Finney v. Machiz

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSON; BIRDSONG, P.J., and SMITH
• Citation: Finney v. Machiz, 463 S.E.2d 60, 218 Ga.App. 771 (Ga. App. 1995)
• Decision Date: 20 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. A95A1688,A95A1688
• Parties: FINNEY v. MACHIZ.

Page 60

463 S.E.2d 60

218 Ga.App. 771

FINNEY v. MACHIZ.

No. A95A1688.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 20, 1995.

Alembik, Fine & Callner, Lowell S. Fine, and Kevin S. Green, Atlanta, for appellant.

Gaines C. Granade, Atlanta, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Angel Lantigua was driving his car southbound on Ashford Dunwoody Road in Atlanta when it swerved over the road's centerline and smashed into Leslie Finney's northbound van. Jody Machiz, a passenger in the van, sued Finney. Machiz alleges in her lawsuit that she was injured in the collision and that her injuries were caused by Finney's negligence in driving the van while under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. Finney moved for summary judgment on the ground that her alleged negligence did not proximately cause any of Machiz's injuries. The trial court denied the motion but granted Finney's request for a certificate of immediate appellate review of the denial. We granted Finney's application for interlocutory review.

Finney correctly asserts that she is entitled to summary judgment on the negligence action. "In order to state a cause of action for negligence it is necessary to establish the essential elements of duty, breach of that duty, and proximate cause which amounts to a legally sufficient causal connection between the conduct alleged and the resulting injury. [Cit.] A defendant who pierces the plaintiff's pleadings by showing that under any theory one essential element is lacking is entitled to summary judgment despite any remaining issues of fact with respect to other essential elements. [Cit.]" Black v. Ga. Southern, etc., R. Co., 202 Ga.App. 805, 806(1), 415 S.E.2d 705 (1992). Here, even assuming that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Finney breached a duty she owed to Machiz by driving under the influence of alcohol and cocaine, Finney is still entitled to summary judgment because she presented uncontradicted evidence that her alleged negligent conduct did not proximately cause the collision.

"It is well settled that there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent, intervening, act of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant's act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury. If an injury would have occurred notwithstanding alleged acts of negligence of the defendant, there could be no recovery, in an action for negligence. Where the evidence plainly and manifestly shows that the injury was caused by the intervening efficient act of a third person, the defendant can not be held responsible for having produced the injury, and the question is then one of law for determination by the court, and not one of fact for the jury." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 192 Ga.App. 806, 807, 386 S.E.2d 386 (1989). The evidence in the instant case plainly and manifestly shows that the collision was caused by the independent, intervening, unforeseeable act of Lantigua's car crossing the road's centerline and hitting Finney's van, not by Finney's driving while intoxicated.

Finney, the police detective who investigated the accident, and the sole eyewitness to the collision all gave deposition testimony establishing that it was dark and raining at the time of the...