Fisher v. Harden
| Decision Date | 25 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-3996.,02-3996. |
| Parties | William E. "Buster" FISHER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tom E. HARDEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Morrow County, Ohio, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
James D. McNamara, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Douglas J. Suter, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
James D. McNamara, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Douglas J. Suter, Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Before: KEITH, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
The Plaintiff-Appellant, William E. "Buster" Fisher, filed a complaint on December 4, 2000, in which, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he charged the Defendants-Appellees, Sheriff Tom E. Harden, Deputy Stephen Alexander, Deputy Molly Alexander, and Deputy Mark Leary (collectively "the Defendants"), with having violated his right against an unreasonable seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On May 9, 2002, the Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The district court subsequently issued an opinion and order on August 6, 2002, in which it granted the Defendants' request for a summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they had a reasonable suspicion that Fisher was suicidal, and, as a consequence, their actions in affecting a seizure of Fisher were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact on Fisher's claim that the County failed to adequately train and supervise the deputies. In this appeal, Fisher asserts that the officers who seized him did not have probable cause to justify a mental health seizure, and that Harden failed to adequately train and supervise his deputies.1 For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE, in part, and AFFIRM, in part, the judgment of the district court.
The facts relevant to this cause occurred on the afternoon of July 10, 2000, in a rural farming area of Morrow County, Ohio. The area consists of wide open farming land, with heightened visibility in all directions. On that day, Fisher, a seventy-seven-year-old retired farmer, had gone out to shoot groundhogs, an activity in which he routinely engaged in an effort to help protect his neighbors' crops. Dressed in bib overalls, Fisher had taken with him a folding chair, his rifle, and a tripod that he used to help him aim his rifle and hold it steady. He positioned himself, sitting in the folding chair, upon an elevated railroad grade on one of his neighbor's property.
Fisher sat at a distance of approximately 250 yards from County Road 59, a rural road that runs through this area of Morrow County. A passerby noticed Fisher off in the distance sitting on railroad tracks and found his presence there quite unusual. Upon gathering that this was possibly a suicidal person, the passerby telephoned the Morrow County Sheriff's Department and reported, incorrectly, that a man had his feet tied to the railroad tracks. The Sheriff's Department subsequently dispatched a "Code 58," which indicates a possible suicide.
Two of the Defendants, deputies Stephen Alexander and Molly Alexander, who are husband and wife, responded to the dispatch. Upon their arrival on the scene, the officers located Fisher, who was still seated in his folding chair approximately 250 yards away. Mr. Alexander used the cruiser's microphone and speaker system to arouse Fisher's attention and instruct him to come toward the officers. Fisher stood up, gathered his belongings, and began walking along the railroad tracks toward the officers. As Fisher proceeded toward them, the officers noticed he was carrying a rifle slung over his shoulder. They drew their firearms, crouched behind their open cruiser doors, and ordered Fisher to lay down the rifle before coming any closer. The officers acknowledged that initially Fisher appeared unable to hear their first command, and they responded with additional instructions for him to lay down his rifle. Upon hearing their command at a distance of nearly 200 yards away, Fisher readily complied with their request. The officers instructed Fisher further to lay down his folding chair and tripod. Again, once Fisher could hear their request, he readily complied.2
For the next couple of minutes, the officers observed Fisher walk toward the road, with nothing in his hands. As he walked deliberately toward them, it became apparent to Mr. Alexander that Fisher was an older gentlemen. The officers conceded that he approached them in a normal fashion, and did not act out or say or do anything out of the ordinary. Nonetheless, they kept their weapons drawn and trained upon him. As Fisher arrived at the road, Mr. Alexander directed him to walk backwards toward Mrs. Alexander. After he finally reached them, the officers commanded Fisher, still at gunpoint, to lay face down on the roadway, and handcuffed him behind his back.
Fisher immediately went into cardiac arrest. After unsuccessfully attempting to stand Fisher on his feet, the officers left him handcuffed and lying on the ground. Presumably unaware of the seriousness of Fisher's condition, Mr. Alexander immediately went to retrieve the objects that Fisher had placed on the ground. Shortly thereafter, a woman who lived nearby and another Defendant, Deputy Mark Leary, separately arrived at the scene. The woman, who had been unable to attain sufficient attention from the Alexanders, informed Leary that Fisher suffered from a heart condition. Leary, observing Fisher's distressed state, uncuffed him, turned him on his back and called for medical assistance. Fisher was life-flighted to Riverside Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, for emergency care. Although Fisher survived, he is permanently disabled as a result of the incident.
Approximately five months later, to wit, December 4, 2000, Fisher filed a complaint against the Defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. In the complaint, Fisher charges, among other things, that the officers violated his right, as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, to be free from unreasonable seizure without probable cause, and that Sheriff Tom Harden failed to adequately train and supervise his deputies. On August 6, 2002, the district court granted the Defendants' motion for a summary judgment. In doing so, the district court determined that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Fisher had failed to establish a constitutional violation, and that there was no genuine issue of a material fact to support his claim against Harden for a failure to train and supervise his deputies. This appeal followed.
This court conducts a de novo review of a district court's grant of summary judgment. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is proper only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering such a motion, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, an adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Fisher raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims that because he pleaded facts sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the Defendants. Second, Fisher asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists on his claim that Harden failed to properly train and supervise his deputies. We address each of these issues in turn.
In his first point of error, Fisher contends that he has established a constitutional violation because the facts, as asserted by him, establish that the officers arrested him without the probable cause that is required to support a mental health seizure. The district court concluded that the officers did not need probable cause to justify their seizure of Fisher, but only needed reasonable suspicion that he was suicidal. Since the officers could point to articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Fisher was suicidal, the district court determined that Fisher had failed to establish a constitutional violation, and as a result the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Whether qualified immunity applies to an official's actions is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Virgili v Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 392 (6th Cir.2001). Qualified immunity "is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). It is "an entitlement not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct." Id."The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806.
In defining this entitlement, the Supreme Court has held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In 2001, the Court established a two-part test for determining whether qualified immunity applies. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (20...
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