Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hudson, 1031
Decision Date | 13 May 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 1031,1031 |
Citation | 112 So.2d 29 |
Parties | FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioner, v. James W. HUDSON and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David J. Kadyk and Charles F. Clark, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for petitioners.
Robert J. McDermott, Clearwater, Burnis T. Coleman and Paul E. Speh, Tallahassee, for respondents.
This is an application for certiorari directed to the Florida Industrial Commission by the employer and its insurance carrier. The deputy commissioner entered an order finding that the employee's disability was not causally connected with his employment and denied compensation. The Full Industrial Commission affirmed the deputy's findings that the employee's initial coronary attack had no causal connection with his work but remanded the cause for further proceedings as to an award of compensation for that portion of the employee's disability caused by acceleration or aggravation of the heart condition as a result of his continued employment after the initial coronary.
In his order the deputy commissioner found that any permanent partial disability which the employee suffered was not due to an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. The Full Commission in its order found:
* * *
'By the same token, the evidence in the instant cause indicates that although the claimant's coronary was not occasioned by his employment, and the Deputy so found, there was an aggravation of the disability caused initially by the coronary, and we are of the opinion that under authority of the Czepial case, supra, the claimant is entitled to compensation for that portion of the disability caused by the acceleration or aggravation of his condition as a result of his continued employment. * * *.'
In the Czepial v. Krohne Roofing Company case, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 84, the Supreme Court held that where a roofer's constant inhalation of dust and fumes contributed to the acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing tubercular condition, the roofer suffered an injury by 'accident', and he was entitled to compensation from his employer in whose employment the injurious exposure occurred. In the instant case the claimant had worked approximately ten years as a btakeman for the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. Some of the duties of the claimant were adjusting and relining brakes, working with master cylinders, repairing tires, which included their removal from and replacement on rims, and installing new tires. While he was changing a tire in the early part of December 1955, he suffered a pain in his chest. He continued to work until about the middle of December, at which time his condition was diagnosed as myocardial infarction. After lengthy hearings and testimony of some four doctors the deputy commissioner entered the order to which we have referred. As the matter now stands, claimant's coronary attack was not an 'accident' arising out of and in the course of his employment, but the order of the full commission, sending the case back to the deputy commissioner for the entry of an award if the employee's subsequent work for approximately one week tended to aggravate or accelerate the pre-existing heart condition, in effect construes the law to be that an aggravation or acceleration of a non-compensable injury, incurred during the performance of one's ordinary duties which involve no condition to which the public generally is not ordinarily exposed, is such an 'accident' and is compensable.
In the Czepial v, Krohne Roofing Company case, supra , our Supreme Court had this to say:
'We re-affirm the rule of Orr, Jr., Inc. v. Florida Industrial Commission, supra, 176 So. 172, that 'excessive exposure may be found to have been the direct cause of the injury, though operating upon other conditions of common exposure', and we agree with the decisions from other jurisdictions, cited above, holding in effect that the fundamentally accidental nature of the injury is not altered by the fact that, instead of a single occurrence, it is the cumulative effect of the inhalation of dust and fumes to which a claimant is peculiarly susecptible that accelerates a claimant's...
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