Fiscus v. Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass'n
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civ. 3:22-CV-1609 |
| Parties | DARLENE K. FISCUS, Plaintiff, v. BIG BASS LAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
This case, which comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's pro se complaint invites us to examine whether federal employment discrimination laws, which are designed to protect employees apply to disputes between unpaid, volunteer officers and directors of a homeowners' association. This motion to dismiss also calls upon us to assess the legal sufficiency of workplace harassment and retaliation claims which rest upon, and infer causation from, disparate acts which occurred months apart.
Darlene Fiscus, the pro se plaintiff, filed this action against Big Bass Lake Community Association, Inc., and several individual Board of Directors of this homeowner's association. (Doc. 1). In 2021, Fiscus became the Chair and Chief Operating Officer (“CEO”) of the Association, a self-managed nonprofit organization. (Id., at 6). The bylaws of the homeowners' association describe this as an unpaid, and essentially volunteer, position. In her complaint, she asserts genderbased harassment and discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), alleging that she was harassed because of her gender, and that she reported the harassment of a subordinate to the Board of Directors and was subsequently removed from her position as Chair and CEO and harassed by other Board members.
The plaintiff alleges that upon beginning her new position in 2021, the female General Manager, Ms. Shannon Ritzcke, faced “constant harassment” from other committee members that forced her constructive discharge. (Id.) Around October 2021, the plaintiff began observing and documenting what she characterizes as a hostile work environment directed at Ms. Ritzcke and other employees. (Id.) She then made arrangements for a private executive board meeting to address Ms. Ritzcke's treatment, an issue that the plaintiff believed required a professional mediator. (Id.) She then alleges that Defendant Kunin “yelled” at her for sharing the issue with an individual outside the organization. (Id.) Immediately after the meeting, Ms. Fiscus received an email which she alleges notified the Association of a special meeting on December 11, 2021 to remove her as Chair and CEO. (Id.)
After the plaintiff's removal as Chair and CEO, she remained on the board as a director, but claims that she was subject to harassment, personal attacks, deliberate obstruction at meetings, and inaccuracies and defamatory remarks being recorded on the official meeting minutes. (Id.) Moreover, the purported negative treatment Ms. Ritzcke and other employees were allegedly subject to by the defendants continued after the plaintiff's removal as CEO and Chair. (Id.) An investigation by a board-selected management attorney was conducted by the defendants to address the hostile work environment. The plaintiff avers that this investigation was “heavily slanted” and was actually a vehicle by which the Board investigated her and Ms. Ritzcke rather than the board members alleged to have committed misconduct. (Id.) The outcome of this investigation is a report that the plaintiff was dismissed from the Board entirely in July of 2022 for “multiple fiduciary violations.” (Id.)
In her complaint, Fiscus alleges that the was discriminated against because of her gender, and that she was retaliated against for reporting the harassment of another employee in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Id., at 3). She asserts these claims against the Association along with three other members of the Board and Association in their individual capacities. (Id., at 2).
The defendants have now filed the instant motion to dismiss. (Doc. 6). They assert that the plaintiff, as an unpaid member of the Board of Directors and Chair/CEO was not an “employee” of the Association for purposes of Title VII or the PHRA. In a similar fashion, the defendants argue that they are not liable with respect to the plaintiff's PHRA claim because they are not her supervisors. The defendants further assert that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim alleging harassment based on her sex in violation of Title VII.
After consideration, we conclude that, as pleaded, the complaint has not established that the Association was Fiscus's employer for purposes of Title VII and the PHRA. We further conclude that a number of the Title VII and PHRA claims against the individual defendants should be dismissed. Accordingly, we will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss, but we will allow the pro se plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this opinion.
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” (Id., at 555.) “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” (Id.)
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when dismissing a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (Id., at 679.) According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by the mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (Id., at 678.) Rather in conducting a view of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
(Id., at 679.)
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this...
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