Fish v. 2444 Acquisitions, LLC
Decision Date | 09 December 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02–1502–MF–100.,49A02–1502–MF–100. |
Citation | 46 N.E.3d 1261 |
Parties | Michael FISH, Appellant, v. 2444 ACQUISITIONS, LLC, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mark J. Crandley, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Richard Brad Gonon, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jon R. Pactor, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Michael Fish appeals the trial court's grant of a motion for relief from judgment filed by 2444 Acquisitions, LLC (“Acquisitions”). We reverse.
[2] Fish raises several issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as whether the trial court properly granted Acquisitions's motion for relief from judgment.
[3] Fish obtained a mortgage on properties owned by Acquisitions, and in March 2011, Fish filed a complaint against Acquisitions and others to foreclose the mortgage. In July 2011, the parties entered into an agreed entry, which the trial court approved. The agreed entry granted Fish a judgment in the amount of $263,308.73 plus interest and foreclosed the mortgage.
[4] At some point prior to the sheriff's sale, Acquisitions apparently filed a bankruptcy action. In August 2014, Fish testified before the bankruptcy court. At the time, Fish testified that, prior to 2011, he transferred the mortgage to Indianapolis Restaurant Ventures, LLC, (“IRV”). According to Fish, Fish owned forty percent of IRV, and Ruben Pazmino's family trust owned sixty percent of IRV. The bankruptcy court raised concerns over the mortgage being held by IRV but Fish holding the judgment of foreclosure.
[5] In December 2014, Acquisitions filed a motion for relief from judgment of the foreclosure and agreed entry. Acquisitions argued in part that the judgment was void because “Plaintiff failed to accurately represent his interest in the mortgage and failed to name a necessary party who holds an interest in the mortgage.” App. p. 9. Acquisitions requested that the judgment be vacated and set aside.
[6] Fish filed an objection and argued that he did not “ever transfer to any other party his mortgage interest relative to said Judgment” and that he remained the real party in interest. Id. at 12. Fish also argued that the motion was based on misrepresentation and was not timely under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)
. Fish further argued, with respect to Acquisitions's position that the judgment was void, that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).
[7] At a hearing on the motion for relief from judgment, Fish testified that, in 2010, Fish and Pazmino formed IRV and entered into an operating agreement. The purpose of IRV was to hold the mortgage on the properties at issue in this case. They later changed their minds about transferring the mortgage to IRV. According to Fish, Pazmino paid Fish, not IRV, $118,000 as an investment in the mortgage. Fish testified that he misspoke at the bankruptcy hearing.
[8] The trial court found that Fish testified before the bankruptcy court that “he transferred the mortgage at issue in this case to another entity, [IRV], in late 2010 or 2011.” App. p. 6. The trial court found that IRV was a real party in interest and should have been named as a party to this matter. Thus, the trial court found that “the judgment and agreed entry entered by the Court on or about July 5, 2011 is void and that Defendant's verified motion for relief was filed within a reasonable time per Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)
.” Id. Fish now appeals.
934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind.2010).
[10] Trial Rule 60(B)
provides:
[11] Acquisitions's motion was filed more than one year after the agreed judgment was entered. Consequently, Acquisitions could not be granted relief under sections (1), (2), (3), or (4), which include relief based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. Instead, Acquisitions argued in its motion for relief from judgment that it was entitled to relief because the judgment was “void.” App. p. 9.
[12] Fish argues that a real party in interest claim does not render a judgment void. In general, “ ‘[a] void judgment is a nullity, and typically occurs where the court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction.’ ” Seleme v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 982 N.E.2d 299, 304 (Ind.Ct.App.2012)
(quoting 22B Stephen E. Arthur, Indiana Practice § 60.2 (2012) ), trans. denied; see also
Moore v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 582 N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ().
[13] The parties make no argument that personal jurisdiction or faulty process is an issue here. Rather, on appeal, Acquisitions claims that this “case does involve the court's jurisdiction” and argues that the real party in interest requirement is comparable to standing. Acquisitions's argument fails for several reasons. First, standing and the real party in interest rule are separate concepts. Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1029 (Ind.1995)
. “Standing refers to the question of whether a party has an actual demonstrable injury for purposes of a lawsuit.” Id. “A real party in interest, on the other hand, is the person who is the true owner of the right sought to be enforced.” Id. at 1030. The real party in interest “is entitled to the fruits of the action.” Id.
[14] Neither concept implicates subject matter jurisdiction. In K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.2006)
, our supreme court clarified:
Like the rest of the nation's courts, Indiana trial courts possess two kinds of “jurisdiction.” Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. Personal jurisdiction requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties. Where these two exist, a court's decision may be set aside for legal error only through direct appeal and not through collateral attack....
To continue reading
Request your trial