Finton v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-02319-PHX-MTL,CV-19-02319-PHX-MTL |
| Parties | Jenae Finton, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
The Court now addresses the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 56, 58). These motions are fully briefed and were discussed at oral argument. The Court now resolves these motions as follows.
Plaintiff Jenae Finton began working for Defendant Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., LLC (the "Club") as a part-time employee in November 2015. (Doc. 59, Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts ("PSOF") ¶ 1.) Ms. Finton was an "Assistant, Arizona Operations" for the Club's Arizona spring training facility, a nonexempt position under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) In this position, Ms. Finton's wages were $14.00 per hour in 2017 and $16.00 per hour in 2018. (Id. ¶ 4.) Ms. Finton reported directly to Defendant Ryan Lantz—the Director of Arizona Operations.1 (Id. ¶ 2.) Mr. Lantz's supervisor, Jerry Crabb, works in the Club's main office in Cleveland, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 3.)
The job duties that Mr. Lantz assigned to Ms. Finton included "participating onvarious non-profit boards, working with local charities to coordinate fund-raisers, arranging and staffing player events and outings, working with vendors and business contacts to ensure the Club facilities were maintained, ordering necessary supplies, and scheduling security staff and interns." (Id. ¶ 10.) Ms. Finton also, many times, had to "perform nightly walk-through's [sic] of the Club's facilities, which involved setting the alarm, walking the property, and making sure doors were closed and locked" when Mr. Lantz was unavailable. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) Mr. Lantz provided Mr. Crabb with a detailed "Year-Round Job Responsibilities" outline for Ms. Finton in May 2018, which outline these same job duties and several others. (Doc. 59-2 at 38-39.) Ms. Finton's participation in these activities and organizations was at Mr. Lantz's request and benefitted the Club. (PSOF ¶ 21.) Given the amount of job duties and activities Ms. Finton dealt with, she "normally did not take a lunch period and ate at her desk while working." (Id. ¶ 23.)
The Club used a computer-based system called "ABI" to record time or hours worked by Club employees throughout Ms. Finton's employment. (Doc. 57, Defendant's Statement of Facts ("DSOF") ¶ 7.)2 The ABI system could record employees' hours in two ways: (1) by an employee physically scanning their badge at the Club's facility to clock in and clock out, and (2) by an employee remotely accessing the ABI system on a computer and reporting through ABI's "timekeeping or time-recording function." (Id. ¶¶ 8-14.) Ms. Finton used both ways to record her hours at times and was trained on the ABI timekeeping system, which was "very simple and easy to use." (Id. ¶¶ 15, 23.) When the Club temporarily relocated its staff to the Goodyear Ballpark while its facilities were being renovated in June 2017, the physical timeclock was not moved, and employees were told to use the online reporting method.3 (PSOF ¶¶ 27-28.) Ms. Finton then struggled to log her hours online because of internet connection issues. (Id. ¶ 29.) Ms. Finton therefore began reporting her hours directly to Mr. Lantz, who then inputted her hours into ABI. (Id. ¶ 29.) Mr. Lantz and Ms. Finton had in-person meetings frequently to input, and have Mr. Lantzapprove, her time into ABI. (Id. ¶ 30.)
Even when the Club finished its renovation and moved back to its facilities, Ms. Finton "continued her practice of providing hours to [Mr.] Lantz either orally or in writing." (Id. ¶ 31.) Although Ms. Finton used the in-person timeclock sporadically, she continued this practice because "she was frequently away from her desk" on Club business. (Id.) This practice of reporting her hours to Mr. Lantz was "either through email, a hand-written note, or orally" in their meetings. (Id. ¶ 33.) Mr. Lantz did not, nor did any other Club employee, "discipline[] or counsel[]" Ms. Finton for using this method to enter her time or for failing to use the ABI timeclock. (Id. ¶ 35.) Mr. Lantz had knowledge from emails and time-approval meetings that Ms. Finton was working overtime hours during several weeks. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 49; Doc. 59-3 at 10-11, 36-42.) Mr. Lantz also knew that Ms. Finton used her personal phone off-premises for work matters on several occasions and thought it was "essential" for her to do so. (Doc. 59-3 at 2.) Even the Club's Human Resource Department acknowledged that there could be a potential "compliance issue" with Ms. Finton continuing to work on her personal phone off-premises because that time would be difficult to track and compensate. (Id.)
Ms. Finton took an unpaid vacation in July 2018 but worked several times during that trip. (Id. ¶¶ 73-75.) Ms. Finton emailed Mr. Lantz about player appearances that would occur during her vacation, Mr. Lantz emailed her requesting more information, to which she responded, and Mr. Lantz also called her three times to discuss work matters during that vacation. (Id. ¶¶ 73-78.) Ms. Finton was not paid for the two total hours she worked during that vacation. (Id. ¶ 79.)
In late December 2018, Ms. Finton emailed Mr. Lantz with the hours that she worked during part of December, which included several hours of overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 36-38.) Although Mr. Lantz acknowledged receipt of Ms. Finton's hours, Mr. Lantz was soon thereafter placed on administrative leave and did not input her time. (Id. ¶ 39.) This caused Ms. Finton's "next paycheck to be short." (Id.) Ms. Finton then contacted Mr. Crabb about her paycheck issue and Mr. Crabb "questioned her hours." (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) Ms. Fintonexplained her hours, asked to provide Mr. Crabb with more information to get paid for all her hours worked, and tried, unsuccessfully, to call Mr. Crabb twice to discuss the issue further. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) Mr. Crabb then emailed Ms. Finton stating that the hours she provided (Id. ¶ 43.) Ms. Finton did not receive overtime pay for her work in December and resigned her employment with the Club in January 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46; Doc. 59-1 at 7.) Ms. Finton then discovered that Mr. Lantz "altered or failed to correctly record and pay time to" her on numerous occasions. (PSOF ¶ 49.) Mr. Lantz "never told" her that he "reduced her hours, disagreed with her reported time, or disciplined her for failing to use the timeclock." (Id. ¶ 50.)
A review of Ms. Finton's timeclock entries, emails to Mr. Lantz, personal recollection, and payroll records revealed that many more of her hours reported to Mr. Lantz or the Club were "altered" or recorded incorrectly. In February 2018, for example, Ms. Finton helped the Club prepare and host a golf event. (Id. ¶ 51; see also Doc. 59-3 at 34.) Ms. Finton worked 9.5 hours on Monday, February 19, 2018, to prepare for the upcoming golf event. (Doc. 59-3 at 28.) The next day, she reported working for 11.5 hours, but Mr. Lantz manually entered only 9.5 hours into ABI. (PSOF ¶¶ 56-57.) On February 21, Ms. Finton "worked at the office for 6 hours and another 6 hours off-site," Mr. Lantz, however, did not input the 6 off-site hours and Ms. Finton was paid for 6 hours in total. (Id. ¶¶ 58-61.) Ms. Finton started her next day at 8:00 A.M. "running errands and taking care of items" for the golf event and ended this day with a 9:55 P.M. email to Mr. Lantz outlining outstanding items for the golf event. (Id. ¶¶ 62-65; see also Doc. 59-4 at 5.) Although Ms. Finton orally informed Mr. Lantz of these long hours the next day at a "payroll approval meeting," she was not paid for any of her time worked on February 22. (PSOF ¶¶ 64-65.) On Friday, February 23, Ms. Finton worked a "regular workday" followed by working 3 hours at the evening golf event. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) Ms. Finton was not paid for the additional 3 hours spent at the event. (Id. ¶ 68.) Ms. Fintonprovides many other days in 2018 where Mr. Lantz unilaterally altered the time Ms. Finton reported or failed to enter Ms. Finton's time altogether. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 49; Doc. 58 at 6-8.) If Mr. Lantz put in the hours that Ms. Finton provided him, there would be several weeks that surpassed the 40-hour threshold to be eligible for overtime pay.4 (PSOF ¶ 49.) These events gave rise to this lawsuit.
Ms. Finton brought six causes of action: (1) FLSA Failure to Pay Overtime; (2) FLSA Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; (3) Arizona Minimum Wage Act ("AMWA"), A.R.S. § 23-362, et seq., Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; (4) Arizona Wage Act ("AWA"), A.R.S. § 23-350, et seq., Failure to Pay Wages; (5) Failure to Comply with Requirements of the Arizona Fair Wage and Healthy Families Act; and (6) Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping Requirements of the AWA. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 83-134.) The first two causes of action under the FLSA are against both the Club and Mr. Lantz, while the last four are only against the Club. (Id.) The Club moved for summary judgment on all six causes of action. (Doc. 56.) Ms. Finton moved for summary judgment on five of the six causes of action, Counts I-V. (Doc. 58.) Both motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 62, 66, 68, 71, 72.)5
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)....
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