First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. People

• Decision Date: 20 March 1952
• Docket Number: No. 32241,32241
• Citation: First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. People, 412 Ill. 29, 104 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. 1952)
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHICAGO et al. v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 630

104 N.E.2d 630

412 Ill. 29

FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHICAGO et al. v.PEOPLE.

No. 32241.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 1952.

Rosenthal, King & Robin, Chicago (Willard L. King, and George W. Gale, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines and John T. Coburn, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook County, affirming an order of the county judge, which fixed the inheritance tax due upon a legacy to Jane Myres, the widow of a stepson of the decedent, Lessing Rosenthal.The legacy was taxed as a legacy to a stranger.The executors appeal, contending that it should have been taxed as a legacy to the widow of a son.

The facts are stipulated: Magnus Myres, the stepson of Lessing Rosenthal, was born May 20, 1890.His own father died in August, 1892.On December 10, 1901, when he was eleven years old, his mother married Lessing Rosenthal.The decedent took Magnus Myres into his household and fed, clothed and educated him.He reared him as his own son.Although he was never legally adopted by the decedent, Magnus Myres called him 'father' and the decedent referred to Magnus as his 'son.'He lived with the decedent until October 31, 1940, when he was married to Jane Mullaley.He died September 11, 1948, leaving her as his widow.He was buried in Lessing Rosenthal's cametery lot.Jane Myres, the widow of Magnus Myres, was given an annuity of $4000 a year by the last will and testament of Lessing Rosenthal, who died December 20, 1949.

Lessing Rosenthal thus stood in 'the acknowledged relation of a parent' to Magnus Myres, under section 1 of the Inheritance Tax Act.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 120, par. 375.)That section enumerates certain persons who, because of the closeness of their relation to the decedent, are to be taxed on their legacies at the lowest rate.To the extent relevant here, the statutory enumeration is as follows: 'When the beneficial interests to any property or income therefrom shall pass to or for the use of any father, mother, lineal ancestor of decedent, husband, wife, child, brother or sister, wife or widow of the son, or the husband or widower of the daughter, or to any descendant of the decedent, or any child legally adopted by the decedent, any child legally adopted by any descendent of the decedent, any descendant of any child legally adopted by the decedent, any child legally adopted by any child legally adopted by the decedent, or to any adopting parent of the decedent, or to any person to whom the deceased, for not less than ten years prior to death, stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent: Provided, however, such relationship began at or before said person's fifteenth birthday and was continuous for said ten years thereafter: And, provided, also that one of the parents of such person so standing in such relation shall have been deceased when such relationship commenced, * * *.'Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 120, par. 375.

The statute includes within the favored category the surviving spouses of the children of a decedent.It does not include the widow or widower of an adopted child or an acknowledged child.The executors contend, however, that it was the object, spirit and intention of the statute to put the child, the legally adopted child, and the acknowledged child all upon the same basis, and that a situation within the spirit of the statute is to be regarded as within the statute although not within its letter.People v. Moczek, 407 Ill. 373, 382, 95 N.E.2d 428, 432.And they urge that because the Inheritance Tax Act imposes a special tax, it is to be construed, in cases of doubt, strictly against the State and in favor of the taxpayer, citing People v. Snyder, 353 Ill. 184, 187 N.E. 158, 88 A.L.R. 1012.

The Moczek case involved an illegitimate child who was unable to establish the identity of her father.Her mother was alive, but insane.She could not therefore comply literally with the statutory requirement that one who claims to fall within the statute as an acknowledged child must show that one parent was dead at the time the relation commenced.Construing the statute as applied to that situation, we said: 'In most cases, where an illegitimate child seeks the benefits of the statute, proof that a named father existed and is deceased is impossible.To hold that the mother must be deceased would mean that, in relatively few, if any, cases could an illegitimate child qualify as a person described in the statute.We are not warranted, under the guise of statutory construction of imputing to the General Assembly an intent to confer merely a still-born right to persons falling within the same class as Frances Moczek.'And pointing out that for the purpose of qualifying as an acknowledged child under section 1 of the Inheritance Tax Act there was no distinction between the nonexistence and the death of a parent, we held that '* * * where, as here, the father of an illegitimate child is and always has been unknown, he was deceased, within the contemplation of the statute, when the relationship commenced.'

In the Snyder case(353 Ill. 184, 187 N.E. 159), the testator devised a portion of his estate to the widower of his daughter.The statute did not then expressly include the widower of a daughter, but mentioned the 'wife or widow of...