First National Bank of Marion v. Adams School Township

• Decision Date: 08 April 1897
• Docket Number: 2,145
• Citation: 46 N.E. 832,17 Ind.App. 375
• Parties: FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARION v. ADAMS SCHOOL TOWNSHIP, ET AL
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

46 N.E. 832

17 Ind.App. 375

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARION v. ADAMS SCHOOL TOWNSHIP, ET AL

No. 2,145

Court of Appeals of Indiana

April 8, 1897

From the Madison Superior Court.

Affirmed.

C. L Henry, E. B. McMahon and J. A. Van Osdol, for appellant.

F. A Walker and F. P. Foster, for appellee.

WILEY J. BLACK, COMSTOCK and ROBINSON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WILEY, J.

The appellee, George M. Ray, sold to his co-appellee, Adams School Township, through its trustee, five hundred "reading circle books," at one dollar each. September 21, 1894, the trustee issued to said Ray a township warrant or order for five hundred dollars in payment for such books, which order matured June 15, 1895, bearing 8 per cent. interest from date. Soon after the issuing of said township warrant, and before its maturity, said Ray transferred it by delivery to the appellant.

The complaint is in two paragraphs, the first of which counts upon the warrant, while the second wholly ignores the warrant and is based upon the quantum meruit, as for goods sold and delivered. In the second paragraph of the complaint it is averred that "on the 27th day of September, 1894, the said George M. Ray sold and transferred to this plaintiff all of his right, title and interest in his account and demands against said school township on account of the goods and supplies so furnished said school township."

Each paragraph of the complaint contains the following averment: "That said books so purchased by said Adams School Township were for the use of said school township and were useful, suitable and necessary, and for the benefit and use of the schools of defendant township, and were reasonably worth the sum of five hundred dollars; * * * that the same were necessary for the thorough organization and efficient management of the schools of said defendant township, and were such as said school township, through its trustee, was authorized to purchase; that the same were delivered to the defendant township for use in the schools of said township."

The second paragraph of the complaint contains the additional averment that said books were "accepted by said school township and have ever since been in use in the schools of said township."

The appellee, Adams School Township, challenged the sufficiency of each paragraph of the complaint, by a demurrer, which the court sustained, and the appellant refusing to plead over, judgment was rendered against it for costs.

The correctness of this ruling of the court upon the demurrer, the appellant questions by its first and second assignments of error.

In determining the liability of the appellee township under the facts alleged, we must look to the statutes defining the powers and authority conferred upon township trustees in the management of the schools, to bind their townships for the supplies mentioned and described in the complaint.

The office of township trustee is wholly a statutory one, and the rule prevails that such trustee has no power to act, or authority to bind his township that is not delegated to him by statute. His authority will not be extended, nor his powers enlarged, either by intendment or by any strained construction of the statute. If he is authorized by statute to purchase the books described in the complaint, and they were useful and necessary for the organization, management and conduct of the schools, then the township is liable, and must respond in damages; but if he had no authority to purchase them, his contract with the appellee, Ray, was absolutely void, and cannot be enforced against the appellee township, notwithstanding the fact that the action is prosecuted by an innocent purchaser of the order or warrant.

Appellant relies upon section 5920, Burns' R. S. 1894 (4444, R. S. 1881), in support of its contention that the appellee township is liable upon the facts averred in its complaint. That section is as follows: "The trustees shall take charge of the educational affairs of their respective townships, towns, and cities. They shall employ teachers; establish and locate, conveniently, a sufficient number of schools for the education of the white children therein; and build, or otherwise provide, suitable houses, furniture, apparatus and other articles and educational appliances necessary for the thorough organization and efficient management of said schools," etc.

Under the provisions of this statute appellant insists that it is as much within the province of the school trustee to buy suitable apparatus, appliances and articles necessary for the thorough organization and efficient management of the school, as it is to provide schoolhouses and employ teachers. With this insistence we heartily concur. But we cannot hold that the statute makes the trustee the sole judge or arbiter as to what are suitable apparatus and other articles and educational appliances necessary for the thorough organization and efficient management of the schools. To so hold would be to confer upon such trustee unlimited power and authority in such matters, and this would be a dangerous rule, and in all probability, in many instances, lead to grave results and serious complications. We are quite clear that the legislature never intended to confer such authority upon school trustees.

Appellant contends that the provisions of section 5925, Burns' R. S. 1894 (4446, R. S. 1881), which authorizes two or more school trustees, in distinct municipal corporations, to establish graded schools, to purchase suitable grounds and erect buildings thereon, is no broader in defining the powers of school trustees than section 5920, supra, and grounds its contention on the case of Craig School Tp. v. Scott, 124 Ind. 72, 24 N.E. 585, in which it was held that it makes the trustees the sole judges of the propriety and advisability of establishing such graded schools and of purchasing real estate for that purpose.

In that case, the court, speaking by Olds, J., said: "This section of the statute contemplates and authorizes the trustees of two or more school townships to join together and to purchase real estate suitable for graded school purposes, and to establish graded schools. It makes the trustees the judges of the propriety and advisability of establishing such graded schools and of purchasing real estate for that purpose."

We do not think that these two sections of the statute are at all analogous. The former, in general terms, defines the authority, duty and power of trustees, while the latter, in express terms, empowers the trustees jointly to establish joint graded schools, to purchase suitable real estate and erect buildings thereon, and hence the case of Craig School Tp. v. Scott, supra, is not in point.

Townships are involuntary political or civil divisions of the State, and are created by general laws to aid in the administration of the general State government. The township trustee is ex officio school trustee of his township, and his powers are limited, being created and defined by statute. For an act done by such school trustee not within the scope of his statutory power, and where he has no authority to act at all, his township is not liable. Board, etc., v. Fertich, 18 Ind.App. 1, 46 N.E. 699; Snoddy v. Wabash School Tp., ante, 284; Board, etc., v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N.E. 206; State, ex rel., v. Hart, 144 Ind. 107, 43 N.E. 7; Board, etc., v. Hemphill, 14 Ind.App. 219, 42 N.E. 760.

A school trustee, like the board of county commissioners, whose duties are defined and circumscribed by statute, cannot do any act which is not either expressly or impliedly authorized by statute. Board, etc., v. Fertich, supra; Gavin v. Board, etc., 104 Ind. 201, 3 N.E. 846; Board, etc., v. Barnes, 123 Ind. 403, 24 N.E. 137.

The rule is well settled in this State that persons contracting with school trustees are bound to know that their powers to contract are limited by statute, and that beyond such limit they cannot go and bind their townships.

In Bloomington School Tp. v. The National School Furniture Company, 107 Ind. 43, 7 N.E. 760, the court, speaking by Howk, C. J., said:

"In the execution of the written contract, which is made the basis of the complaint in this case, appellee was affected with notice of the limited powers of appellant's trustee, under our laws. Such trustee does not and cannot act as the agent merely of his township. He is a public officer, and his relations to his township, as the name of his office clearly imports, are all of a fiduciary nature. In dealing with such trustee, all persons are bound to take notice of his official and fiduciary character, and to know that he can only bind his township by his contracts, verbal or written, when it appears, or is shown by proper averment and proof, that such contracts are authorized by law."

In Honey Creek School Tp. v. Barnes, 119 Ind 213, 21 N.E. 747, the court, speaking by Olds, J., said: "School...