dealing with conditions which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience and general prosperity.
4. Congress did not intend through its labor management relations legislation to interfere with the right oif States to prohibit agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.
5. Under the facts of headnote 1, defendants urged that correction of any supposed evils in employer-employee relations should be accomplished by union regulation, but very clearly there wa reasonable basis for the legislative view that the conditions sought to be remedied by the statute could not be adequately remedied by mere regulatory provisions. There was evidence to be found in the acts of many States and of Congress to support the view that discrimination against employees because they did or did not belong to a union was against the public interest and should not be allowed. Laws merely regulating the union obviously would not accomplish that purpose.
6. Under the facts of headnote 1, defendants urged that total prohibition of the type of contract forbidden by the statute was an excessive and arbitrary exercise of the State's police power, but agreements involving such discrimination are hostile to the free enterprise system and to individual liberty of choice and action, and legislation that protects the citizen in his freedom to disagree and to decline an association which a majority would thrust upon him on the ground that it knows what is best for him does no violence to the spirit of our fundamental law.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City county. Hon. Frank A. Kearney, judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
Beecher E. Stallard, J. Albert Woll, Herbert S. Thatcher and James A. Glenn, for the plaintiffs in error.
F. Lee Ford, for the defendant in error.
This writ of error challenges the constitutional validity of chapter 2, Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1947, page 12,1 commonly called the "Right to Work Statute," which became effective April 30, 1947. It provides in substance that neither membership nor non-membership in a labor union shall be made a condition of employment; that a contract limiting employment to union members is against public policy; and that a person denied employment because he is either a member of a union or not a member of a union shall have a right of action for damages.
Section 8. (Severability clause).
This action was brought pursuant to the provisions of this statute. The facts are not in dispute. Hawkins had been employed as a pressman in Brickey Print Shop, a partnership, in January, 1947. On July 31, 1947, after the effective date of the act, the partnership entered into a contract tract with Newport News Building and Construction Trades Council to print and publish a labor journal. One of the provisions of the contract was that the partnership would employ only union labor in its shop. In September, 1947, Finney, one of the partners, inquired of Hawkins whether he was a member of a labor union. Hawkins replied that he was not, whereupon Finney told him he would have to join a union because his printing contract required employment of union labor only. Hawkins refused to do so, stating that he had never belonged to a union and did not think it was necessary. For this refusal he was discharged and refused further employment until he joined a union. It is admitted that he was skillful in his trade and that his work was very satisfactory. Finney told him that he needed him but would not allow him to work unless he joined a union. He did join later and was given back his job. Afterwards he went to work for another employer and then brought this action in which he has recovered a judgment against the partnership and the Trades Council for $330 for damages sustained by reason of being out of employment for a period of about four weeks.
The defense made to the action in the trial court was, and the reason assigned for reversal of the judgment here is, that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, as well as sections 1, 11 and 12 of the Virginia Constitution, guaranteeing to the defendants and others freedom of assembly and speech, freedom of contract, equal protection of the law and due process of law.
Since this writ of error was granted, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected as invalid the contention that laws having the purpose and effect of this statute infringe any provision of the Federal Constitution, admittedly settling that question in this case. Lincoln Federal Labor Union Northwestern Iron, etc., Co. and Whitaker North Carolina, (1 opinion), 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.ed. 201; American Federation of Labor American Sash, etc., Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.ed. 209.
In the first-named case, as the court stated, a North Carolina statute and a Nebraska constitutional amendment provided that no person in those States should be denied an opportunity to obtain or retain employment because he is or is not a member of a labor organization, and forbade employers ployers to enter into contracts excluding persons from employment on either of those grounds. The North Carolina statute attacked in the Whitaker Case, supra, is practically identical with the Virginia statute. See State Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.(2d) 860.
In rejecting the claim that the North Carolina statute and the Nebraska constitutional amendment violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court said:
* * *" 69 S.Ct. at p. 254.
In sustaining the said statute and constitutional amendment against the charge that they violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court pointed out that these laws in fact command equal employment opportunities for both union and non-union workers, and that it was precisely for that reason that the appellants argued that their constitutional rights of assembly and due process had been infringed, because they claimed the Federal Constitution guarantees greater...
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