Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hudson, 1031

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Citation: 112 So.2d 29
• Docket Number: No. 1031,1031
• Parties: FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioner, v. James W. HUDSON and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 13 May 1959

Page 29

112 So.2d 29 FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioner,
v.
James W. HUDSON and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. No. 1031. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. May 13, 1959.
Rehearing Denied June 3, 1959.

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David J. Kadyk and Charles F. Clark, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for petitioners.

Robert J. McDermott, Clearwater, Burnis T. Coleman and Paul E. Speh, Tallahassee, for respondents.

SHANNON, Judge.

This is an application for certiorari directed to the Florida Industrial Commission by the employer and its insurance carrier. The deputy commissioner entered an order finding that the employee's disability was not causally connected with his employment and denied compensation. The Full Industrial Commission affirmed the deputy's findings that the employee's initial coronary attack had no causal connection with his work but remanded the cause for further proceedings as to an award of compensation for that portion of the employee's disability caused by acceleration or aggravation of the heart condition as a result of his continued employment after the initial coronary.

In his order the deputy commissioner found that any permanent partial disability which the employee suffered was not due to an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. The Full Commission in its order found:

'Claimant has applied for a review from this Order, urging essentially that the Deputy erred by not finding any portion of claimant's permanent partial disability to be due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. But for the decision by our Supreme Court in Czepial v. Krohne Roofing Co., Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 84, we would be of the opinion that the Deputy Commissioner's Order accords with the essential requirements of law; however, in the Czepial case, our Supreme Court held that claimant would be entitled to compensation for disability caused by the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. * * *

'By the same token, the evidence in the instant cause indicates that although the claimant's coronary was not occasioned by his employment, and the Deputy so found, there was an aggravation of the disability caused initially by the coronary, and we are of the opinion that under authority of the Czepial case, supra, the claimant is entitled to compensation for that portion of the disability caused by the acceleration or aggravation of his condition as a result of his continued employment. * * *.'

In the Czepial v. Krohne Roofing Company case, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 84, the Supreme Court held that where a roofer's constant inhalation of dust and fumes contributed to the acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing tubercular condition, the roofer suffered an injury by 'accident', and he was entitled to compensation from his employer in whose employment the injurious exposure occurred. In the instant case the claimant had worked approximately ten years as a btakeman for the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. Some of the duties of the claimant were adjusting and relining brakes, working with master cylinders, repairing tires, which included their removal from and replacement on rims, and installing new

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tires. While he was changing a tire in the early part of December 1955, he suffered a pain in his chest. He continued to work until about the middle of December, at which time his condition was diagnosed as myocardial infarction. After lengthy hearings and...