First Tech. Capital, Inc. v. Banctec, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 5:16-CV-138-REW,5:16-CV-138-REW |
Parties | FIRST TECHNOLOGY CAPITAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. BANCTEC, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
As in many enduring business relationships that culminate in contentious litigation, First Technology Capital, Inc. (FTC), and BancTec, Inc. (BancTec), enjoyed a fruitful partnership for many years—one built on "good faith negotiations and gentlemen agreements"—but one that ultimately ended, mired in "controvers[y]" and "head-butting." DE #72-13 (Bridges Depo.), at 43 (Depo. p. 168). The parties had long enjoyed a series of positive sale / leaseback encounters, all under a broad 2006 master lease, with each deal per a sub-schedule. Things soured in 2015. In March 2016, FTC sued BancTec, asserting the following general claims:
DE #26 (Amended Complaint); see also DE #29 (Answer).
Following a heavily contested period of discovery and resolution of numerous intervening motions, the parties filed dueling motions for summary judgment, each of which is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. See DE ##42, 72, 74, 80, 83, 90, 91, 98, 102, 103, and 107. The Court has laboriously reviewed every page submitted—indeed, the entire docket—and carefully wrestled with the issues raised.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART each motion (DE ##42, 72, and 74). There is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Schedule 7; the Court quickly dispatches that suite of claims, largely in BancTec's favor. Genuine disputes of material fact do, though, pervade the Schedule 8 record—and the Court does consider all relevant documents—surrounding the parties' intentions, and thus agreement, concerning Schedule 8. Due to related claims' interdependency on this foundational issue, the Court (with but a few exceptions detailed below) denies both sides summary judgment on the Schedule 8-related topics. A jury must decide the bulk of the Schedule 8 disputes.
In 2006, FTC and BancTec entered a Master Lease Agreement (MLA) in which, generally speaking, FTC agreed to lease BancTec certain items of equipment "listed on Schedule 'A' and any supplemental or additional schedule 'A' attached to and made apart of" the MLA. See DE #26-1 (MLA). Each Schedule A "constitute[d] a single lease" under the MLA. Id.; see also DE #42-4, at 4. The arrangement was a sale / leaseback, where BancTec sold assets it already owned to FTC, and FTC leased the equipment, already in place, back to BancTec. The arrangement assisted BancTec's cash-flow and EBITDA, and FTC made money on an initial fee and the interest-rate spread. See DE ##74-2 (Cushman Depo.), at 8 (Depo. p. 23); 72-13 (Bridges Depo.), at 25 (Depo. p. 94); id. at 70 (Depo. p. 274). Paragraph 2 defined the commencement rent mechanics and the date of each lease "for the purpose of determining when the monthly rental charges begin[.]" DE #26-1, at ¶ 2. Over the years, the parties entered into many such Schedules. The present case concerns Sub-Schedule No. 7 (Schedule 7) and Sub-Schedule No. 8 (Schedule 8) to the MLA. See DE ##26-3, 26-10.
In Schedule 7, BancTec agreed to make 60 rental payments of $76,765.00 per month to FTC. DE #26-3, at 2. The parties also "incorporated" all "terms and conditions of the" MLA into Schedule 7. Id. BancTec accepted (on paper) the Schedule 7 equipment on October 21, 2008. Id. at 4; DE #29, at ¶ 21. In Schedule 8, BancTec agreed to make 60 rental payments of $58,027.00 per month to FTC. DE #26-10, at 2. The parties likewise "incorporated" all "terms and conditions of the" MLA into Schedule 8. Id. BancTec "accepted" the Schedule 8 equipment on December 1, 2009. Id. at 3; DE #29, at ¶ 54.1 Further, the MLA provides that "each Lease"—i.e., each Schedule—is "subject to theterms and conditions of this Agreement until its expiration or termination." DE #26-1, at ¶ 1. As discussed, following many years of a workable business relationship, disputes arose, and the parties turned to state and federal court to hash out their plenteous disagreements. The merits of the claims are now fully before the Court for summary judgment consideration.
The parties take interesting tacks in approaching the record. FTC tries to lash BancTec to the fine and specific verbiage of the MLA, essentially ignoring deal-related and contemporaneous documentation and the parties' course of performance over the life of the MLA. BancTec tries to ignore MLA mechanics and draw the Court into a holistic assessment sensitive to the economic realities and equities of the relationship. Each side is right, and each side is wrong. On Schedule 7, the Court agrees that BancTec properly completed the purchase and owes, at most, interest on the slight delay in purchase payment. On Schedule 8, the Court perceives reasonable and legitimate questions about the parties' agreement and intent, as to the situation and claims involved. A jury will sort through most of the Schedule 8 claims, and will have to settle lease term (the 61st month issue), issues of default, and post-lease obligations, including the status of and remedies related to the Schedule 8 equipment.
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A reviewing court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986);Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the court may not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact initially rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) ( ); Lindsay, 578 F.3d at 414 (). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue" for trial. Celotex Corp., 106. S. Ct. at 2253; Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1999). However, "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2552.
If the movant bears the burden of persuasion at trial, "that party must support its motion with credible evidence—using any of the materials specified in Rule 56(c)—that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." Id. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) ( ); see also Celotex Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ( .
A fact is "material" if the underlying substantive law identifies the fact as critical. Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. Thus, Id. A "genuine" issue exists if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 2511; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1356 () (citation omitted). Such evidence must be suitable for admission into evidence at trial. Salt Lick Bancorp v. FDIC, 187 F. App'x 428, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2006).2
The Court confronts the following motions:
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