Firefighters Local 3858 v. City of Germantown, 99-2289 DA.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-2289 DA.,99-2289 DA. |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 3858, a/k/a Germantown Firefighters Association, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF GERMANTOWN, Sharon Goldsworthy, individually, and in her official capacity as Mayor, and Patrick Lawton, individually, and in his official capacity as City Administrator, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Deborah A. Godwin, Agee, Allen, Godwin, Morris, Laurenzi & Hamilton, Memphis, TN, for plaintiff.
Edward R. Young, John Marshall Jones, Heather R. Gunn, Young & Perl, Memphis, TN, for defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the court are motions by both parties for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff International Association of Fire-fighters Local 3858 a/k/a Germantown Firefighters Association ("Association") moves for partial summary judgment on the basis that there is no genuine issue of material fact that need be resolved to find that Defendants are in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-51-204. Defendants the City of Germantown ("Germantown"), Sharon Goldsworthy ("Goldsworthy"), and Patrick Lawton ("Lawton") contend that there is a factual dispute over whether T.C.A. § 7-51-204 applies to the instant case. Defendants further argue that summary judgment in their favor on this issue is warranted because T.C.A. § 7-51-204 is unconstitutional under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied, and Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is granted.
The Association, a firefighters' union, was chartered by the International Association of Firefighters on July 1, 1998. On September 22, 1998, representatives of the Association notified Defendants of the formation of the Association, and requested that Defendants recognize the Association and deduct union dues from firefighters' wages. The following day, Lawton responded, declining to recognize the union or deduct union dues. The Association reiterated its request on October 13, 1998, and on October 16, Lawton again refused. The Association made another request on October 28, 1998, and then on November 17, Thomas Woodley ("Woodley"), general counsel for the International Association of Fire Fighters, requested that Defendants reconsider their position. On December 10, 1998, Lawton responded to Woodley, confirming Defendants' refusal to recognize the union or deduct union dues.
At the center of this entire controversy, and the only point at issue in the current motions, is a state statute, T.C.A. § 7-51-204. Plaintiff claims that it is an "employee association" pursuant to the provisions of that statute, and that therefore Defendants are legally obligated to deduct union dues from firefighter wages and remit the dues to the Association. Defendants argue that it is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether T.C.A. § 7-51-204 applies to Plaintiff.
Defendants further contend that T.C.A. § 7-51-204 is unconstitutional, in that it violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, and in that it is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In other words, summary judgment is appropriately granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment may satisfy its initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This in turn may be accomplished by submitting affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or by attacking the opponent's evidence to show why it does not support a judgment for the nonmoving party. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727, at 35 (2d ed. Supp.1996).
Facts must be presented to the court for evaluation. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 171 F.3d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir.1999). The court may consider any material that would be admissible or usable at trial. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2721, at 40 (2d ed.1983). Although hearsay evidence may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment, Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir.1999), evidentiary materials presented to avoid summary judgment otherwise need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 400 (6th Cir.1999).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, all the evidence and facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Walborn v. Erie County Care Facility, 150 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.1998). Justifiable inferences based on facts are also to be drawn in favor of the nonmovant. Kalamazoo River, 171 F.3d at 1068.
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made, the "adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue for trial exists if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
The first issue to be resolved is whether T.C.A. § 7-51-204 applies to the Association. Only if the court finds that the statute is applicable need it go on to consider whether the statute is unconstitutional under either the Tennessee or United States Constitution. The court avoids deciding the constitutional issues if possible, of course, because "[d]eciding constitutional issues only after considering and rejecting every nonconstitutional ground for the decision is a `fundamental rule of judicial restraint.'" Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984)).
At issue here is whether Plaintiff qualifies as an "employee association" under T.C.A. § 7-51-204. The statute reads in its entirety as follows:
(a)(1) Any municipal corporation or other political subdivision of the state which maintains a regular fire department with regular full-time employees shall, upon the written request of any such employee, make monthly deductions of membership dues for an employee association if the chief administrative officer of the employee association has previously certified to the chief executive officer of the municipality or political subdivision that the association's current membership is not less than ten percent (10%) of all the employees of the municipality or political subdivision who qualify for membership.
(2) Such deductions shall be made by the municipality or other political subdivision from each regular paycheck and shall be remitted to the employee association within thirty (30) days after the deduction is made.
(3) Authorization for such payroll deduction shall continue in effect until the next regular pay period following the thirtieth day after receipt by the municipality or other political subdivision of a written revocation signed by the employee.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply in counties having a population of:
not less than nor more than
13,600 13,610
28,690 28,750
48,400 48,500
49,275 49,375
77,700 77,800
according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent census.
In filing a motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff is in effect asking the court to make a preliminary finding that as a matter of law Defendants are in violation of T.C.A. § 7-51-204. Defendants argue that summary judgment on this issue in favor of Plaintiff is inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is an "employee association" under the statute. Initially, the court must point out that Defendants have confused "law" with "fact." Whether Plaintiff is an "employee association" under T.C.A. § 7-51-204 is not a genuine issue of material fact because it is not a factual issue at all. Construction of a statute is a question of law. See, e.g., Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1994). Indeed, though Defendants mislabeled this issue as a factual dispute, their argument is purely a legal one. Therefore the court will proceed to consider the legal issue of whether Plaintiff is an "employee association" under T.C.A. § 7-51-204.
In construing the meaning of a statute, courts must first look to the text of the statute....
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