Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2022
• Docket Number: 21-1683
• Citation: 42 F.4th 366
• Parties: Christa B. FISCHER, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, Appellant v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.; FedEx Ground Package System
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

42 F.4th 366

Christa B. FISCHER, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, Appellant

v.FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.; FedEx Ground Package System

No. 21-1683

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: January 26, 2022

Filed: July 26, 2022

Kelly A. Burgy, Benjamin L. Davis, III, Scott E. Nevin, Suite 1700, 36 South Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21201, Adam W. Hansen [ARGUED], Apollo Law, 333 Washington Avenue North, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55401, Colin R. Reeves, Apollo Law, 1314 Pacific Street, Brooklyn, NY 11216, Scott M. Pollins, 800 Westdale Avenue, Swarthmore, PA 19081, Counsel for Appellants Christa B. Fischer and Andre Saunders

Scott L. Nelson, Public Citizen Litigation Group, 1600 20^th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20009, Counsel for Amicus Appellant Public Citizen Inc

Frederick L. Douglas [ARGUED], Brandon D. Pettes, Federal Express Corporation, 3620 Hacks Cross Road, Building B, 3^rd Floor, Memphis, TN 38125, Counsel for Appellee Federal Express Corp

Benjamin Ferron, Esq., FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 1000 FedEx Drive, Moon Township, PA 15108, Counsel for Appellee FedEx Ground Package System

David R. Fine, K&L Gates, 17 North Second Street, 18^th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Amicus Appellee Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

Philip S. Goldberg, Esq., Shook Hardy & Bacon, 1800 K. Street, NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20006, Counsel for Amicus Appellee International Association of Defense Counsel

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge Appellant Christa Fischer, a Pennsylvania resident who worked for nearly ten years as a security specialist for Appellees Federal Express Corp. ("FedEx") and FedEx Ground Package System ("FedEx Ground"), brought this collective action under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Fischer alleges FedEx misclassified her and other FedEx security specialists as exempt from the FLSA's overtime rule and underpaid them.

Two out-of-state former FedEx employees, Andre Saunders, from Maryland, and Andrew Rakowsky, from New York, submitted notices of consent, seeking to join Fischer's collective action. Saunders and Rakowsky both worked for FedEx in their home states but, other than FedEx's allegedly uniform nationwide employment practices, have no connection to Pennsylvania related to their claims. The District Court did not allow these two opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit, reasoning that, as would be true for a state court under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017), the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over FedEx with respect to the out-of-state plaintiffs' claims.

We granted Appellants' petition for interlocutory appeal to resolve whether, in an FLSA collective action in federal court where the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over the defendant, all opt-in plaintiffs must establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their individual claims. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have answered in the affirmative, holding FLSA opt-in plaintiffs' claims must arise out of or relate to the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state. See Canaday v. Anthem Cos. , 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021) ; Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp., LLC , 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021). The First Circuit has answered in the negative, holding that, while initial plaintiffs' claims must arise out of or relate to the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state—the test of the constitutional limit under the Fourteenth Amendment—opt-in plaintiffs' claims need only arise out of or relate to a defendant's minimum contacts with the entire nation—the test of the constitutional limit under the Fifth Amendment. See Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. , 23 F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022).

We join the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and hold that, where the basis of personal jurisdiction in an FLSA collective action in a federal court is specific personal jurisdiction established by serving process according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), every plaintiff who seeks to opt in to the suit must demonstrate his or her claim arises out of or relates to the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state. In this way, the specific personal jurisdiction analysis for an FLSA collective action in federal court operates the same as it would for an FLSA collective action, or any other traditional in personam suit, in state court. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's judgment because the out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs here cannot demonstrate their claims arise out of or relate to FedEx's contacts with Pennsylvania.

I.

Appellant Christa Fischer is a Pennsylvania resident who worked for FedEx in Lewisbury and Williamsport, Pennsylvania from approximately August 2005 to July 2019. On October 22, 2019, she filed a complaint against FedEx in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging FedEx misclassified employees in her position as exempt from the FLSA's overtime rule and, accordingly, seeking unpaid overtime. Under the FLSA's collective action device in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Fischer brought her suit on behalf of herself and "other similarly situated employees," alleging FedEx had misclassified these employees around the country. FedEx¹ is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is in Tennessee.

On May 15, 2020, Fischer filed a motion for conditional certification and court-authorized notice. On July 17, 2020 and July 28, 2020, respectively, Andre Saunders, from Maryland, and Andrew Rakowsky, from New York, submitted notices of consent to join the litigation. Neither Saunders nor Rakowsky worked for FedEx in Pennsylvania. And neither has alleged any other connections to FedEx in Pennsylvania. On December 23, 2020, the trial judge granted Fischer's motion for conditional certification.

The District Court held that, because no federal statute authorizes nationwide service of process for opt-in plaintiffs in FLSA collective actions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) requires a federal court to follow the personal jurisdiction rules applicable to a state court, including the requirement clarified in Bristol-Myers that all claims must arise out of or relate to the defendants' minimum contacts with the forum state. Considering the facts in this case, the District Court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over FedEx with respect to the putative opt-in plaintiffs who worked for FedEx outside Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the District Court only certified the collective action and authorized notice with respect to security specialists employed by FedEx in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs now appeal that decision, arguing that the District Court erred in applying Bristol-Myers to this FLSA collective action because it was filed in federal court.

II.

We begin with a brief summary of the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers. That suit involved claims that a Bristol-Myers-made drug, Plavix

, had injured individuals who took it. The suit included eight separate complaints, collectively including over 600 named plaintiffs, all of which had been aggregated into a single mass action under a California state court aggregation rule. See

Bristol-Myers , 137 S. Ct. at 1778. Only 86 plaintiffs were California residents; the other 592 were residents of 33 other states. Id. The nonresident plaintiffs "did not allege that they obtained Plavix through California physicians or from any other California source; nor did they claim that they were injured by Plavix

or were treated for their injuries in California." Id.

Applying "settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction" under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 1781, the Supreme Court held Bristol-Myers's "extensive activities in California" were not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers as to the claims of the non-resident plaintiffs, id. at 1778. In doing so the Court clarified several key questions in the law of personal jurisdiction. Notably, Bristol-Myers explained that for a state court to have specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a plaintiff's claims, those claims must "arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Bristol-Myers , 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (modifications and citations omitted). Because the out-of-state plaintiffs' alleged injuries did not arise out of or relate to Bristol-Myers's specific contacts with California, the California state courts lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the company with respect to those claims. Id. at 1781. The Court also explained that "[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix

in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims." Id. at 1781. In other words, even if a state court might have personal jurisdiction over similar claims, other potential plaintiffs must still demonstrate personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their own claims.

But the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers addressed a requirement placed on state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, it did not purport to address the precise issue in this case, i.e., whether a nationwide FLSA collective action brought in federal court is subject to the same jurisdictional analysis as a mass action brought in a California state court. Id. at 1784. Moreover, the Court left open questions about how the decision might impact the personal jurisdiction analysis for other procedural devices like class actions. See id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

A.

The District Court held the analysis in Bristol-Myers applied to Fischer's FLSA action, despite this case being in federal court rather than state court, and despite the...