Fiori-Lacivita v. Franco-Palacios
| Decision Date | 13 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 16-4445 (RBK/JS) |
| Parties | MELISSA C. FIORI-LACIVITA, Plaintiff, v. YLBE FRANCO-PALACIOS, M.D., et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant United States' (the "Government") Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (the "Government's Motion") [Doc. No. 55] on the basis that the Government is immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") or entitled to a cap on damages pursuant to the New Jersey Charitable Immunities Act ("NJCIA"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, et seq. For the reasons discussed below, the Government's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be GRANTED.
This is a medical malpractice lawsuit that arises from the emergency caesarean section surgery performed on Plaintiff Melissa Fiori-Lacivita and her post-surgical care at Inspira Medical Center ("Inspira") in Vineland, New Jersey. Defendants Dr. Ylbe Franco-Palacios, an employee of CompleteCare Health Network ("CompleteCare"), and Dr. Jessica Balkema, a fourth-year resident at Inspira, performed the surgery on January 31, 2014. Five days after the surgery, Plaintiff discovered she had a perforation in her colon and required additional surgery. Plaintiff alleges that these physicians, employees of CompleteCare, a federally qualified health center ("FQHC"), deviated from the standard of care.
The United States, answering for Defendants, now argues that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this suit because CompleteCare qualifies as a "charitable organization" under New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act ("NJCIA"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a), and is therefore absolutely or partially immune from liability. Alternatively, the Government seeks partial summary judgment and asks the Court to find that CompleteCare is a qualified entity and entitled to a damages cap pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8.
If the absolute immunity provision applies, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction by operation of the United States' limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. If the damages cap applies, the United States is entitled to summary judgment limiting its liability to $250,000. Finally, if the NJCIA does not apply at all, as Plaintiff contends, then the United States' Motion should be denied in its entirety.
The Court will apply the standard under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) for the issue of absolute immunity under Section 7, and the standard under Federal Rule 56 for the issue of the damages cap under Section 8 of the NJCIA.
An attack on subject matter jurisdiction may be either a facial or a factual attack. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008). A facial attack "concerns an alleged pleadingdeficiency whereas a factual attack concerns the actual failure of a plaintiff's claims to comport factually with the jurisdictional prerequisites." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). In a facial attack, "the court looks only at the allegations in the pleadings and does so in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). In a factual attack, "it is permissible for a court to review evidence outside the pleadings." Id. (citing Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Government has presented this Court with a factual attack, as the Government contends that the facts of the case preclude this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. In a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's allegations enjoy no presumption of truthfulness. CNA, 535 F.3d at 139; Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. The burden of persuasion is placed on plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction, and the Court may make factual findings beyond the pleadings that are decisive to determining jurisdiction. CNA, 535 F.3d at 145; Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514. However, the Court is also mindful of the fact that as this particular jurisdictional issue that is "intertwined with the merits," the Court will "demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage." See CNA, 535 F.3d at 144-45 (internal quotations omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A genuinedispute of material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the Court weights the evidence presented by the parties, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. A fact is material only if it will affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the applicable law, and a dispute of a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Even if the facts are undisputed, a disagreement over what inferences may be drawn from the facts precludes a grant of summary judgment. Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, "any unexplained gaps in materials submitted by the moving party, if pertinent to material issues of fact, justify denial of a motion for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
The nonmoving party must present "more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). The court's role in deciding the merits of a summary judgment motion is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial, not to determine the credibility of the evidence or the truth of the matter. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable for "tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C.§ 2674. Essentially, the United States acts as an employer with respondeat superior liability for its employees under the FTCA. See Lomando, 667 F.3d at 374 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, the United States "stands in the shoes" of CompleteCare, and can assert "any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defense to which the United States is entitled." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674). The immunity at issue here stems from the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act ("NJCIA"). See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A.
The NJCIA provides two different immunity provisions relevant to the Government's Motion. First, the NJCIA provides absolute immunity from suit for certain nonprofit organizations while also refusing to immunize individual paid healthcare providers. Section 7 of the NJCIA provides, in relevant part, as follows:
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a) (emphases added). Second, the NJCIA provides for a cap on liability for certain nonprofits. Section 8, in turn, provides as follows:
Therefore, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 and -8 limits an entity's liability under the NJCIA where the entity: "[1] is formed as a nonprofit corporation ..., [2] is organized exclusively for hospital purposes, [3] was promoting those objectives and purposes at the time the plaintiff was injured, and [4] the plaintiff was a beneficiary of the activities of the hospital." Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health Ctr., 221 N.J. 239, 247, 249 (2015). (internal citation omitted).
Because CompleteCare is a federally funded health center, the first element is not at issue here. Instead, the instant motion focuses predominantly on whether CompleteCare is organized for an exclusively hospital or charitable purpose.
"The most prominent distinction between nonprofit entities organized exclusively for charitable, religious, or educational purposes and nonprofits organized exclusively for hospital purposes is that the former are...
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