Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Center

• Decision Date: 30 March 1992
• Docket Number: 91-1842,Nos. 91-1027,s. 91-1027
• Citation: 960 F.2d 229
• Parties: , 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 299 Richard C. FIORE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 229

960 F.2d 229

60 USLW 2622, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 299

Richard C. FIORE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v.WASHINGTON COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, et al Defendants, Appellees.

Nos. 91-1027, 91-1842.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

March 30, 1992.

John W. Ranucci with whom D'Agostino & O'Donnell, Providence, R.I., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Charles J. Vucci with whom Thomas C. Plunkett, Leonard A. Kiernan, Jr., and Kiernan, Plunkett & Woodbine, Providence, R.I., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Gael Mahony with whom Ben T. Clements, Hill & Barlow, Boston, Mass., and David L. Shapiro, Cambridge, Mass., were on brief, amicus curiae.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, TORRUELLA, SELYA and CYR, Circuit Judges.

OPINION EN BANC

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

A panel of this court confronted a technical problem of civil procedure--how the "separate document" requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 should be applied in the context of post-judgment motions--and concluded that meticulous compliance with the rule was necessary.The full court, suspecting that a more flexible approach might exist, decided to reconsider the issue en banc.Having given careful consideration to the policies and practicalities at issue, we reaffirm the position originally adopted by the panel and advocated by amici.¹We therefore hold that the separate document requirement applies to all appealable post-judgment orders.²

I.

As the panel noted, only a few facts concerning the underlying lawsuit are necessary for an understanding of the issue before us.Richard Fiore originally brought this action alleging that the Washington County Community Mental Health Center and its employees had treated his young daughter negligently by erroneously teaching her that her father had engaged in "sexually inappropriate behavior" toward her.In March 1990, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.

Fiore subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to vacate the summary judgment and asking for leave to file a third amended complaint.On June 27, 1990, the district court denied the petition by means of a notation on a photocopy of Fiore's motion.³On July 17, Fiore filed a motion seeking reconsideration or, alternatively, explanation of the court's reason for denying the 60(b) motion.On September 21, the district court denied the motion by means of a margin notation and without discussion.

On October 22, Fiore moved the district court for entry of final judgment on the June 27 denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.He contended that that decision was not final for purposes of appellate review because the order denying his motion had not been set forth on a "separate document," as required by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.⁴The district court issued a Memorandum and Order holding that the finality of the June 27 decision"is a matter for the First Circuit Court of Appeals to consider when and if Mr. Fiore appeals that decision."⁵Accordingly, the court dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction.Fiore then filed the appeal first heard by our panel last year, and now before us again.⁶

At stake is Fiore's right to appellate review of the district court's June 27 decision.If Fiore is correct that the district court had not entered a final judgment because there was no "separate document," the time for filing an appeal of the decision would not yet have begun to run.If the judgment had become final, however, the time for appeal would have passed.

The panel concluded that the policies underlying the separate document rule require that it be applied rigidly in both the post-judgment and final judgment contexts.The ruling created some confusion, however, because of the longstanding practice of trial judges disposing of post-judgment motions with curt margin orders.A majority of the court considered the problem sufficiently troublesome to warrant en banc review and, accordingly, we withdrew the panel decision to take a second look.

II.

A.Language of the Rules

Rule 58 provides that "every" judgment shall be set forth in a separate document, and Rule 54(a) defines the word "judgment" to include "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies."In this circuit, it is well-established that denials of Rule 60(b) motions are appealable orders, see, e.g., FDIC v. Ramirez Rivera, 869 F.2d 624, 626(1st Cir.1989);Echevarria-Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24, 27(1st Cir.1988)("[T]he order of denial [of a Rule 60(b) motion] meets the definition in the Federal Rules of a 'judgment'.").The language of the rules thus clearly embraces such orders, directing that they be set forth on a separate document to be effective and to trigger the time for appeal.

Although this case specifically involves only an order rendered under Rule 60(b), amici, seesupra note 6, have urged us to address Rule 58's impact on post-judgment motions comprehensively and to adopt a uniform approach for all orders denying post-judgment motions under Rules 50(b),52(b)and59(b) and (e), as well as under Rule 60(b).⁷Because the underlying principles are closely analogous, we believe it is appropriate to do so.As with Rule 60(b) denials, we consistently have held that denials of other post-judgment motions challenging the judgment are appealable separately from the appeal of the underlying judgment.See, e.g., Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 945 F.2d 1, 3(1st Cir.1991)(denial of Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment);Creedon v. Loring, 249 F.2d 714, 717(1st Cir.1957)(denial of new trial motion may be appealed despite failure to appeal original judgment).Such orders therefore also constitute "judgments" subject to Rule 58's separate document requirement.⁸

Moreover, denials of motions made under Rules 50(b),52(b), and59(b) and (e) are subject to the separate document requirement as well by virtue of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.Rule 4(a)(4) provides that, when a timely motion has been made under any of those three Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to appeal the underlying judgment will run from "the entry of the order" denying or granting the motion.Subsection (7) states that, to be entered within the meaning of Rule 4(a), a judgment or order must be "entered in compliance with Rules 58and79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."Rule 4(a) therefore expressly imposes Rule 58's separate document requirement on denials of these motions.

B.The Principle at Stake

The clear mandate of the language is underscored by the policy behind the separate document rule, which we believe can be satisfied only if the provision is applied without exception to all appealable judgments.The sole purpose of the separate document requirement, enacted by a 1963amendment to Rule 58, was "to establish a certain reference point for determining the timeliness of post-judgment motions and appeals."Alman v. Taunton Sportswear Mfg. Corp., 857 F.2d 840, 843(1st Cir.1988)(citingBankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 385, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1120, 55 L.Ed.2d 357(1978)(per curiam)).Logically, then, the rule should be applied to the specific order that starts the clock running.Without consistent application of this formality, there would be no unambiguous signal that the time for appeal has begun to run.But seeWright v. Preferred Research, 937 F.2d 1556, 1560-61(11th Cir.1991).

The need for a post-judgment "separate document" is particularly acute in the context of Rule 60(b) motions, which neither affect the finality of the original judgment nor extend the time for appealing the judgment.Because the appeal of an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion can be wholly independent of, and not linked in time to, the date of the underlying judgment, the separate document issued for that original judgment in no way informs a party of the time to appeal the motion denial.The only significant date is the date of the order denying the motion.It therefore follows that, to provide certainty about the proper time for appeal, such an order must be entered in accordance with Rule 58's requirements.

Although motions filed under Rules 50(b),52(b), and59(b) and (e) are more closely linked to the underlying judgment, the need for a separate document memorializing denials of such motions is equally apparent.Under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), timely motions under Rules 50(b),52(b)and59 suspend the finality of the original judgment, and the time for appeal from both that judgment and denial of the motions runs from the entry of the order denying the motions.Thus, as in the 60(b) context, the separate document setting forth the original judgment is of no help in determining the precise date on which the time to appeal begins to run.The significant date is the date of the order denying the motion.Because Rule 58's purpose is to ensure that that date is precisely clear, the separate document requirement must apply to such orders.

We recognize that the type of uncertainty that prompted the separate document rule is less likely to occur with respect to post-judgment orders than for initial judgments.The Advisory Committee that drafted the requirement expressed particular concern about those occasions on which courts had issued opinions or memoranda containing "apparently directive or dispositive words"--such as "the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted"--and then later signed formal judgments.In such circumstances, it was unclear whether the opinions or the later orders started the time running for appeals and post-judgment motions.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 58, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1963Amendment.Because post-judgment motions typically will be narrowly focused and fairly specific in defining the relief sought, a brief order disposing of such motions more likely would be the court's last word on the case, and to be understood as...