First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., s. 91-5262

• Decision Date: 02 April 1993
• Docket Number: 91-5336,Nos. 91-5262,s. 91-5262
• Citation: First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 988 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
• Parties: , 61 USLW 2597 FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellants, v. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, et al. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Lexington State Bank, Appellants, v. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1272

988 F.2d 1272

300 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 61 USLW 2597

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellants, v.NATIONAL CREDIT UNION

ADMINISTRATION, et al.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Lexington

State Bank, Appellants, v.NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION.

Nos. 91-5262, 91-5336.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 16, 1992.

Decided April 2, 1993.

Michael S. Helfer, with whom William J. Kolasky, Jr., John J. Gill, and Michael F. Crotty, were on the brief, for appellants.

Jonathan R. Siegel, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay P. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and Douglas N. Letter, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for appellee Nat. Credit Union Admin.

Paul J. Lambert and Teresa Burke were on the brief, for appelleesAT&T Family Federal Credit Union and Credit Union National Association, Inc.

Edward C. Winslow and William C. Scott were on the brief, for amicus curiae North Carolina Alliance of Community Financial Institutions.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, four North Carolina banks and the American Bankers Association, challenged the National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA) approval of several recent applications by AT & T Family Federal Credit Union (AT & T Family) to expand its membership.According to appellants, the NCUA's decisions violated the requirement of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) that membership in federal credit unions be limited to "groups having a common bond of occupation or association."12 U.S.C. § 1759.The banks complain that, by allowing AT & T Family improperly to extend its membership and thereby its number of potential borrowing customers, the NCUA has made the credit union a formidable competitor.The district court applied the "zone of interests" tests for prudential standing and determined that appellants lacked standing to sue.Although we agree with the district court that the appellants were not intended beneficiaries of the FCUA, we think that they are suitable challengers because the statute arguably prohibits the competition of which they complain.This case thus falls within the rationale of Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757(1987), andInvestment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367(1971).We reverse and remand to the district court.

I.

Passed in 1934 in the midst of the Great Depression, the FCUA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795k(1988), was designed to improve access to credit for people of "small means."S.REP. NO. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1934).For many working Americans, credit at reasonable rates had essentially disappeared in the years following the stock market crash.Lacking the security necessary to obtain loans from banks, working Americans turned to loan sharks who typically charged usurious interest rates, which was thought to reduce the overall purchasing power of American consumers.See78 CONG.REC. 12,223(1934).Congress saw the solution to this problem in a system of federal credit unions that would provide credit at reasonable rates and thus would help spur economic recovery.Seeid. at 7260, 12,223-25.

To ensure that credit unions fulfilled their purpose of meeting members' credit needs, Congress restricted credit unions' management and business activities.For example, a federal credit union is owned and controlled by its members, see12 U.S.C. §§ 1757-1761, and it can make loans only to members or to other credit unions, seeid.§ 1757(5).Congress expected that such measures guaranteeing democratic self-government would infuse the credit union with a spirit of cooperative self-help and ensure that the credit union would remain responsive to its members' needs.

A related provision of the FCUA, the common bond requirement, is at the heart of this case.Section 109 of the Act restricts membership in federal credit unions to "groups having a common bond of occupation or association."12 U.S.C. § 1759.For much of the Act's history, the NCUA interpreted this provision to require all members of a credit union to share the same bond.In the 1980s, however, the NCUA issued a series of Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statements (IRPS) construing the statute to allow a number of different groups, each having its own bond, to form a credit union, even though no overall common bond united the different groups.See47 Fed.Reg. 26,808(1982)(IRPS 82-3);48 Fed.Reg. 22,899(1983);49 Fed.Reg. 46,536(1984)(IRPS 84-1);54 Fed.Reg. 31,165(1989)(IRPS 89-1).The NCUA's most recent interpretation, IRPS 89-1, made clear that a credit union could comprise a "combination of distinct, definable occupational and/or associational groups."54 Fed.Reg. 31,165, 31,170(1989).

Appellants challenged several decisions in which the NCUA applied IRPS 89-1 to approve applications by AT & T Family to expand its field of membership.Until recently, AT & T Family's membership consisted primarily of employees of AT & T Technologies, Inc., AT & T Network Systems, and Bell Telephone Labs.In late 1989 and 1990, AT & T Family filed eight applications to extend its membership to include groups of employees from other companies such as the American Tobacco Company, Western Auto Supply Company, and WGHP-TV, to name but a few.In all, the NCUA approved the extension of AT & T Family's membership to 16 new employee groups.Appellants claimed before the agency and in the district court that IRPS 89-1 ignored the statutory language by allowing groups lacking any common bond between them to join together in a credit union.The banks contended that by allowing AT & T Family to expand to 71,000 members in violation of the statute, the NCUA has allowed the credit union, which is exempt from state and federal income taxes, see12 U.S.C. § 1768, to become a formidable competitor to banks.

The district court granted NCUA's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.The court determined that appellants were not pressing claims "arguably within the zone of interests" protected by the FCUA.SeeFirst Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 772 F.Supp. 609, 611-13(D.D.C.1991).Relying on the language of this court's post-Clarke decisions on prudential standing, see, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918(D.C.Cir.1989)(HWTC IV );Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 861 F.2d 277(D.C.Cir.1988),cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3157, 104 L.Ed.2d 1020(1989)(HWTC II ), the district court said that "[t]hose not regulated by an agency have standing only if they are the intended beneficiaries of the specific statute or are nonetheless 'suitable challengers' to the statute because their interests coincide with the interests which Congress did intend to protect."First Nat'l Bank, 772 F.Supp. at 611.The banks were not intended beneficiaries of the Act, thought the district court, because "the Act was passed to establish a place for credit unions within the country's financial market, and specifically not to protect the competitive interest of banks."Id. at 612;see alsoBranch Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin. Bd., 786 F.2d 621(4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063, 107 S.Ct. 948, 93 L.Ed.2d 997(1987).Under applicable precedent, the district court believed that the banks were not suitable challengers either.Because the banks and the credit union competed for the same business, any coincidence in their interests "would be at best fortuitous."First Nat'l Bank, 772 F.Supp. at 612.The banks, according to the district court, could not rely on the Supreme Court's cases, see, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757(1987);Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367(1971)(ICI );Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184(1970), that granted standing to competitors as suitable challengers because, unlike the competitors in those cases, the banks were not suing under an entry-restricting statute.SeeFirst Nat'l Bank, 772 F.Supp. at 613.

II.

It should be noted that no one questions appellants' Article III standing; that appellants will suffer competitive or economic injury is not in doubt.The question before us is whether under the FCUA the banks can claim prudential standing as well.In other words, are they pursuing an interest (not just an objective), seeHWTC IV, 885 F.2d at 925, ¹ arguably within the zone of interests Congress intended either to regulate or protect, and, thus, are they among the class of persons entitled to sue to enforce FCUA's restrictions?SeeClarke, 479 U.S. at 396, 107 S.Ct. at 755;Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 829.This "zone of interests" test ensures that standing is granted only to plaintiffs who will not distort congressional objectives.It excludes those plaintiffs whose "interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757.Because the banks are not regulated by the common bond requirement, we must inquire whether the banks can be thought to have been "protected" by that statutory limitation on the activities of credit unions.Litigants can qualify as "protected" by a statute if they are intended beneficiaries of the legislation or are nevertheless what we have termed suitable challengers, seeHWTC IV, 885 F.2d at 923-24; that is, if their interests are sufficiently congruent with those of the intended beneficiaries that the litigants are not "more likely to frustrate...