Fish v. Cleland

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BECKWITH
• Citation: Fish v. Cleland, 33 Ill. 238, 1864 WL 2913 (Ill. 1864)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1864
• Parties: WILLIAM T. FISHv.SAMUEL CLELAND and ELLEN B. CLELAND, his wife.

33 Ill. 238

1864 WL 2913 (Ill.)

WILLIAM T. FISH

v.SAMUEL CLELAND and ELLEN B. CLELAND, his wife.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1864.

APPEAL from Circuit Court of Morgan County.

The facts are sufficiently stated by the court.

I. J. Ketchum and H. B. McClure, for Appellant.

D. A. & T. W. Smith, for Appellees.

BECKWITH, J.

The appellees filed a bill in chancery to set aside a sale made by them to the appellant of a life estate in a town lot in Jacksonville, on the ground of fraud. The specific allegations on which relief is sought are: First. That the parties owning the remainder, held a meeting at Jacksonville, at which the appellant represented his wife, one of the owners, when it was concluded by them to file a bill in chancery for a partition of the property, and in order to facilitate the same it was deemed expedient to buy the life estate of Mrs. Cleland on joint account, at the price of $2,600 to $2,800, or thereabouts; that for this purpose the appellant, representing one of the joint owners, went to Rock Island, where Mrs. Cleland resided, and there purchased her life estate, fraudulently suppressing what had transpired between the joint owners of the remainder at Jacksonville. Second. That the appellant on that occasion fraudulently represented to Mrs. Cleland that the property could not be sold unless all the persons interested therein were willing; and that Hatfield, one of the joint owners, was not willing to have it sold, when he well knew that Hatfield wished it partitioned and sold. By means of the suppression of what had transpired between the owners of the remainder and these representations, the appellees allege that they were induced to sell the life estate in question for a grossly inadequate consideration.¹ In the present case it is not material to define the nature and extent of the appellant's obligation to the owners of the remainder. He may have been under obligation to act for them and not for himself, but their rights cannot be asserted by the appellees, and are not involved in the present controversy. It is mentioned in the bill that the appellant was the son-in-law of Mrs. Cleland, but it is not alleged that this relationship occasioned any confidence between the parties. There might have been such a confidence growing out of this relation as to authorize the appellees to act upon the presumption that there could be no concealment of any material fact from them, but a court of equity cannot afford relief on that ground in the absence of any allegation that the parties acted on such presumption, and where there is no evidence from which that fact can be inferred. Undue concealment which amounts to a fraud from which a court of equity will relieve, where there is no peculiar relation of trust or confidence between the...