Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Tyler G. Hart's Estate

• Decision Date: 07 January 1932
• Citation: 158 A. 92,104 Vt. 197
• Parties: FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY v. TYLER G. HART'S ESTATE
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

158 A. 92

104 Vt. 197

FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY v. TYLER G. HART'S ESTATE

Supreme Court of Vermont

January 7, 1932

Special Term at Rutland, November, 1931.

Judgment---Conclusiveness---Privity---G. L. 3303---Estoppel---Effect on Judgment of Lower Court by Allowance and Filing of Exceptions---Harmless Error---Mutuality as to Estoppels---Inadequate Briefing.

1. General rule is that, as between parties or their privies final judgment on merits rendered by court of competent jurisdiction is, in absence of collusion or fraud, conclusive as to all material issues therein involved.

2. Record of entry of judgment and findings of fact against joint surety, held admissible in evidence, to show fact of judgment and material issues involved, in subsequent proceeding against estate of deceased co-surety.

3. Where husband and wife were joint sureties, they were in privity with each other, and, upon death of husband, same privity exists between surviving joint surety and deceased surety's estate.

4. Common-law rule that death of joint contractor discharges his estate has been modified by G. L. 3303 to extent of making estate of deceased promissor liable for debt, but not affecting liability of survivor thereby.

5. To operate as an estoppel, judgment must be final.

6. Judgment of trial court in action at law is not vacated by allowance and filing of bill of exceptions, but remains valid until reversed or annulled, and execution is not thereby stayed as matter of course.

7. Error, if any, of trial court in holding judgment against surviving joint surety conclusive as an estoppel against estate of deceased co-surety, although exceptions had been taken thereto and cause transferred to Supreme Court, held rendered harmless, when judgment was affirmed.

8. In proceeding to recover from estate of deceased joint surety, previous judgment against surviving joint surety, held to operate as estoppel against personal representative of deceased co-surety under general rule that estoppels must be mutual.

9. Brief on question of damages, which was only practical repetition of what was said upon subject in trial court, held inadequate, and so not for consideration of Supreme Court.

APPEAL IN PROBATE to county court from disallowance of claim by commissioners on Tyler G. Hart's Estate. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1930, Rutland County, Buttles, J presiding. Verdict directed for plaintiffs and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Novak Bloomer & Spero for the defendant.

Webber & Leamy for the plaintiff.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION

MOULTON

The facts in this case are the same as those involved in Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Elizabeth K. Hart, decided at the present term of this Court. Elizabeth and the decedent, Tyler G. Hart, who were husband and wife, entered into a joint obligation whereby they agreed to be sureties for the payment of sums owed by William H. and John G. Keenan to the plaintiff. After default by the Keenans, Tyler died and Elizabeth became his administratrix. Suit was commenced against Elizabeth, and, in due time, a claim was presented to the commissioner of Tyler's estate, which was disallowed and on appeal taken to county court. The case against Elizabeth was tried without a jury, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and exceptions taken by the defendant. At a subsequent term of county court, the appeal from commissioners was tried, the case against Elizabeth being then pending in this Court, but not having come on for hearing. At the close of plaintiff's evidence a verdict was directed against the defendant estate and the defendant excepted.

The plaintiff offered in evidence the findings of fact in the case against Elizabeth, the entry of judgment therein, the record of the appearance of Elizabeth as defendant; and the writ and declaration in that case for the purpose of showing that the subject-matter of the two proceedings was identical. All were received. The trial court held that the judgment against Elizabeth was conclusive as against the estate of her husband. The only exception briefed calls in question the soundness of this ruling.

The general rule is that, as between the parties or their privies, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is, in the absence of collusion or fraud, conclusive as to all the material issues therein involved. 1 Greenleaf Evidence (16th ed.), pars, 523, 528, 529; Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419, 431, 123 A. 626, 632; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98, 104; Cady v. Sanford, 53 Vt. 632, 638, 640. This doctrine is said to be based upon the theory of estoppel. Greenleaf, supra, par. 523; Cutler v. Jennings, 99 Vt. 85, 89, 130 A. 583; Dunnett v. Shields, supra. It is dictated by a policy of repose, since "it is for the interest of the community that a limit should be prescribed for litigation; and that the same cause of action should not be brought twice to a final determination." Public tranquillity demands the end of the controversy. Greenleaf, supra, par. 522; 33 Harv. Law Rev. 850, 851; Nason v. Blaisdell, 12 Vt. 165, 171, 36 A. D. 331. Mr. Wigmore says that the operation of recognizing a judgment "in support of a plaintiff or in defense of a defendant is upon analysis not at all an employment of evidence. It is rather the lending of the Court's executive aid, on certain terms, to a claimant or a defendant, without investigation of the merits of fact." 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.), par. 1347. The record of the entry of judgment, and the finding of facts, are admissible in evidence to show the fact of the judgment and the material issues involved. Spencer v. Dearth, supra, 43 Vt. at page 105; Cady v. Sanford, supra, 53 Vt. at page 639; Littleton v. Richardson, 34 N.H. 179, 187, 66 A. D. 759.

Elizabeth and her husband, Tyler G. Hart, were joint promisors, and therefore in privity with each other under the holding in Spencer v. Dearth, supra, 43 Vt. at page 110. See, also, Brown's Admr. v. Johnson, 54 Va. 644, 13 Gratt. 644. Consequently the same privity exists between Elizabeth and her husband's estate. The situation is not one where a judgment against an individual is not to be held binding against the same person acting in a representative capacity as in Buck v. Hunter, 98 Vt. 163, 168, 126 A. 504. The common-law rule that a judgment against one joint contractor is a bar to a subsequent action upon the same obligation against another joint contractor, since, in such a case, there can be but one recovery, because there is only one debt (see Heckemann v. Young, 134 N.Y. 170, 31 N.E. 513, 514, 30 A. S. R. 655; Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231, 6 Wall. [73 U.S.] 231, 18 L.Ed. 783, 785; King v. Hoare, 13 Mees & Welsb. 494, 505), does not apply here because by G. L. 3303 it is provided that when one of two or more joint contractors dies his estate shall be liable therefor, and the claim may be allowed by the commissioners as if the contract had been joint and several. This statute modifies the rule of the common law that the death of a joint contractor discharges his estate to the extent of making the estate of the deceased promisor liable for the debt, but the liability of the survivor is unaffected thereby. Hogan v. Sullivan, 79 Vt. 36, 40, 64 A. 234.

Since, therefore, in the instant case, the defendant estate is in privity with the defendant in the former suit; the issue is the same in each case; the record shows that the proposed defense to the validity of the obligation is also the same; and the action is not barred by the first judgment, we conclude that the judgment against Elizabeth is conclusive against the estate of the deceased husband, unless it has been deprived of the quality of finality by the filing of a bill of exceptions and the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court.

In order to operate as an estoppel, the judgment must be final. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28 60 L.Ed. 868, 872, 36 S.Ct. 477. Upon the question whether the pendency of an appeal or other proceedings of that nature prevents the requisite finality, the authorities are not harmonious. In some jurisdictions it is held that a judgment or decree cannot be used as res adjudicata pending an appeal to a higher court. Bryar v. Campbell, 177 U.S. 649, 654, 44 L.Ed. 926, 928, 20 S.Ct. 794; Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635, 35 P. 433, 38 A. S. R. 314, 321; Souter v. Baymore, 7 Pa. 415, 47 A. D. 518, 519; Haynes v. Ordway, 52 N.H. 284, 285; Sutton v....