Finney v. Mabry, PB-69-C-24.
| Citation | 534 F. Supp. 1026 |
| Decision Date | 19 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. PB-69-C-24.,PB-69-C-24. |
| Parties | Robert FINNEY, et al., Petitioners, v. James MABRY, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Philip E. Kaplan, Jack Holt, Jr., Phillip McMath, Little Rock, Ark., for petitioners.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., A. Carter Hardage, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ark., Little Rock, Ark., for respondents.
This case, which was originally filed in April 1969, is a class action on behalf of all inmates confined in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The plaintiff class challenges the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement at the various institutions administered by the Arkansas Department of Correction. During the long history of the case numerous hearings have been held, and the Court has entered many orders determining the rights of the parties. In addition, the parties entered a Consent Decree in October 1978, which was made an order of this Court, setting forth certain minimum requirements that the respondents agreed to meet in the administration of the Arkansas Department of Correction. The Consent Decree set up a mechanism to monitor the degree of compliance by the respondents with the terms of the Decree, and allowed either party to petition the Court for dismissal of the case upon compliance with the terms of the Decree or upon the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the Decree, whichever occurred first. The Arkansas Department of Correction operated under the Consent Decree until March 1981, when it became apparent that the cooperation of the parties, necessary for continued progress within the framework of the Decree, was no longer forthcoming. Upon the request of the plaintiff class, a hearing was scheduled for August 1981 to determine the extent of compliance by the Arkansas Department of Correction with the Constitution, the Consent Decree, and other prior orders of the Court in this case.
The plaintiff filed an amended petition setting forth approximately forty particular practices or conditions of the Arkansas Department of Correction which it alleged to be unlawful. The respondents denied that any conditions or practices of the Arkansas Department of Correction were unlawful, and requested that the case be dismissed. In addition, the respondents submitted at trial a list identifying approximately fifty additional issues which they contended were raised by the Consent Decree or prior orders of the Court, and therefore were in dispute at the hearing, although not included in the plaintiffs' petition. The plaintiffs agreed that the issues listed should be considered in dispute, so that the record could be made complete on the extent of compliance of the respondents. There were therefore pending approximately ninety matters upon which a determination was to be made concerning the extent of compliance of the Arkansas Department of Correction with the Constitution, the Consent Decree, and prior orders of the Court.
As would be expected, the degree of compliance demonstrated by respondents differed for the various issues in dispute. For many of the identified issues, the Court found that the respondents were in compliance, and in many cases had been in compliance for some time. In other areas, the Arkansas Department of Correction had changed practices or policies shortly before or during the trial, or had adopted plans to do so, and the Court found that, with the implementation of those changes, the respondents would be in compliance. There were a few matters which were identified by the Court as still-existing problems in the Arkansas Department of Correction, and the respondents were held, with respect thereto, not to be in compliance with either the Constitution, prior orders of the Court, or the Consent Decree.
The conclusions of the Court concerning the degree of compliance of the respondents on the various identified issues, and the factual findings in support thereof, were stated on the record during the course of the trial and during the oral arguments following the trial on September 28, 1981, and October 5, 1981. The purpose of this Memorandum and Order is to summarize and supplement some of the findings and conclusions of the Court previously made from the bench during the trial, at the end of the trial, and during oral argument. The findings and conclusions so made from the bench are hereby ratified and readopted. If, however, there are any conflicts or inconsistencies between those findings and conclusions and the ones stated in this written Memorandum, the latter shall supersede and control.
Although this case was originally filed on behalf of all inmates of the Arkansas Department of Correction, housed in all institutions of the Department, it has become apparent that the problems remaining involve primarily the Cummins Unit and, to a lesser extent, the Tucker Unit. The remaining institutions operated by the Department are essentially in compliance with respect to their "local" conditions of incarceration. The evidence presented at trial centered upon conditions at the Cummins Unit and the Tucker Unit, as did the arguments of counsel after the trial. The attorney for the plaintiff class conceded in a letter to the Court dated October 13, 1981, that "since the entry of the Consent Decree in this matter on October 15, 1978, the Department has achieved constitutional status at some of its institutions," but he did not specify any certain institutions. There is no question but that the conditions at the Women's Unit, which has been highly acclaimed by experts in the field, are sufficient to meet all the requirements of the Constitution and the prior orders of this Court. The Court also finds that the conditions at the Benton, Wrightsville, and the Diagnostic Units, and all of the separate work release units satisfy such requirements. It is therefore the opinion of the Court that these institutions will not require continuing supervision. Furthermore, the Cummins and Tucker Units will need only limited court controlled supervision during the "windup" period discussed below.
It should be noted that the Court is finding only that the conditions specific to the named institutions are being approved. As will be discussed in this opinion, there are several matters which apply to the entire Department, such as the provision of medical and mental health care, the grievance procedure and the affirmative action program, as to which a finding of total compliance cannot be made at this time. As to those services which are provided to all inmates of the Department on a systemwide basis, rather than on an institution by institution basis, the "release" of the specified institutions has no effect. The Department remains, of course, under an obligation to provide those services in a suitable manner to all inmates in all units, not just to those inmates at the Cummins and Tucker Units. As to all matters that are provided on a "local" rather than a "system-wide" basis, all units except Cummins and Tucker are in compliance.
It should also be noted that the release of these institutions does not mean that the Arkansas Department of Correction will necessarily be free of all future scrutiny concerning the conditions at them. The attorney for the plaintiff class opposed the release of any particular institutions or the dismissal of the suit as to any specific issues until the entire case was dismissed, apparently because of his concern that unless the entire department and all issues remained under the direct or indirect supervision of the Court until the Department is in compliance on all particulars, that the Department would "backslide" in those areas released from control in order to more easily bring those areas still under direct scrutiny into compliance. Although such a possibility does exist, the Court concludes that all deference should be given to the intentions of the respondents not to allow such "backsliding" to occur. The respondents are aware of their responsibilities to maintain the entire Department in a constitutional manner and have, indeed, made exceptional progress toward that goal. It is very doubtful that the success that they have worked so hard to achieve over the years would be forfeited easily through neglect or a lack of perseverance. Furthermore, the ruling of the Court is only that the institutions in question are in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution and the prior orders of the Court at this particular time. This decision would not preclude the inmates from raising the issue again in the future if conditions fall below the constitutional minimums. At some point, hopefully soon, jurisdiction over the Department must be relinquished completely by this Court and the respondents must be trusted with the responsibility to maintain conditions at the level that allowed dismissal of the case, without continual monitoring by the Court or a Court-approved third person. To relinquish active oversight in stages, and thereby to transfer greater responsibility back to the respondents in a somewhat gradual way, will increase the independence of the Department and will make this litigation more manageable for all concerned.
The remainder of this opinion will therefore deal with and resolve the disputes between the parties concerning the degree of compliance by the respondents within the requirements of the Constitution, the Consent Decree, and the prior orders of the Court in the various substantive areas, or issues, identified.
With respect to the largest group of issues identified, the Arkansas Department of Correction is in compliance, and had been in compliance for some time before the hearing. For many of these issues, which include such matters as the adequacy of and access to the law library, mail regulations and the opening of legal mail, and provision for religious...
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