Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co.

Decision Date04 November 1943
Citation130 Conn. 381,34 A.2d 636
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesFINOIA v. WINCHESTER REPEATING ARMS CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; Quinlan, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Theresa E. Finoia, claimant, opposed by Winchester Repeating Arms Company, employer. The employer's appeal from a finding and award of the compensation commissioner in favor of claimant brought to the superior court was reserved by the court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Question answered in accordance with opinion.

Alexander Winnick, of New Haven, for plaintiff.

Harrison D. Schofield, of Hartford, for defendant.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

DICKENSON, Judge.

The plaintiff, a young married woman twenty-two years of age, sustained an injury while in the employ of the defendant which resulted in a scar six inches long running from a point three and one-half inches above the wrist to a point one and one-half inches below the elbow. The compensation commissioner found that the scar constituted a serious and permanent disfigurement and held that it was compensable as a disfigurement of a hand within the meaning of ‘hands' as used in General Statutes, Cum.Sup.1939, § 1328e. The defendant appealed from the award to the Superior Court which reserved the question for this court. The sole question before us is whether the word ‘hands' is to be given its common definition or a broader meaning suggested by its use in another portion of the statute.

Anatomically the hand includes the wrist, although in popular usage the wrist is often excluded. The forearm is defined to be that part of the forelimb between the elbow and the wrist. Webster's New International Dictionary; Ford Motor Co. v. Farmer, 146 Okl. 9, 10, 293 P. 191. Section 1328e, a substitute for General Statutes, § 5237, with an amendment added providing for compensation for disfigurement, contains the following provisions: ‘With respect to the following-described injuries the compensation, in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation, shall be half of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more than twenty-five dollars or less than seven dollars weekly: (a) For the loss of one arm at or above the elbow, or the complete and permanent loss of the use of one arm * * *; (b) for the loss of one hand at or above the wrist, or the complete and permanent loss of the use of one hand * * *; (c) for the loss of one leg at or above the knee, or the complete and permanent loss of the use of one leg * * *; (d) for the loss of one foot at or above the ankle, or the complete and permanent loss of the use of one foot, * * *.’ Similar provisions, (e) to (k), are made for the loss or loss of the use of other portions of the body. There is no question that, so far as the loss or loss of the use of the ‘hand’ is concerned in the statute, ‘hand’ extends to but does not include the elbow joint.

The statute, however, uses the word ‘member’ a number of times and defines it as including all portions of the human body referred to in subsections (a) to (k) inclusive. The significance of this lies in the use of ‘member’ in the provision relating to compensation for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Connecticut State Medical Soc. v. Connecticut Bd. of Examiners in Podiatry
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 23, 1988
    ...development quite different from that underlying the podiatry statutes. The podiatrists rely heavily on Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 385, 34 A.2d 636 (1943), in which we interpreted "hands" as used in a workers' compensation statute in its common anatomical sense ......
  • State v. Taylor
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1965
    ...be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless such meaning is clearly at odds with the legislative intent. Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 384, 34 A.2d 636; Blake v. Meyer, 145 Conn. 612, 616, 145 A.2d 584. The ordinary meaning of the word 'minor' is one who is unde......
  • Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Walsh
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 15, 1948
    ...which is expressed in the words it has used. Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 438, 28 A. 540; Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 385, 34 A.2d 636. It may be true that any tax upon the use of materials by the telephone and power companies to carry on their ......
  • Royce v. Heneage
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 23, 1976
    ... ... when the statute is read in the light of its history and purpose, Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 384, 34 A.2d 636, even ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT