Fintak v. Fintak
| Citation | 120 So.3d 177 |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D12–3407.,2D12–3407. |
| Parties | Shirley FINTAK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Edmund P. Fintak, Appellant, v. Thomas S. FINTAK and John B. Fintak, individually and as Cotrustees, and Kathleen F. Dunn, David P. Fintak and Matthew P. Fintak, individually, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James L. Essenson and Barbara J. Welch of the Law Firm of James L. Essenson, Sarasota, for Appellant.
Kimberly A. Bald, Adam Mohammadbhoy and Brian L. Trimyer of Harllee & Bald, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellees Thomas Fintak and John Fintak.
No appearance filed for remaining Appellees.
Shirley Fintak, as personal representative of the estate of Edmund Fintak, appeals an order of the trial court entering final summary judgment on Counts I and II of her second amended complaint against Thomas Fintak and John Fintak, individually and as cotrustees of the Edmund P. Fintak Irrevocable Trust.1 Because we find that the settlor of a self-settled trust funded with his own assets is not required to renounce any benefits received under the trust before he can challenge its validity, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment for Thomas and John on Counts I and II. We also find that the trial court erred in ruling that Thomas and John were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II under various estoppel theories. Thus, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
This is a particularly contentious case involving the dangerous amalgam of family and money. Amidst the family warmongering, this court was able to suss out the following facts relevant to this appeal.
Edmund Fintak and Shirley Fintak married in 1998. Edmund had six children from a previous marriage, including Thomas Fintak, John Fintak, Kathleen Dunn, David Fintak, Matthew Fintak, and MichaelFintak. But the issues in this case find their genesis in Edmund's visits to the office of attorney Jason DePaola in September 2006. During one of these visits, Edmund, accompanied by his son Thomas, executed the Edmund P. Fintak Sr. Irrevocable Trust (the Trust), prepared by Mr. DePaola.2 The Trust is self-settled, i.e., created by Edmund for the benefit of Edmund, and was initially funded entirely by Edmund's assets, which consisted of a substantial portion of his life savings. The Trust named Edmund, Thomas, and John as cotrustees.3
As stated in the Trust, its purpose was to provide for Edmund's health, education, and support in reasonable comfort. Article III of the Trust governs the administration of the Trust during Edmund's lifetime. In addition to providing for regular payments from the income of the Trust, Article III(A) of the Trust provides that during the lifetime of Edmund the cotrustees “shall pay to or apply for the benefit of [Edmund] such part of the principal of the trust as [Edmund] shall request in writing from time to time.” In the event that Edmund became incapacitated or unable to properly manage his affairs, Article III(B) requires the cotrustees to exercise their discretion to use the income and principal of the Trust for Edmund's “care, support and comfort ... or for any other purpose the [cotrustees] deem[ ] to be for the best interest of [Edmund].” 4
Article VI of the Trust governs the administration of the Trust following Edmund's death and provides that the remaining income and principal of the Trust should be divided in six equal shares and distributed to Edmund's children.5 The Trust makes no provision for, and no mention of, Shirley.
Beginning in January 2007, Edmund received income from the Trust on a periodic basis and also received funds from principal invasions made at his written request. But in February 2007, suspecting that Edmund was incapacitated, Edmund's children initiated incapacity proceedings in Sarasota County. The petition for incapacity was subsequently dismissed in favor of Edmund.6 Afterward, rather than making disbursements to Edmund, Thomas and John used the principal of the Trust to directly pay Edmund's bills.
On August 3, 2007, Edmund filed the initial complaint against Thomas and John to compel payment of a particular written demand for $30,000 and to set aside the Trust based upon coercion. In March 2010, Edmund executed a codicil, exercising a power of appointment under the Trust, to bequeath the remainder of the Trust assets to Shirley. On March 11, 2010, Edmund filed a second amended complaint raising five counts against Thomas and John, including: (1) undue influence (Count I); (2) lack of testamentary capacity (Count II); (3) a request for judicial modification of the irrevocable trust (Count III); (4) breach of trust (Count IV); and (5) a request for declaratory judgment (Count V).
At this point, the facts diverge. On the one hand, Edmund and Shirley accuse Thomas and John of undue influence and coercion in selecting Jason DePaola rather than Edmund's regular attorney, Michael Reiter, to prepare the Trust. According to Edmund and Shirley, this alleged undue influence caused “Edmund's hard-earned assets” to come under the control of Thomas and John and caused an increase in the shares of Edmund's estate to the remainder of Edmund's children. Edmund and Shirley also alleged that Thomas and John encouraged Edmund to drink alcohol with the knowledge that Edmund was taking prescribed medication for Parkinson's Disease and that the combination of alcohol and prescription drugs would “exacerbate Edmund's confusion and forgetfulness” to the point that when he executed the Trust, he did not understand its nature and extent. These allegations provide the basis for Edmund's claims for undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.
On the other hand, Thomas and John allege that Shirley was controlling Edmund and that Edmund originally sought advice from Jason DePaola regarding a divorce from Shirley. According to Thomas and John, Shirley threatened that they would never see their father again if they did not set aside the Trust. They contend that Shirley moved Edmund to Michigan and refused to provide his children with his location. Thomas and John assert that they used the Trust assets to pay for Edmund's care by paying his expenses directly. Based on these accusations, Thomas and John filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the second amended complaint alleging that Shirley manipulated Edmund into filing this action, Edmund lacked the mental capacity to prosecute this action, and Edmund was estopped from bringing his claims because of an improper conversion of the Trust assets. Thomas and John also filed several counterclaims, which included an action to construe and declare the meanings of Article III and X of the Trust, an action for reformation of the Trust, and an action for conversion of the Trust assets against Shirley and Edmund.7
While the action was pending in the trial court, Edmund passed away. Shirley, as the personal representative of Edmund's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. Thereafter, Shirley filed a petition for probate of Edmund's estate in Luce County, Michigan. The petition acknowledges and includes the Trust as a beneficiary of Edmund's estate. Additionally, Shirley filed an inventory of Edmund's estate that listed the Trust as an asset.
Thomas and John moved for summary judgment on Counts I and II of the second amended complaint, arguing that Shirley, substituted for Edmund, was barred from bringing actions for undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity because Edmund failed to renounce benefits received under the Trust and because Shirley took inconsistent legal positions by listing the Trust as a beneficiary and asset of Edmund's estate in the probate action filed in Michigan. In ruling on the motion, the trial court found that Edmund received and accepted benefits under the Trust and never returned or offered to return any of the Trust assets he received. The trial court also concluded that Shirley's act of listing the Trust as a beneficiary and asset of Edmund's estate in the Michigan probate proceeding was inconsistent with her assertions in this action that the Trust is invalid. Because the trial court concluded that renunciation was a condition precedent to challenging the Trust's validity, it entered final summary judgment in favor of Thomas and John on the claims for undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.
On appeal, Shirley contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Counts I and II because neither the renunciation rule nor estoppel applies to the facts of this case. We agree.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000); see alsoFla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). Although the parties intensely dispute the overall facts of this case, they do not dispute that Edmund received distributions from the Trust that he did not return or offer to return. Nor do the parties dispute that Shirley listed the Trust as a beneficiary and asset of Edmund's estate. Because the parties do not dispute the facts relevant to the issues on appeal, the only dispositive questions on appeal are strictly questions of law. Thus, the applicable standard of review is de novo. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, 760 So.2d at 130–31.
First, the trial court ruled that Thomas and John were entitled to summary judgment because renunciation of the benefits received under the Trust was a condition precedent to Shirley's claims for undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, and, therefore, a lack of renunciation was fatal to those claims.
The “renunciation rule,” established by the English ecclesiastical courts, originally provided that “a legatee, who has received a legacy...
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