Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co.

Decision Date30 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 79-3684,79-3684
Citation654 F.2d 1212
PartiesRussell A. FIRESTONE, III and Myrna Odell Firestone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CLEVELAND TRUST COMPANY and Russell A. Firestone, Jr., Defendants- Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Joan Odell, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Timothy F. Bannon, Baker, Hostetler & Patterson, Richard F. Stevens, Jonathan E. Thackeray, Baker & Hostetler, Mark O'Leary, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.

James R. Bright, Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell, Cleveland, Ohio, for Firestone, Jr.

Before BAILEY BROWN and BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves yet another effort to confer domestic relations jurisdiction upon the federal courts. The district court dismissed 1 on the ground that as a general rule federal courts will not entertain matters involving domestic relations even though diversity of citizenship exists. We affirm.

I

This ongoing domestic relations dispute began when Myrna Odell Firestone obtained a divorce from Russell A. Firestone, Jr., in a Florida state court in 1974. The 1974 divorce decree spawned further litigation between Myrna and Russell Firestone, Jr., in the Florida circuit and appellate courts. Mrs. Firestone and her son, Russell Firestone, III, filed the present action in the district court against Russell Firestone, Jr., and the Cleveland Trust Company, 2 the trustee of several trusts for which Russell Firestone, Jr., is the beneficiary. Mrs. Firestone and her son seek money damages, declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged failure of her former husband to meet his obligations under the divorce decree, and for Cleveland Trust's refusal to pay the support obligations of Russell Firestone, Jr., out of trust proceeds.

On February 25, 1974, the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, issued a final judgment of dissolution of marriage between Myrna Firestone and Russell A. Firestone, Jr. The final judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement executed by Mr. and Mrs. Firestone, and awarded custody of their child, Russell, III, to Mrs. Firestone. The property agreement imposed alimony and child support obligations upon Russell Firestone, Jr., and provided for the sale or division of jointly held personal and real property. The duties and obligations of both parties were numerous, and performance of those duties necessarily extended over a number of years.

Mrs. Firestone filed a motion for contempt on December 26, 1975, in the Dade County Circuit Court alleging that Mr. Firestone had failed to abide by the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The Dade County Circuit Court retained jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Fla.Stat. §§ 61.13 and 61.14. The motion alleged Russell Firestone, Jr. was delinquent in the payment of alimony, child support, attorney fees, and miscellaneous financial obligations amounting to a substantial sum. A hearing on the motion on January 8, 1976, was continued until February 27, 1976, and continued again until March 5, 1976, with no order entered. Mrs. Firestone amended her complaint on January 18, 1977, to allege only a violation of the settlement agreement concerning mortgage payments on the marital home on La Gorce Island, Florida. On March 11, 1977, a hearing was conducted on the sale of the La Gorce Island property, but no order resulted. Finally, on May 19, 1977, Mrs. Firestone filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which was granted by the Dade County Circuit Court.

Next Mrs. Firestone, individually and on behalf of her minor son Russell, III, filed the present action on February 14, 1978, in the district court. The complaint, grounded upon diversity jurisdiction, named Russell Firestone, Jr. and the Cleveland Trust Company as defendants and contained seven claims for relief. Claim I alleged Russell Firestone, III was a beneficiary of the Harbel Trust, 3 asserted that Cleveland Trust's mismanagement and waste had caused loss to the corpus and income, and demanded an accounting and replacement of the sums lost. Claim II accused Cleveland Trust of filing a complaint in an Ohio state court for the purpose of insulating itself from liability to the trust beneficiaries for past and future breaches of its fiduciary duties. This second claim sought an injunction restraining Cleveland Trust from continuing the state court action or modifying the trust agreement, demanded removal of Cleveland Trust as the trustee, and requested compensatory and punitive damages.

Claims III through VII of the complaint are the subject of this appeal. Russell Firestone, III, through his mother, brought Claim III against Cleveland Trust. He alleged that his claims for support and maintenance from his father were enforceable against Cleveland Trust and, as a "third-party beneficiary of the Separation Agreement," all the unfulfilled provisions of the agreement were enforceable against Cleveland Trust. The alleged breaches in Claim III were similar to those in the contempt motion filed in the Dade County Circuit Court in December, 1975. Russell Firestone, III sought a money judgment from Cleveland Trust for accrued obligations of support, a declaration of his "rights and interests in and to the interests of defendant, Russell A. Firestone, Jr." in the various trusts, and an injunction against any further trust payments to his father "until and after the total sum due and owing for the support of Russell A. Firestone III, as determined by this court" was paid by Cleveland Trust. The fourth claim against Cleveland Trust made by Mrs. Firestone in her capacity as the mother of her minor son contained basically the same allegations and requested relief as Claim III.

Mrs. Firestone individually made the fifth claim against her former husband and Cleveland Trust to recover accrued sums and items owed on the obligations and support duties of Mr. Firestone under the agreement and decree. Claim V alleged many breaches of the agreement and demanded judgment against Russell Firestone, Jr., and Cleveland Trust in excess of $1,362,500 for accrued support obligations as determined by the court, a declaration of Mrs. Firestone's rights and interests in the Firestone trusts, and an injunction restraining Cleveland Trust from making any trust payments until the support for Mrs. Firestone was paid.

Claim VI, brought by Mrs. Firestone, and Claim VII, brought by her son, alleged that Cleveland Trust knew the obligations of Mr. Firestone under the divorce decree, that Cleveland Trust intentionally prevented the performance of these support obligations, and that Cleveland Trust continually advised Russell Firestone, Jr. to breach his support obligations under the agreement. They demanded compensatory and punitive damages against Cleveland Trust.

On March 13, 1978, Russell Firestone, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging, inter alia, that the district court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the complaint. Cleveland Trust filed a motion on April 28, 1978, requesting dismissal of Claims III through VII on the grounds of federal abstention.

Prior to the district court's ruling on these motions, Russell Firestone, Jr., filed a motion for contempt against Mrs. Firestone in the Dade County Circuit Court in April 1978. The Florida Circuit Court conducted a hearing on the motion and issued an order on May 22, 1978. The order found Mrs. Firestone in contempt for refusing to execute an agreement for the sale of jointly held farm property at a price previously agreed upon, and relieved Mr. Firestone from paying further alimony until Mrs. Firestone executed the sales agreement and purged herself of contempt. Mrs. Firestone filed a motion for rehearing and to vacate the contempt order, which was denied by the Circuit Court on June 14, 1978. Mrs. Firestone subsequently appealed the contempt order to the Florida District Court of Appeals.

While the Florida appeal was pending, on September 7, 1978, the district court dismissed Claims III through VII of the complaint in the present case, declining to exercise jurisdiction because the settlement agreement was at the core of Claims III-VII, the issues raised therein were closely associated with domestic relations issues, and the 1974 divorce decree was still the subject of active litigation in the Florida state courts. In his order the district judge quoted the following from the Florida circuit court order of June 14, 1978:

It appears from the Motions and Affidavits filed on her behalf that she is proceeding in other Courts in other jurisdictions for relief concerning the Final Judgment entered in the above-styled cause. The Respondent, MYRNA O'DELL FIRESTONE, may proceed at any time under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure on a Contempt Notice to enforce any provision of the Final Judgment in the above-styled cause in this Court.

And further, the Florida state court stated:

The Respondent, MYRNA O'DELL FIRESTONE, is hereby given leave to file any Contempt Notice against Petitioner or any Motion to enforce the Final Judgment entered in the above-styled cause and the Agreement entered into between the parties and approved and confirmed by said Final Judgment at any time and she may bring to the attention of the Court by proper pleading any issue involved in said Agreement entered between the parties and the Final Judgment entered in the above-styled cause approving said Final Judgment. (The Respondent has taken one (1) Voluntary Dismissal under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure but she is entitled to proceed again on contempt against the Petitioner and on any other issue mentioned above one (1) more time before she is barred from proceeding further on the same matters involved when a second Voluntary Dismissal is taken).

Ultimately the Florida Court of Appeals on May 29, 1979,...

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