First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Randall

• Decision Date: 16 December 1897
• Citation: 20 R.I. 319,38 A. 1055
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF SHREVEPORT v. RANDALL et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

38 A. 1055

20 R.I. 319

FIRST NAT. BANK OF SHREVEPORT

v. RANDALL et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 16, 1897.

Bill by the First National Bank of Shreveport against Charles J. Randall and others. Heard on demurrer to the bill. Demurrer sustained.

Edwards & Angell, for complainant.

Harrison A. McKenney, for respondents.

STINESS, J. The complainant, having obtained a judgment in Louisiana against Charles J. Randall, brings this bill, as a creditor, to set aside a conveyance of realty in this state, made by said Randall, which is alleged to be a fraudulent conveyance. The bill is demurred to upon the grounds (1) that there is no allegation that the complainant has judgment in this state; (2) that there is no allegation that execution has been issued and remedy at law exhausted; (3) that there is no allegation that, at the time of the conveyance, said Randall had no other estate subject to execution; (4) that it is not alleged that the other respondents had knowledge of the judgment, or had a fraudulent intent. The allegations of the bill, applicable to these objections, are that the judgment has not been satisfied; that the conveyance was without consideration, and for the purpose of preventing the complainant from pursuing said property for the purpose of collecting its claim; that Charles J. Randall is not a resident of this state, and is not to be found herein; and that he has no property in this state which it can attach, and thereby secure service of process; and that the complainant has exhausted all the remedies at law within its power against said Randall.

Creditors' bills to set aside fraudulent conveyances and bills to reach equitable assets are frequently treated as though they were the same thing. In some respects they are alike, but the grounds of jurisdiction upon which they rest are quite distinct; the former invoking the aid of the court for relief from fraud, and the latter for the appropriation of assets which cannot be reached at law. Both are proceedings in equity, and so are subject to the same general rules. The office of equity is to supplement, and not to supplant, the law. Hence, when the remedy at law is adequate, equity does not need to interpose. The rule, therefore, that a bill to reach equitable assets cannot stand until legal remedies have been exhausted, and the complainant's right as a creditor has been established in the jurisdiction where the equitable remedy is sought, is applied to both proceedings, because it is based upon the principles that the aid of equity should not be invoked when there is an adequate remedy at law, and that the court of law is the proper forum to establish a right of recovery. Of course, there must be exceptions in cases where the requirements of the rule cannot be complied...