Fischer-Marsh v. Fischer, 46A03-0406-CV-267.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 46A03-0406-CV-267.,46A03-0406-CV-267.
• Citation: 822 N.E.2d 1055
• Parties: Roberta FISCHER-MARSH, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Scott FISCHER and Rebecca Fischer, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

822 N.E.2d 1055

Roberta FISCHER-MARSH, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Scott FISCHER and Rebecca Fischer, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 46A03-0406-CV-267.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

February 25, 2005.

James O. McDonald, Everett Everett & McDonald, Terre Haute, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Donald E. Baugher, Osborn Baugher Roule & Johnson, LaPorte, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Roberta Fischer-Marsh ("Marsh") appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Scott and Rebecca Fischer ("the Fischers") on Marsh's complaint. Marsh raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court's judgment that Marsh did not establish that she was entitled to rescission of her sale of property to the Fischers was contrary to law. We affirm.¹

The relevant facts follow. Marsh and her first husband, Leonard Fischer, owned a farm in LaPorte County consisting of a farmhouse and 215 acres of farmland. Marsh and Leonard had five children, Scott, Mark, Dianne, Julie, and Gregg. Scott and Mark assisted them with the farming operations, and Scott and his wife, Rebecca, lived on an adjoining piece of property.

In 1986, Marsh and Leonard decided to bid for a dairy buyout program and stopped their dairy operations. A short time later, Leonard died, and Marsh became the sole owner of the farm. Mark obtained other employment, but Scott was unable to find a new job and asked to continue farming with Marsh. This relationship continued until 1996, when Marsh was sixty-five years old. At that time, the farm, farmhouse, and improvements were valued at $474,260. In an effort to keep the farm from being sold upon her death and to perform estate planning, Marsh decided to sell the farm and farmhouse to the Fischers. In April 1996, the Fischers purchased the farm and farmhouse from Marsh for $100,000. The deed transferring the property listed no restrictions or conditions. Marsh later sent a letter to her other children stating that Marsh would have "a lifetime residency, all utilities, electric, heating oil & taxes paid by Scott. And lifetime medical care and final burial expenses." Appellant's Appendix at 349-350. The Fischers do not dispute that they agreed to provide Marsh with these items;² however, they dispute that these items were part of the real estate purchase.

Marsh continued to live in the farmhouse and started dating Hank Marsh. The relationship between Marsh and the Fischers remained friendly until 1998. Although it is unclear from the record exactly what precipitated the conflict that began in 1998, it apparently concerned the Fischers' acrimonious relationship with Hank and the Fischers' desire to trade homes with Marsh. In June or July of 1998, Marsh announced that she was going to marry Hank, and a few months later, the Fischers told Marsh that Hank would not be allowed to live in the farmhouse. Marsh apparently stopped sleeping at the farmhouse but went there daily, and she married Hank in December 1998.

On January 7, 1999, Marsh's attorney sent the Fischers a letter that provided, in part:

[Marsh] tells me that as part of the consideration involved with the sale of the farm to you was an agreement that she was to be able to continue to reside in the [farmhouse]. I have been advised that in addition to the right to continue to reside in that home, there were other agreements regarding the property taxes, maintenance and insurance on that home along with medical care if necessary for your mother.

I spoke with your mother a day or so ago, and she is concerned that since her remarriage, that you do not intend to keep the agreements that had been reached at the time of the sale. She tells me that she intends to move elsewhere, but that it will take some time for this to happen. If things go as planned, she would be able to vacate the [farmhouse] within a year.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 at 102.

On January 11, 1999, the Fischers responded to the letter from Marsh's attorney and expressed their concern regarding Hank's "combative behavior and attitude" and "intimidating tactics." Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at 100. The Fischers again stated that they could not allow Hank to reside at the farmhouse. Further, the Fischers stated that "[s]ince [Marsh] voluntarily moved out, and this is not her primary residence, we feel it would be fair to all parties concerned to move her personal items out within 90 days." Id. The relationship between the Fischers and Marsh continued to deteriorate to the point that in June 1999, the Fischers informed Marsh that they would be disconnecting the telephone to the farmhouse, changing the locks, placing her possessions in storage, and barring her from holding family gatherings at the farmhouse.

In June 1999, Marsh filed a complaint against the Fischers alleging that she had transferred the property to the Fischers in exchange for $100,000.00 and "a lifetime residence in the farm house situated on said property with [the Fischers] to pay all utilities, electric, heating oil and taxes as well as provide [Marsh] with lifetime medical care and final burial expenses," and that the Fischers had breached the contract. Appellant's Appendix at 13. Marsh requested rescission of the parties' agreement and an accounting of farm profits and proceeds. Marsh also alleged that she had loaned $30,000 to the Fischers but they had failed to repay the loan, that she owned the farm equipment and tools, and that she was entitled to attorney fees. Marsh also requested preliminary and permanent injunctions against the Fischers to prevent them from removing her or her possessions from the farmhouse.

The trial court granted Marsh's request for a preliminary injunction, and the preliminary injunction provided:

[T]he parties stipulate to the entry of a Temporary Restraining Order granting exclusive possession and occupancy of the dwelling house, the porch, the contents therein, and the area immediately surrounding the house, located at 2262 North Fail Road, LaPorte, Indiana, to [Marsh]; and that the [Fischers] are granted possession of all farm machinery and equipment and remaining farm property and are permitted to continue normal farming operations thereon and both parties are hereby restrained from the disposition of any real or personal property without either court order or written consent of the opposing party.

Appellant's Appendix at 21A.

Marsh filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which the trial court granted but later vacated. Marsh appealed the trial court's order, and we affirmed the trial court's decision to set aside the partial summary judgment order. See Fischer-Marsh v. Fischer, No. 46A03-0104-CV-132, 763 N.E.2d 3 (Ind.Ct.App. Jan.16, 2002), trans. denied. Following the appeal, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The trial court held a three-day bench trial in March 2004. During her opening statement, Marsh argued that the evidence demonstrated constructive fraud if not actual fraud. After Marsh rested her case, the Fischers moved for judgment on the evidence on Marsh's claim of actual or constructive fraud. The trial court granted the motion after it found no mention of actual or constructive fraud in Marsh's complaint and found that no evidence had been "submitted to support the theory of fraud, actual or constructive." Transcript at 209.

After the bench trial, the trial court entered the following order:

* * * * *

2. [Marsh] concedes that her claim for the farm equipment in Count III of her complaint should be denied.

3. [Marsh's] remaining claim is in two parts: 1) that the deed to the farmhouse and property consisting of two hundred fifteen (215) acres of farmland be rescinded, and; 2) that the balance of the $30,000.00 promissory note signed by the [Fischers] be satisfied.

4. Concerning rescission of the [Fischers'] deed in Count 1 of [Marsh's] claim and regarding the $30,000.00 promissory note as set forth in Count II of [Marsh's] claim, the Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence does not support those claims.

5. The court finds in the interest of justice and particularly because of the mother-son relationship of [Marsh] and Scott Fischer that the preliminary injunction entered by this court on June 11, 1999, is now made permanent.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Marsh] take nothing by way of her complaint. Costs versus plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the court's preliminary injunction is now made permanent.

Appellant's Appendix at 9-10.

The issue is whether the trial court's judgment that Marsh did not establish that she was entitled to rescission of her sale of property to the Fischers was contrary to law.³ Because Marsh appeals from a negative judgment, she must demonstrate that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law. Infinity Prod., Inc. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1031-1032 (Ind.2004). A judgment is contrary to law only if the evidence in the record, along with all reasonable inferences, is without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Id. at 1032. In conducting our review, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of any witness, and must affirm the trial court's decision if the record contains any supporting evidence or inferences. Id.

According to Marsh, she sold the farm to the Fischers for $100,000 and, in exchange, the Fischers agreed to provide her with a lifetime residency at the farmhouse and with lifetime medical care and pay for all utilities, electricity, heating oil, taxes, and final burial expenses. Marsh argues that she is entitled to rescission of the agreement because the Fischers failed to provide her with lifetime residency in the farmhouse, failed to provide her with lifetime medical care, and failed to pay the maintenance and utilities at the farmhouse. We begin by noting that a rescission of a contract is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Barrington Mgmt....