First Nat. Bank of Burns v. Buckland

• Decision Date: 17 September 1929
• Citation: 130 Or. 364,280 P. 331
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF BURNS v. BUCKLAND ET UX.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

280 P. 331

130 Or. 364

FIRST NAT. BANK OF BURNS v. BUCKLAND ET UX.

Supreme Court of Oregon

September 17, 1929

Department 1.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Harney County; W. W. Wood, Judge.

Suit by the First National Bank of Burns against Starr Buckland and wife. From the decree, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

See also (Or.) 273 P. 393.

J. W. Biggs and C. H. Leonard, both of Burns, for appellant.

Chas W. Ellis, of Burns (C. B. McConnell, of Burns, on the brief) for respondents.

RAND J.

This is a suit to set aside a deed. The defendants pleaded former adjudication. The court sustained the plea, and plaintiff has appealed.

The facts are as follows:

On and prior to December 9, 1921, Starr Buckland, the husband of defendant Mattie Buckland, was the owner of 160 acres of land in Harney county, and also of a house and two lots in Crane and owed a large sum of money to the First National Bank of Burns, credit for which he had partly obtained by reason of his said ownership, he having enumerated said property from time to time in his statement of assets to the bank. On said day Buckland conveyed to his wife by separate deeds the 160 acres of land and the house and two lots. Shortly thereafter the bank reduced its claim against Buckland to judgment execution was issued thereon, and an attempted levy on both of said properties was made thereunder by the sheriff.

Thereupon Mattie Buckland, claiming to be the owner thereof, brought suit against the bank and the sheriff to quiet title to the 160 acres of land. In her complaint she alleged that the land had been conveyed to her by her husband; that she had paid a valuable consideration therefor, and was the owner and in possession of it at and before the rendition of the judgment against her husband, and that the land was not subject to the lien of the judgment; that defendants had wrongfully levied upon the land, and were threatening to sell the same under said execution; and prayed that the sheriff and the bank be enjoined and restrained from levying upon or selling the land under said execution, and that the land be decreed to be not subject to the lien of the judgment. She also alleged that she was at the time residing upon the land with her family, occupying the same as a homestead, and that she had given notice in writing to the sheriff that she was claiming the property as a homestead.

Defendants answered, and alleged "that prior to the 9th day of December, 1921, the said Starr Buckland was the owner of and in possession of" the land, describing it, and denied that he conveyed the same to his wife, or that she was the owner of it; admitted the rendition of the judgment, the issuance of the execution, and the levy on the land, and affirmatively alleged "that the judgment mentioned herein is a good, valid, and subsisting lien against the lands herein described, and that the said Starr Buckland for many years last past has been and now is the owner of said lands"; and prayed that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, and that they recover their costs and disbursements in the suit.

That cause was tried upon the issues stated, and from the evidence offered upon the trial the court found that the land had been conveyed by warranty deed by Starr Buckland to Mattie Buckland, and the deed duly recorded; that the defendants were threatening to sell the land under the bank's judgment, and that the suit was instituted for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from selling the land, and, in the language of the court, "from enforcing said judgment against and out of said real estate and premises." Based upon these findings the court concluded as a matter of law "that the equities are with the plaintiff"; that the deed was sufficient in form to operate as a conveyance of the land, and the recording of it was notice of plaintiff's claim; that plaintiff was entitled to a decree enjoining the defendants, "their agents, attorneys, successors, or employees," from attempting to sell the land under the execution, and then, as to a matter not in issue under the pleadings, said: "But is not entitled to any judgment or decree passing upon the fraud, if any, in the execution of said deed." Based upon these findings and conclusions of law, the trial court entered a decree enjoining the defendants from selling or disposing of the land under or by virtue of the execution then in the hands of the sheriff. No appeal was taken from said decree, and it is now in full force and effect.

After the determination of that suit, this suit was commenced by the bank, seeking to have the same conveyance of the same lands decreed to be fraudulent and void as against the same judgment of the bank that was involved in the former suit, and as a defense thereto the defendants have pleaded the proceedings and decree in the former suit as a bar to the prosecution of this suit, and from a decree sustaining such plea the bank has appealed.

The contention of the bank is that, since the question of whether the conveyance from Buckland to his wife of the lands was made in fraud of the bank was not in issue or passed upon in the former suit, there has been no judicial determination of that question, and hence it claims the bank is not estopped from prosecuting this suit by the decree rendered in the former suit.

In Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195, Mr. Justice Field said:

"In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such defenses were not presented in the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate, when applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.

"But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action."

We have quoted thus extensively from the opinion of Mr. Justice Field, because of its clearness in stating the law applicable under the facts of this case, and also because it has been followed and applied by this court in numerous cases, and has become the settled law of the state. Neil v. Tolman, 12 Or. 289, 7 P. 103, 106, 107; Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567, 13 P. 442; Applegate v. Dowell, 15 Or. 513, 16 P. 651; White v. Ladd, 41 Or. 324, 68 P. 739, 741, 93 Am. St. Rep. 732; La Follett v. Mitchell, 42 Or. 465, 69 P. 916, 918, 95 Am. St. Rep. 780; Ruckman v. Union Ry. Co., 45 Or. 578, 78 P. 748, 749, 69 L. R. A. 480; Taylor v. Taylor, 54 Or. 560, 103 P. 524; Carroll v. McLaren, 60 Or. 233, 118 P. 1034; Campbell's Gas Burner Co. v. Hammer, 78 Or. 612. 153 P. 475; Matlock v. Matlock, 86 Or. 78, 167 P. 311; Runnells v. Leffel, 105 Or. 346, 207 P. 867.

In White v. Ladd, supra, Mr. Justice Wolverton said:

"The potency of a judgment as an estoppel concludes every fact necessary to uphold it, and extends, not only to matters actually determined, but to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have had decided as incident to and essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action, both in respect to the matters of claim and defense, and a default judgment, or one confessed, is attended with the same legal consequences, as there exist no tenable grounds of distinction between a title confessed and one tried and determined. Barrett v Failing, 8 Or. 152; Neil v. Tolman, 12 Or. 289, 17 P. 103; Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567, 13 P. 442; Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. [ N. Y.] 88; Hanson v. Manley, 72 Iowa, 48, 33...