FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO. v. Sleigh, Record No. 031515.
| Decision Date | 23 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 031515. |
| Parties | FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY v. Betty L. SLEIGH, et al. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
David E. Lynch (John R. McNeer; Williams & Lynch, on brief), for appellant.
Michael A. Kernbach (Burgess, Kernbach & Perigard, on brief), Fairfax, for appellee Betty L. Sleigh.
Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KOONTZ, LEMONS, and AGEE, JJ., and RUSSELL, Senior Justice.
In this appeal from a declaratory judgment, we revisit the frequently-litigated question of the extent of the coverage provided pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, Code § 38.2-2206.
Betty L. Sleigh was employed by the City of Alexandria Police Department as a Parking Enforcement Officer. Her unrefuted testimony was the only evidence in the record concerning the facts of the case. She testified that on May 10, 1999, she went to the 400 block of North Royal Street, in Alexandria, to enforce "street cleaning hours" when parking was prohibited by local ordinance on certain days of the week. Finding a car parked in violation of the ordinance, she stopped her police vehicle "alongside it," got out, walked to a position between the two vehicles, and began to write a citation.
Before Sleigh could complete the citation and place it on the parked car, a young woman, later identified as Crystal A. Gibson, ran out of a nearby building and "jumped into the vehicle," striking Sleigh in the arm with the driver's-side door as she opened it to enter the parked car. Apparently realizing that she had failed to bring her keys with her, Gibson "yelled to a woman behind us . . . bring her the keys." The woman produced the keys and Gibson opened the door, striking Sleigh a second time as she got out of the car to retrieve the keys. Opening the door a third time, Gibson "jumped back into the car" with the keys and Sleigh "kind of pushed the door back to defend myself." At this point, Gibson "started yelling" and "jumped out the door and slammed the door up against me . . . she come [sic] flying out of the car and pushed the door very, you know, really very hard, and I turned to move and she then pushed me where my left side went up against the car." Sleigh further testified that this final blow from Gibson's car door drove her back into the side of her police vehicle with such force that she sustained permanent back injury requiring surgery. Sleigh tried to make a radio call requesting "backup" but Gibson seized her radio, threw it to the ground, "jumped in her car and took off."
Sleigh filed a motion for judgment against Gibson in the trial court to recover damages for her injuries and took the position that Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (the insurer) afforded coverage to her under the uninsured motorist provisions of a policy the insurer had issued on Sleigh's personal automobile. The insurer brought the present motion for declaratory judgment against Sleigh seeking an adjudication that the uninsured motorist coverage provided by its policy does not apply to Sleigh's "altercation" with Gibson. It is undisputed that Sleigh was an "insured" under the policy and that Gibson was an "operator of an uninsured motor vehicle" as defined by Code § 38.2-2206 and as contemplated by the policy. The only dispute is whether the coverage applies under the facts of the case.
The parties, by agreement, submitted the case to the court on Sleigh's deposition and the policy, further agreeing that the facts were undisputed. The court, in a letter opinion, ruled that the insurer's policy afforded coverage to Sleigh, and dismissed the motion for declaratory judgment.
On appeal, the insurer contends that Gibson was not using her car as a vehicle when she struck Sleigh with the car door, but was rather using the car, or a part of it, as a weapon. The uninsured motorist clause of the policy provides:
The Company will pay . . . all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of...
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