Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg

• Decision Date: 01 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 100,100
• Citation: 548 A.2d 151,76 Md.App. 709
• Parties: FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. v. Walter E. BRAGG, et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 709

76 Md.App. 709

548 A.2d 151

FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. v. Walter E. BRAGG, et al.

No. 100, Sept. Term, 1988.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 6, 1988.

Gregory R. Dent (Law Offices of Austin W. Brizendine, Jr., on the brief), Lutherville, for appellant, Fireman's.

Paul J. Weber (Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellants, Fuhrman, et al. and Allstate.

Daniel J. Earnshaw (Parker, Pallett & Earnshaw, on the brief) White Marsh, for appellees.

Argued before BISHOP, BLOOM and WENNER, JJ.

WENNER, Judge.

On May 24, 1985, Walter E. Bragg was injured when his motor vehicle was struck by a vehicle owned by Thomas Gaylin and driven by Timothy Fuhrman. As a result of that accident, Bragg filed a single count complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He later amended that complaint to add an additional count. In Count I of the amended complaint, he sought to recover damages for injuries he claimed to have suffered as a result of the negligence of Fuhrman, Gaylin, and the driver of a phantom tractor trailer. ¹ In Count II Bragg sought to recover damages from Fireman's Fund Insurance Company for breach of contract. Specifically, in Count II, Bragg asserted that Fireman's Fund had "refused to live up to its contractural [sic] obligations under the phantom clause" of the policy of insurance it had provided Bragg. Fireman's Fund filed a cross-claim ² seeking indemnification from Fuhrman and Gaylin.

A jury found that the accident was caused by the negligence of Fuhrman, Gaylin and the phantom tractor trailer, ³ and assessed Bragg's damages at $70,000. Accordingly, after disposing of a flurry of post-trial motions, the trial judge entered judgments in favor of Bragg against Allstate Insurance Co. in the amount of $50,000 and against Fireman's Fund in the amount of $20,000.

Following the entry of judgment, Fireman's Fund, Allstate and Timothy Fuhrman appealed, presenting a number of issues for our review. After responding to those issues, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case to that court for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

The principle issues we have been asked to consider are:

I. Does the language of Article 48A, Section 541(c) apply to the facts of this case so as to reduce Fireman's Fund uninsured motorist liability to zero?

II. Was the judgment and award of costs against Allstate Insurance Company for defendants, Fuhrman and Gaylin, proper?

III. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it permitted plaintiff's medical expert, Steven Manekin, to testify as to his opinion of plaintiff's character?

IV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it permitted plaintiff's medical expert to testify as to his opinion of a report written by defendant's medical expert?

V. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it permitted portions of appellant's deposition to be read into evidence?

I.

The most significant disagreement among the parties involves the construction of Art. 48A, § 541 of the Maryland Insurance Code, entitled "Required and optional additional coverage." That section contains several subsections relating to minimum insurance coverage requirements as well as provisions for optional additional coverage. Section 541(c) provides for mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. The term "uninsured motor vehicle" is defined in § 541(c)(1) as "a motor vehicle whose ... use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and collectible liability insurance policies ... is less than the amount of coverage provided to the insured under this subsection."

Section 541(c)(2) requires every motor vehicle insurance policy issued in Maryland to provide uninsured motorist coverage in at least the amounts required by Title 17 of the Transportation Article, and permits motorists to contract for higher amounts than those provided under Title 17. Section 541(c)(3) limits the liability of an insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage to "the amount of that coverage less the sum of the limits under the liability insurance policies ... applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured." As Judge Eldridge pointed out for the Court of Appeals in Hoffman v. United Services Automobile Association, 309 Md. 167, 172, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987) "[t]his mandatory coverage has the 'purpose of providing minimum protection to individuals injured by uninsured motorists.' "

A.

Initially, we are asked to determine whether § 541(c) is applicable to a situation, such as that in the case sub judice, where an individual is injured by the joint negligence of an insured and an uninsured motorist. We hold that § 541(c) is applicable to such a situation.

While it may be that the legislature in enacting § 541(c) contemplated a situation where an individual is injured by the negligence of a single uninsured motorist, it is nevertheless clear to us that the legislation is not limited to that situation. As we said earlier, § 541(c)(1) defines an "uninsured motor vehicle" as one "whose use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured." It does not provide that use of the uninsured vehicle must be the only cause of the injury.

Here, Bragg was injured by the joint negligence of Fuhrman, Gaylin and a phantom tractor trailer. The tractor trailer was a vehicle "whose use has resulted in the bodily injury ... of [the] insured." Additionally, the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and collectible insurance policies applicable to the phantom tractor trailer, (zero), was less than the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided to Bragg by Fireman's Fund.

B.

Having determined that § 541(c) is applicable, we must now decide whether the limiting provision of § 541(c)(3) operates to prevent Bragg from recovering under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy with Fireman's Fund. In other words, where, as in the case sub judice, an individual is injured by the negligence of an insured and an uninsured tort-feasor, and the insured tort-feasor's liability insurance equals the injured individual's uninsured motorist coverage, will the limiting provision of § 541(c)(3) prevent his recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his own policy? We hold that it will.

Section 541(c)(3) limits the liability of an insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage:

(3) The limit of liability for an insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage under this subsection is the amount of that coverage less the sum of the limits under the liability insurance policies ... applicable to the bodily injury ... of the insured.

The amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided to Bragg by Fireman's Fund was $50,000. From that must be subtracted "the sum of the limits under the liability insurance policies ... applicable to the bodily injury ... of the insured." § 541(c)(3). In the case sub judice, as we have observed, the only liability insurance policy applicable to the bodily injury of Bragg is the one provided to Gaylin by Allstate Insurance Company. The limit under that policy is $50,000. Thus, the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided to Bragg less the amount of liability insurance applicable to his injury equals zero.

It is a settled principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and free from ambiguity, there is no need to look beyond its words to find its meaning. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund v. Stith, 277 Md. 595, 597, 356 A.2d 272 (1976). When that principle is applied to the case at hand, we conclude that there is no need to look beyond the plain language of § 541(c)(3) to ascertain its meaning. Accordingly, we hold that Bragg may not recover from the uninsured motorist provision of his policy with Fireman's Fund.

Despite the clear statutory language of § 541(c), Bragg nevertheless contends that § 541(c) does not apply to the facts of this case because the purpose for its enactment was to provide the insured the opportunity to recover only in an underinsured motorist situation. He relies principally on two recent Maryland decisions that discuss uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

In Christensen v. Wausau Insurance Companies, 69 Md.App. 696, 519 A.2d 776 (1987) we were asked to interpret an insurance policy that provided separate coverage for uninsured motorists and underinsured motorists. Specifically, we were asked to determine what was meant by underinsurance, and whether, under the terms of Christensen's policy, Wausau was liable for underinsured motorist coverage.

In that case, Christensen was injured when he was struck by a motor vehicle driven by Gerd W. Herrman. Although he settled with Herrman's insurance carrier for $20,000, the maximum available under Herrman's policy, that settlement did not entirely cover the damages he suffered in the accident. Christensen therefore sued his insurer, Wausau, based upon an underinsured motorist endorsement in its policy, to recover the difference between the settlement and his actual damages. The trial court denied him recovery. Upon appeal, we reversed. We reasoned that uninsured motorist coverage is applicable when the vehicle involved in an accident is without insurance or is insured for less than the required liability limits. Underinsured motorist coverage, on the other hand, is applicable when the tort-feasor carries insurance which comports with the legal requirements, but that insurance is inadequate to cover the damages incurred. Since Christensen had paid a separate, additional premium for the underinsurance, we held that Wausau could not escape liability by claiming that the setoff provisions applicable to Christensen's uninsurance would also be applicable to his underinsurance.

In Hoffman v. United Services Automobile Association, 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987), Hoffman and his...