First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15377,15377
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FIRST FEDERAL BANK, FSB v. WHITNEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

Page 1363

677 A.2d 1363

237 Conn. 679

FIRST FEDERAL BANK, FSB v. WHITNEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

No. 15377.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 1996.

Decided July 9, 1996.

Dean W. Baker, New Haven, with whom was William Craig, for appellant (defendant Carmel Sullivan).

Richard B. Cramer, New Haven, for appellee (substitute plaintiff Berkeley Federal Bank and Trust, FSB).

Lawrence W. Berliner filed a brief for the Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, KATZ and DUPONT, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

This appeal requires us to decide whether General Statutes § 47a-23c, ¹ which protects certain classes of tenants from dispossession, limits the right of a mortgagee after foreclosure to obtain, pursuant to General Statutes § 49-22, ² an execution of a judgment of ejectment against a protected tenant. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure against the defendants, ³ including the tenant in possession of the mortgaged property, Carmel Sullivan, and in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Berkeley Federal Bank and Trust, FSB (Berkeley). ⁴ Subsequently, the trial court issued an execution of a judgment of ejectment against Sullivan, but stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal. Sullivan appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

For the purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts are undisputed. Because Sullivan is over sixty-two years of age and has certain physical disabilities, she meets the requirements of a protected tenant of a condominium unit under General Statutes § 47a-23c(a)(1)(A) and (B). She has paid and continues to pay fair rent in the amount of $600 each month. Berkeley does not have good cause to evict Sullivan under § 47a-23c(b)(1).

The plaintiff mortgagee filed a complaint against Sullivan, and others, seeking strict foreclosure and other relief. ⁵ After the trial court, Hon. Anthony V. DeMayo, state trial referee, rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure against the defendants, ⁶ Sullivan moved to open the judgment. The trial court, Hon. Donald W. Celotto, state trial referee, granted the motion in order to allow Sullivan to preserve a defense of protection from dispossession pursuant to § 47a-23c in the event that Berkeley sought an execution of the judgment of ejectment, and later re-entered the judgment nunc pro tunc.

After none of the defendants, including Sullivan, redeemed on the assigned law days, Berkeley moved for possession and an execution of the judgment of ejectment against Sullivan. The trial court, Hon. Donald W. Celotto, state trial referee, granted the motion, concluding that § 47a-23c does not protect a tenant in possession from ejectment pursuant to § 49-22. The trial court stayed its judgment pending appeal.

On appeal to this court, Sullivan claims that § 47a-23c applies to any proceeding to dispossess a protected tenant, including a proceeding for an execution of a judgment of ejectment after a judgment of strict foreclosure has been rendered. Berkeley claims, to the contrary, that the applicable statute is § 49-22, which authorizes an execution of a judgment of ejectment without regard to § 47a-23c, which, according to Berkeley, relates solely to summary process proceedings. We agree with Sullivan.

Resolution of the issue presented by this appeal requires a reconciliation of two statutes that lie at the conjunction of mortgage law and landlord tenant law. One statute confers rights upon a mortgagee and the other confers rights upon the mortgagor's tenants. In undertaking our analysis of the proper realm of each statute, we are guided "by well established principles of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary.... [O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the [statutes themselves], to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding [their] enactment, to the legislative policy [they were] designed to implement, and to [their] relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter[s]. (Citations omitted....) State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22-23, 670 A.2d 851 (1996); HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 656, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herbert S. Newman & Partners v. CFC Construction Ltd. Partnership, 236 Conn. 750, 755-56, 674 A.2d 1313 (1996).

Our task of statutory construction is guided further by the fact that "s 47a-23c is a remedial statute intended to benefit elderly, blind and physically disabled tenants." O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 215 Conn. 367, 373, 576 A.2d 469 (1990); see 23 H.R.Proc., Pt. 18, 1980 Sess., p. 5327, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano; 23 S.Proc., Pt. 5, 1980 Sess., pp. 1393-94, remarks of Senator Clifton A. Leonhardt. As such, the statute must be "construed liberally in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit" in order to effect the legislative intent. O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, at 373, 576 A.2d 469; see Herbert S. Newman & Partners v. CFC Construction Ltd. Partnership, supra, 236 Conn. at 757, 674 A.2d 1313; Kaufman v. Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 122, 140, 653 A.2d 798 (1995).

Under the circumstances of this case, we must answer two questions. First, does the protection afforded to tenants by § 47a-23c have any applicability in the context of an action by a mortgagee under § 49-22 to obtain possession of the mortgaged premises after foreclosure? Second, if § 47a-23c is applicable, how are the terms of the two statutes to be reconciled? We conclude that both questions should be answered to afford Sullivan the rights conferred upon her by § 47a-23c.

I

We must first determine whether the circumstances of this case implicate § 47a-23c as well as § 49-22. The parties agree that, as a general matter, § 49-22 authorizes a mortgagee to obtain possession of foreclosed property from a mortgagor's tenant in possession. Berkeley disagrees, however, with Sullivan's contention that § 47a-23c affords the right to prevent ejectment to a mortgagor's tenant after foreclosure. We conclude that the fact of a foreclosure, under the circumstances of this case, does not preclude a tenant from invoking the rights conferred by § 47a-23c.

The crucial question is the scope of § 47a-23c. That statute provides in relevant part that "[n]o landlord may bring an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a [protected] tenant ... except" for good cause. (Emphasis added.) Berkeley argues that it is not a "landlord," that its motion for an execution on its judgment of ejectment after foreclosure is not an "action" and that, after foreclosure, Sullivan is no longer a "tenant." We disagree. The terms "landlord," "action" and "tenant" are each defined by statute in a manner that brings this case within § 47a-23c.

Berkeley fits the definition of "landlord" because it holds absolute title to the condominium unit. A "landlord" is defined as "the owner ... of the dwelling unit...." ⁷ General Statutes § 47a-1(d). "Owner" is defined as "one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested ... all or part of the legal title to property...." General Statutes § 47a-1(e). Berkeley became the owner, and thus the landlord, when the entire legal title to the condominium unit became vested in it as a result of the foreclosure judgment and the passing of the law days. ⁸ See Barbara Weisman, Trustee v. Kaspar, 233 Conn. 531, 551, 661 A.2d 530 (1995) ("judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of senior mortgagee vests absolute title in the foreclosing plaintiff, upon the failure of the junior mortgagees who are parties defendant to redeem the property"); Crane v. Loomis, 128 Conn. 697, 700, 25 A.2d 650 (1942) (upon failure to redeem, title becomes absolute in mortgagee); City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Murphy, 120 Conn. 16, 25, 179 A. 339 (1935) ("[w]here a foreclosure decree has become absolute by the passing of the law days, the outstanding rights of redemption have been cut off and the title has become unconditional in the [mortgagee]"); Nourse v. Lycett, 114 Conn. 432, 437, 159 A. 277 (1932) (judgment of foreclosure determines "debt and the absolute title of the mortgagee after the law day").

Berkeley next claims that a motion for an execution of the judgment of ejectment, pursuant to an action for foreclosure, is not an "action," as that term is used in § 47a-23c and defined in General Statutes § 47a-1(a). ⁹ Specifically, Berkeley contends that the codification of § 47a-23c in the summary process chapter of the landlord and tenant title implies a corresponding limitation in the scope of the phrases "other action to dispossess a tenant" in § 47a-23c(b)(1) and "any other proceeding in which rights are determined" in the definition of "action." See General Statutes § 47a-1(a), footnote 9. Despite this broad statutory language, Berkeley argues that § 47a-23c applies only to actions brought pursuant to statutes contained in title 47a, denominated Landlord and Tenant. We are not persuaded.

Section 47a-23c(b)(1) protects certain classes of tenants from eviction through "an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a tenant...." (Emphasis added.) "Action" is expansively defined in part as "any other proceeding in which rights are determined, including an action for possession." General Statutes § 47a-1(a). Although § 47a-23c does not explicitly state that it applies to a motion for ejectment after foreclosure, we conclude that such a motion is an "action to dispossess a tenant," and thus, is an "actio...