First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Newham

CourtNebraska Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtCassel, J.
CitationFirst Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Newham, 859 N.W.2d 569 (Neb. 2015)
Decision Date27 February 2015
Docket NumberNo. S–14–326,S–14–326
PartiesFirst Tennessee Bank National Association, successor by merger to First Horizon Home Loann Corporation, appellant, v. Jason Newham, appellee.

Brian J. Muench, Omaha, for appellant.

Edward F. Noethe and Michael G. Monday, of McGinn, McGinn, Springer & Noethe, for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller–Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary Judgment.Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error.In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error.It is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

4. Summary Judgment: Evidence: Proof.After the movant for summary judgment makes a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment if the evidence was uncontroverted at trial, the burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of law shifts to the party opposing the motion.

Cassel, J.

INTRODUCTION

A lender sued upon a promissory note. The district court determined that the action was barred by a California statute of limitations and entered summary judgment in the borrower's favor. On appeal, the lender contends that the limitations period was tolled by either a California statute or a provision of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).1 We affirm.

The California tolling statute could not be applied against the borrower, a nonresident of California, without violating the Commerce Clause.2 And the borrower's membership in the National Guard provided no basis to toll the limitations period.

BACKGROUND

Jason Newham executed a promissory note dated September 8, 2005, in favor of First Horizon Home Loan Corporation in the amount of $182,000. Newham used the funds to refinance a prior mortgage on real property located in Dixon, California. At that time, Newham was a resident of California and “in active duty, Air Force,” stationed at Travis Air Force Base. Payments on the note were due on the first of every month, and the note was secured by a deed of trust for the property.

Sometime after execution of the note, First Horizon Home Loan Corporation merged with First Tennessee Bank National

Association (First Tennessee). As a result, First Tennessee became the holder of the note.

Newham left California and vacated the property in May 2007. He made his last payment on the note on August 6. He resided in Papillion, Nebraska, until September, when he moved to Kansas to work for an aircraft company as a demonstration pilot. Although Newham had joined the North Dakota National Guard in July 2007, he did not move to North Dakota until June 2009. With the North Dakota National Guard, he was “part-time for the first [2] years, and then ... full-time, at the state level, for the last ... almost [3] years.” Newham later moved to Minnesota, but he returned to Nebraska in June 2013.

On August 5, 2013, First Tennessee filed a complaint against Newham, alleging that he was in default on the note and seeking damages in the amount of $274,467.13, plus interest. In response, Newham moved for summary judgment and alleged that First Tennessee's suit was barred by the statute of limitations. First Tennessee filed an amended complaint and alleged that Newham was an “absconding debtor.”

At the summary judgment hearing, Newham's counsel argued that First Tennessee's action was governed by California law and that First Tennessee had failed to bring the action within 4 years as required by Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 337 (West 2006). First Tennessee, however, asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled by either Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 351 (West 2006) or 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a). As discussed in greater detail below, § 351 tolls the statute of limitations during the period of time that a defendant is outside of California and § 526(a) tolls the statute of limitations during the “period of a servicemember's military service,” as defined by relevant federal law.

The district court also received various discovery into evidence, including Newham's answers to interrogatories and his deposition testimony. As to his current employment status, Newham stated that he is a “part-time member” of the Nebraska Air National Guard. His position does not entail active duty status. When asked to provide the dates and duty stations of his periods of active duty, Newham indicated that

his most recent period of active duty was from March 2005 to July 2007 at Travis Air Force Base.

As to his repayment of the note, Newham confirmed that he made his last payment on August 6, 2007, and that he “was in breach of the contract” as of September 2. Additionally, he testified that he never returned to California after he vacated the property.

On February 3, 2014, the district court entered summary judgment in Newham's favor. In its order, the court determined that First Tennessee's claim was governed by the California statute of limitations and that First Tennessee had failed to file suit within the 4–year limitations period. As to the tolling provision of Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 351, the court concluded that, if applied against Newham, § 351 would violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the court did not address the tolling provision of 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a).

First Tennessee moved for new trial and alleged that the district court erred in failing to apply § 526(a). Additionally, First Tennessee asserted that Newham had the burden to show that the application of § 351 would violate the Commerce Clause. And it alleged that applying § 351 would not result in any constitutional violation.

At the hearing on First Tennessee's motion, the district court acknowledged that it had failed to consider § 526(a) in its summary judgment order. However, it clarified that in considering the statute of limitations, it had reviewed § 526(a) and concluded that it did not apply because Newham was not on active duty. The court explained that it did not set forth its analysis in the order, because it “did not believe it was relevant and necessary, based on the information.”

The district court overruled the motion for new trial, and First Tennessee filed a notice of appeal. We moved the case to our docket pursuant to statutory authority.3

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

First Tennessee assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by either (1) Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 351 or (2) 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4

In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.5

ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction

We first dispose of a preliminary matter. Although neither party has alleged a jurisdictional defect, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.6

After the district court entered summary judgment, First Tennessee timely filed a motion for new trial, which, despite its title, we treat as a motion to alter or amend the judgment.7 The motion terminated the time for taking an appeal.8

First Tennessee's notice of appeal was timely filed after the terminating motion was overruled. Thus, we have jurisdiction of the appeal.

California Law Applies

Having established our jurisdiction over the appeal, we turn to First Tennessee's assignments of error. The parties agree that California law applies.

Neither party contests the conclusion that First Tennessee's claim was governed by the 4–year limitations period of Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 337. And it is clear that First Tennessee did not file suit within the limitations period. Newham acknowledged that he was in default on the note on September 2, 2007. While First Tennessee contended at oral argument that Newham was in default as of September 3, the specific date of default makes no difference to our analysis. First Tennessee did not file the present action until August 5, 2013, nearly 6 years later.

First Tennessee asserts only two statutory bases for tolling the statute of limitations. We therefore limit our analysis to whether the limitations period was tolled by either Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 351 or 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a).

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 351

Because Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 351 is a California statute, we set forth its full text.

Exception, where defendant is out of the State . If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

As discussed above, the district court determined that § 351 could not be applied to toll the limitations period, because its application against Newham, a nonresident of California, would violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We agree.

State tolling statutes, such as § 351, raise constitutional concerns due to their potential...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
3 cases
  • Hopkins v. Hopkins
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • August 19, 2016
    ...277 Neb. 919, 766 N.W.2d 134 (2009).19 Watkins v. Watkins , 285 Neb. 693, 829 N.W.2d 643 (2013).20 See, First Tennessee Bank Nat. Assn. v. Newham , 290 Neb. 273, 859 N.W.2d 569 (2015) ; In re Interest of Xavier H. , 274 Neb. 331, 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007) ; Mefferd v. Sieler & Co. , 267 Neb. 532......
  • Jordan v. LSF8 Master Participation Trust
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • July 13, 2018
    ...AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED .1 See Strode v. City of Ashland, 295 Neb. 44, 886 N.W.2d 293 (2016).2 Id.3 Id.4 First Tennessee Bank Nat. Assn. v. Newham, 290 Neb. 273, 859 N.W.2d 569 (2015).5 Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 (2017).6 See § 25-1912(3)(b).7 See, Clarke ......
  • State v. Covey
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • February 27, 2015
    ... ... “personal identifying information.” We first observe the history of the impersonation ... ...
1 books & journal articles
  • California Courts on Active Duty
    • United States
    • California Lawyers Association California Litigation (CLA) No. 28-3, 2015
    • Invalid date
    ...it.[Page 5]The SCRA has been used against a service member as well. In First Tennessee Bank National Association v. Newham (Neb. 2015) 859 N.W.2d 569, Newham borrowed money and bought property in California in 2005 while he was in the Air Force. Years later, when he was out of the service, ......