Fisher v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 10 November 1947
• Docket Number: No. 9592.,9592.
• Citation: 164 F.2d 707,82 US App. DC 371
• Parties: FISHER et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

82 US App. DC 371, 164 F.2d 707 (1947)

FISHER et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 9592.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.

Argued October 16, 1947.

Decided November 10, 1947.

Mr. Vincent A. Sheehy, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for petitioners.

Mr. George C. Updegraff, of Washington, D. C., Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. Vernon E. West, Corporation Counsel, and Chester H. Gray, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, both of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for respondent.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and WILBUR K. MILLER and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Associate Justice.

This petition for review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia requires us to determine how the real estate of a decedent is to be valued for inheritance tax purposes. It is asserted by the petitioning taxpayers that, because the annual valuation of real estate required by §§ 704 to 709 inclusive of Title 47, D.C.Code (1940)¹ "shall constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding year * * *," such valuation must be adopted by the assessor in appraising for inheritance tax purposes the real property of one who dies within the succeeding year. The District of Columbia, which is the respondent, contends on the other hand that the valuation ascertained in accordance with §§ 704 to 709 is simply that to which all tax levies on the real estate itself must be applied; and that such valuation has no relation to inheritance taxation, since § 1602 of Title 47 directs the assessor to appraise real estate for inheritance tax purposes at its market value at the time of the owner's death, and provides that the tax shall be paid on that value.

A second question in the case is whether, in the circumstances here presented, an inheritance tax can be imposed with respect to the transfer of assets less than six months after a prior tax had been levied with respect to the transfer of the same assets.

These questions arose from the following situation: Willis W. Fisher, who died May 13, 1946, devised an undivided interest in real estate to his wife, Mary I. Fisher. She filed an inheritance tax return listing the undivided interest at $22,278.00, which was its then current valuation for taxation determined under the process prescribed by §§ 704 to 709. But the assessor, for the computation of the inheritance tax, appraised the interest in realty at $37,125.00.

Mrs. Fisher died intestate in October, 1946, and the interest passed to her three sons. Her administrator filed an inheritance tax return showing the divisions of her estate among her heirs at law, but claiming that no inheritance tax was due. The assessor disagreed and, in computing a tax, again appraised the undivided interest in real estate at $37,125.00.

The action of the assessor with respect to both estates was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, and the taxpayers have asked us to review that action.

Whether the assessor is bound by the current annual valuation made under the section of the Code referred to above in appraising real estate for the purpose of computing an inheritance tax depends, in large part, upon the true meaning of the crucial language in § 709, which is that the valuation made under that and the five preceding sections "shall constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding year."

We have no doubt that the legislative intent was that such valuation should be the basis for the imposition of the next succeeding year's real estate levy. Section 709 is a part of the Congressional enactment known as the "District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1939."² That same statute amended and reenacted many sections of the District inheritance tax law, and included the paragraphs which are now §§ 1602 and 1603 of Title 47 of the Code. Section 1602 contains this sentence: "The (inheritance) tax provided in section 47-1601 shall be paid on the market value of the property or interest therein at the time of the death of the decedent as appraised by the assessor or, in the discretion of the assessor, upon the value as appraised by the probate court of the District."

The pertinent portion of § 1603 is as follows: "The appraisal thus made shall be deemed and taken to be the true value of the said property or interest therein upon which the said tax shall be paid, * * *."

Had it been the legislative purpose to require that the valuation under § 709 be used by the assessor in appraising the realty of one who died during the next succeeding year, it is unthinkable that § 1602 would have been written in its present form into the same piece of legislation. In construing a statute it is, of course, necessary to give effect to all its provisions, if possible; different portions of a statute will not be held to be repugnant to each other if they can be reconciled. We are not to suppose, therefore, that in one section of the Revenue Act of 1939 the Congress instructed the assessor to appraise, for the inheritance tax computation, a decedent's real estate at its market value as of the time of death, but in another section provided that in doing so he be absolutely bound by an earlier valuation made through quite a different process and, as we think, for an entirely different purpose, thus rendering nugatory the assessor's duty of appraising as of the death date. Such a supposition would require a strained and illogical extention of the words "basis of taxation for the next succeeding year" found in § 709. We have italicized the word "for" because it points to the true meaning of the whole phrase. The petitioners necessarily read the phrase as though the word "for" had been replaced by the word "during," and so conclude that the...