First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Jones

• Citation: 732 S.W.2d 281
• Decision Date: 04 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-251-II,86-251-II
• Parties: FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Bill JONES, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Safety, Appellee. 732 S.W.2d 281
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

Page 281

732 S.W.2d 281

FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Bill JONES, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Safety Appellee.

No. 86-251-II

732 S.W.2d 281

Court of Appeals of Tennessee Middle Section, at Nashville.

March 4, 1987.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court May 18, 1987.

John F. Dugger and Thomas R. Frierson, II, Morristown, for appellant.

W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Myra L. Sanderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

CANTRELL, Judge.

This case involves the forfeiture of a 1980 Mercedes 450 automobile to the State under the following provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 55-5-108(b)(hereafter referred to as Sec. 55-5-108):

(b) As used in this subsection, unless the context otherwise requires, "property" means any vehicle, aircraft, boat or other vessel, special mobile equipment, boat trailer, mobile self-propelled construction, farm or forestry machinery, similar equipment, or any component part thereof.

(1) Any property on which the manufacturer's serial number, engine number, transmission number, vehicle identification number, or other distinguishing number or identification mark has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, destroyed or otherwise rendered unidentifiable is hereby declared to be contraband and subject to forfeiture to the state. This subdivision shall apply to all persons....

The appellant, First Tennessee Bank, is first lienholder on the automobile. As a claimant to the automobile, the appellant received a hearing on the forfeiture as required by Sec. 55-5-108(b)(4). The initial hearing was before a Department of Safety hearing officer, who ordered the forfeiture of the automobile to the State. That decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Safety and by the Chancery Court of Davidson County on appeal.

Judicial review of an administrative agency decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act is confined to the record made before the agency, and at the appellate level, before the Chancery Court. Under Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-322(h), the reviewing court may reverse or modify an agency decision if it is unsupported by substantial and material evidence in the record.

The appellant first contends that the agency's decision to order the forfeiture of the automobile is not supported by substantial and material evidence in the record. In addition, he argues that since forfeiture statutes must be strictly construed, Williams v. City of Knoxville, 220 Tenn. 257, 416 S.W.2d 758 (1967), the State must not only prove that an identification number required by statute has been covered or changed in some way, but also that the vehicle is thereby rendered unidentifiable before the automobile is subject to forfeiture. This interpretation, however, is contrary to the plain wording of the statute. Section 55-5-108(b)(1) states, in relevant part:

Any property on which the manufacturer's serial number, engine number, transmission number, vehicle identification number, or other distinguishing number or identification mark has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, destroyed or otherwise rendered unidentifiable is hereby declared to be contraband and subject to forfeiture to the state.

The inclusion of the words "or other distinguishing number or identification mark" clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend this section to apply only to identification numbers required by statute, such as the engine number, transmission number and vehicle identification number. Instead, the Legislature first listed specifically the numbers required by statute to be on a vehicle or its component parts, then added the general phrase "or other distinguishing number or identification mark" to explicitly include other numbers or marks not required by statute to be on the vehicle.

Furthermore, the plain wording of the statute is contrary to the appellant's contention that the State must prove that the vehicle has been rendered unidentifiable. The general phrase "or otherwise rendered unidentifiable" following the specific list "removed, defaced, covered, altered, destroyed" refers to the number or mark on the property in question. The statute does not require the State to prove that the vehicle is unidentifiable or stolen. The statute only requires the State to prove that an identification number or mark has been changed or rendered unidentifiable. Once the State has proved that, the property is contraband and the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to prove the original identification number and his right to the property under Sec. 55-5-108(b)(5).

We must now determine whether there is substantial and material evidence in the record to support the agency's decision. The Supreme Court has interpreted "substantial and material evidence" to mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration. Southern Ry. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn.1984).

The hearing officer made written findings of fact, which were adopted in their entirety by the Commissioner. The hearing officer found that the PVIN plate bearing the vehicle identification number had been removed from the dash of the impounded vehicle and replaced with the PVIN plate from a vehicle that had been wrecked, burned, and declared a total loss by the owner's insurance company. This finding was supported by the testimony of the State investigator that the plate was loose and bent and the dash had faded, leaving an outline of a larger plate than the plate presently on the dash.

The investigator also testified that the information plate on the left side door striker post was attached with American pop rivets, whereas the Mercedes manufacturer attaches these plates with metric rivets. Based on that testimony, the hearing officer found that the information plate had been removed and put back on the door post.

Although the Mercedes manufacturer affixes a confidential vehicle identification number in two different places on the frame, the vehicle in question bore no confidential vehicle identification number, and the investigator could find no evidence that these numbers had been removed. The hearing officer thus concluded that the entire section of the frame where these numbers should have been was removed and replaced with different sections bearing no numbers.

The original owner of the vehicle bearing the vehicle identification number on the impounded automobile told the investigator that his vehicle was blue with a blue interior and that he was paid a total loss claim by his insurance company after his automobile was wrecked and burned. The engine number on the impounded vehicle matches the number on the engine originally installed in the blue Mercedes. However, the vehicle impounded is red with a beige interior, and was originally white, as evidenced by paint samples taken from the exterior. The investigator testified that he was unable to locate any other identification number or marks on the impounded vehicle. From this testimony we must infer that no number appeared on the transmission.

Based on the above findings of fact, we conclude that there is substantial and material evidence in the record to support the agency's decision to order forfeiture of the vehicle, with the exception of the engine. The evidence is clearly sufficient to conclude that the body of the vehicle, including the interior, is not the body to which the vehicle identification number was originally attached. The transmission apparently bore no number at all. The body and the transmission therefore are contraband under Sec. 55-5-108(b)(1) and subject to forfeiture.

Although the appellant argues that parts of the frame could have come from other automobiles which could have been legally acquired, there is no proof to support that theory in the record. Even assuming the body and other parts were legally acquired, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 55-5-112(a) makes it unlawful to "place or stamp any serial, engine, transmission, or other number or mark upon a motor vehicle or its component parts, except one (1) assigned thereto by the division." Subsection (b) then provides that the restoration by an owner of an original identification number shall be allowed under a permit issued by the division of motor vehicles. If the parts used to rebuild the wrecked Mercedes were legally acquired, the owner could have protected his interest by obtaining a permit. Even though the owner did not obtain a permit to restore the original identification number, Sec. 55-5-108(b)(5) provides that any claimant can prevent forfeiture by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the original identification number on the parts in question and his right, title or interest in that property. This the appellant apparently could not do. However, the statute clearly states that "if no claimant can establish in this manner his ownership of the property, the property shall be forfeited to the State." (Emphasis added.) The agency therefore correctly ordered the forfeiture of the transmission and the body, including the vehicle identification number plate. See Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 55-5-127.

With regard to the engine, however, the State has failed to show that the engine number was removed, defaced, covered, altered, destroyed or otherwise rendered unidentifiable. The hearing officer found that the engine number was the same as the number on the engine originally installed in the wrecked blue Mercedes. The investigator also testified that the current vehicle title reflected First Tennessee Bank as the lienholder on the vehicle, and the bank president testified that the debtor was in default on the promissory note.

The statute clearly contemplates separate treatment of parts with individual identification numbers, since it defines "property" as "any vehicle, aircraft, boat or other vessel,...