First Chicago v. Industrial Com'n

• Decision Date: 10 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1-97-1116WC,1-97-1116WC
• Citation: 691 N.E.2d 134,294 Ill.App.3d 685,229 Ill.Dec. 198
• Parties: , 229 Ill.Dec. 198 FIRST CHICAGO, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sharon Skalon, Appellee).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 134

691 N.E.2d 134

294 Ill.App.3d 685, 229 Ill.Dec. 198

FIRST CHICAGO, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sharon Skalon, Appellee).

No. 1-97-1116WC.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District,

Industrial Commission Division.

Feb. 10, 1998.

Hennessy & Roach, P.C., Chicago (Daniel E. O'Brien, Thomas G. Hennessy, of counsel), for appellant.

Arthur German, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, First Chicago, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing respondent's judicial review of the Industrial Commission's (Commission) order awarding benefits to claimant, Sharon Skalon, under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1996)). The circuit court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Commission's decision. We reverse and remand with directions.

FACTS

The facts are undisputed. On June 27, 1995, an arbitrator entered an award in claimant's favor. On June 10, 1996, the Commission partially modified, but otherwise affirmed, the arbitrator's decision. On August 12, 1996, the Commission issued a corrected decision. Respondent claims, and claimant does not argue otherwise, that it received the Commission's decision on August 19, 1996.

On September 9, 1996, respondent timely filed documents in the circuit court of Cook County, including an appeal bond, to institute the judicial review of the Commission's decision. The appeal bond was signed as follows:

First Chicago

/s/ John A. Bradley

As principal

Safeco Insurance Company of America

/s/ Theodore C. Sevier, Jr.

As surety

Theodore C. Sevier, Jr., Attorney-in-Fact

On October 9, 1996, claimant filed a special and limited appearance and a motion to quash summons and dismiss the action. Claimant argued that the bond was insufficient to bind respondent because it was not signed by Mr. Bradley as an officer of respondent and did not indicate that Mr. Bradley was authorized to execute the bond on respondent's behalf. Claimant also complained that respondent's original summons erroneously referred to the June 10, 1996, Commission decision and contained an erroneous return date. Accordingly, claimant argued that respondent failed to comply with In its decision, the circuit court made no findings of fact regarding Mr. Bradley's authority to bind respondent. Instead, the circuit court stated a single legal conclusion--Mr. Bradley signed the bond individually. The circuit court rejected claimant's argument under section 19(f)(1) regarding the decision date and return date in the original summons but granted the motion to quash based on Mr. Bradley's failure to identify his authority and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Respondent timely appealed.

[229 Ill.Dec. 200] the 20-day statutory review period under section 19(f)(1) of the Act because an amended summons referring to the corrected decision date with a proper return date was not filed until October 15, 1996. On December 16, 1996, respondent filed its brief in response to claimant's motion wherein respondent identified Mr. Bradley as respondent's vice president-management of corporate insurance and as respondent's authorized agent.

ANALYSIS

When the facts upon an issue are undisputed and susceptible to but a single inference, as in this case, the issue is a question of law, and the circuit court's decision is not binding on this court. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.2d 52, 60, 133 Ill.Dec. 454, 541 N.E.2d 665 (1989). Accordingly, based upon the undisputed facts in this case, we review the circuit court's decision as a question of law.

I. SECTION 19(F)(2)

A. Identification of Individual Signing Appeal Bond

In this case, we do not know Mr. Bradley's status with or relationship to respondent. The record contains no evidence identifying Mr. Bradley, and respondent's identification of Mr. Bradley as an officer in its brief in response to claimant's motion to dismiss is simply not evidence. As a result, we do not know whether Mr. Bradley is respondent's officer or someone else. Thus, the first issue is whether an individual signing an appeal bond (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 1996)) on behalf of a corporate respondent must identify on the appeal bond his or her status as an officer of the corporation in order to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court under section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996)). We find section 19(f)(2) does not contain such a requirement.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d 435, 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). In this case, section 19(f)(2) provides in pertinent part: "No such summons shall issue unless the one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of his written request for such summons file with the clerk of the court a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay the award and the costs of the proceedings in the courts." 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 1996).

Furthermore, where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, the court is not free to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d at 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. Similarly, when the legislature is silent, a court may not fill a void through judicial interpretation. Gabriel Builders, Inc. v. Westchester Condominium Ass'n, 268 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1068, 206 Ill.Dec. 448, 645 N.E.2d 453 (1994).

According to the plain language of the Act, section 19(f)(2) only requires that the bond be executed by the party against whom the award has been made (Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 Ill.2d 413, 414, 177 Ill.Dec. 446, 603 N.E.2d 516 (1992)), and, in this case, that party is First Chicago. Thus, while the better practice may be for an individual to always identify his or her status as an officer of a corporate respondent when signing an appeal bond on the corporation's behalf, section 19(f)(2) does not require that the signing individual identify on the bond his or her office, and we decline to add such a condition.

B. Evidence of Authority Outside 20-day Period

The second issue then is whether a corporate respondent may present evidence after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period under section 19(f)(1) of the Act to refute an attack on the signing individual's authority to bind the corporation. In other words, if the individual signing the appeal bond on behalf of the corporation did not identify his or her status as an officer of the corporation and the claimant attacks the appeal bond after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period, may the corporate respondent submit evidence, such as an affidavit, identifying the individual's corporate office and authority to bind the corporation. The answer is yes.

In the line of cases involving attorneys signing appeal bonds on behalf of respondents, each of the respondents filed affidavits after the expiration of the 20-day period. See Deichmueller, 151 Ill.2d 413, 177 Ill.Dec. 446, 603 N.E.2d 516 (respondent filed affidavit ratifying attorney's actions outside 20-day period); Berryman Equipment v. Industrial Comm'n, 276 Ill.App.3d 76, 212 Ill.Dec. 694, 657 N.E.2d 1039 (1995)(respondent filed affidavit with reply in support of motion to reconsider order dismissing judicial review); Illinois Armored Car Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 205 Ill.App.3d 993, 150 Ill.Dec. 824, 563 N.E.2d 951 (1990)(respondent filed affidavit confirming attorney's authority outside 20-day period). Similarly, in Lee v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill.2d 496, 45 Ill.Dec. 947, 413 N.E.2d 425 (1980), two partners filed a second bond after the expiration of the 20-day period. Accordingly, respondent should be permitted to present evidence identifying Mr. Bradley's status as an officer in order to prove the sufficiency of the appeal bond.

We note that the interests of justice further support our position on this issue. If we did not allow a corporate respondent to submit evidence outside the 20-day statutory review period to refute an attack on an individual's authority to sign an appeal bond on behalf of the corporation, the claimant would always wait until the 20-day period expired and then attack the appeal, as in this case. The respondent would not be able to prove the signing individual had authority even if that person did possess the appropriate authority. The respondent would then be punished because the individual did not identify his or her corporate office even though the Act does not contain such a requirement.

C. Effect of Signing Individual's Identity on Motion

Even though respondent may file evidence after the expiration of the 20-day period, our inquiry continues. The signing individual's identity ultimately controls the outcome of the motion to dismiss the appeal.

For instance, if the evidence is filed outside the 20-day period and the signing individual is the respondent's attorney, the appeal should be dismissed. See Berryman, 276 Ill.App.3d at 76, 212 Ill.Dec. 694, 657 N.E.2d 1039 (an attorney who signs an appeal bond "as principal" in lieu of a corporate officer for a corporate respondent must attach to the appeal bond and file the written authority conferred upon the attorney by the party within the 20-day statutory review period to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act); see also Deichmueller, 151 Ill.2d 413, 177 Ill.Dec. 446, 603 N.E.2d 516; Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill.App.3d 993, 150 Ill.Dec. 824, 563 N.E.2d 951.

Conversely, if the evidence is filed outside the 20-day period and the individual...