First Nat. Bank v. Hagood

• Decision Date: 30 June 1921
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 527
• Citation: 206 Ala. 308,89 So. 497
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF EVERGREEN v. HAGOOD, Tax Assessor.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

89 So. 497

206 Ala. 308

FIRST NAT. BANK OF EVERGREEN v. HAGOOD, Tax Assessor.

3 Div. 527

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Conecuh County; John D. Leigh, Judge.

Petition by H.S. Hagood, Tax Assessor, for mandamus to the First National Bank of Evergreen, as depositary for Conecuh County to compel said depositary to pay warrant drawn under the orders of the commissioners' court for assistance in the office of the tax assessor. From a decree overruling demurrer setting up unconstitutionality of the act under which warrant was issued, respondent appeals. Reversed and remanded.

J.S Stearns, of Evergreen, for appellant.

Powell & Hamilton, of Greenville, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

On September 25, 1919 (Local Acts, p. 211), the Legislature passed an act entitled:

"An act to authorize the commissioners' court of Conecuh county, Alabama, to pay out of the general fund of said county to the tax assessor of said county, the sum of six hundred dollars per annum for extra assistance in his said office."

The language of the body of the act is "that the commissioners' court of Conecuh county be and hereby is required to pay," etc. One contention made on behalf of appellant, who is the county depositary, and on whom a warrant for the annual sum stipulated in the act has been drawn, is that the act is unconstitutional and void under section 45 of the Constitution for the reason that the subject of the act is not clearly expressed in its title. We indulge all reasonable intendments in favor of the constitutional validity of this act of the Legislature. It remains a fact, nevertheless, that the Legislature has used different words in the title and the body of the act--the title gives notice of the legislative purpose to pass an act authorizing the commissioners' court to pay a certain sum for a specified purpose; the body of the act requires the court to pay. We cannot assume that those different words mean the same thing, for they do not (National Surety Co. v. Huntsville, 192 Ala. 82, 68 So. 373), nor can we induce conformity by assuming one meaning to pervade the title and body of the act, for we cannot know which meaning to adopt. One would leave it to the discretion of the commissioners' court to pay the salary in question; the other would impose the duty to pay as a command or matter of compulsion--would leave no discretion. How, then, can it be said that the subject of this...