Fisher v. Jansen

• Decision Date: 16 May 1889
• Citation: 128 Ill. 549,21 N.E. 598
• Parties: FISHER et al. v. JANSEN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

128 Ill. 549

21 N.E. 598

FISHER et al.

v.JANSEN.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 16, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action for personal injuries, brought in the superior court of Cook county by Egbert L. Jansen against James K. Fisher and Archibald J. Fisher. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff. This was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, and defendants again appeal. The evidence showed that in the accident for which suit was brought the plaintiff's right arm was broken in such a manner as to render it practically useless.

Flower, Remy & Holstein, for appellants.

E. A. Otis, for appellee.

SCHOLFIELD, J.

Appellee received severe and permanent injuries through the negligence of the servant of the appellants in charge of an elevator used by them for the convenience of the Beaurivage flats, of which they were, in possession. The question of appellants' liability is settled by the judgment below, and the only question presented for our determination upon this appeal is whether the second instruction, given at the instance of appellee, is correct. That instruction is as follows: ‘In determining the amount of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case, if the jury find from the evidence, under the instructions of the court, he is entitled to recover any damages, the jury have a right to and should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence before them; and they may consider the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, testified about by the witnesses in this case; his pain and suffering, if any, resulting from such injuries; the permanent disability, if any, caused by said injuries; the money necessarily paid, if any, by the plaintiff in and about endeavoring to be healed or cured of said injuries; and any future pain or suffering, (or future inability to labor or transact business,) if any, that the jury may believe from the evidence the plaintiff will sustain by reason of injuries received.’ The contention of counsel who argue on behalf of appellants is that there is no evidence in the record of the ‘earning ability’of appellee, and that it was therefore error to say to the jury that they could take into consideration his permanent disability, and consequent future inability to labor or transaction business. The evidence tends to prove that at the time appellee was injured he was a little over 53 years old; that he had gone into the book business in Chicago when a boy, and continued therein until in January, 1886, clerking from 1848 until 1856; a partner in the firm of S. C. Griggs & Co. from 1856 until 1872; and a partner in the firm of Jansen, McCurg & Co. from 1872 until January, 1886. At the last-named date he had broken down in health from overwork, but he immediately thereafter spent several months in travel and recreation, in Kansas and California, and, at the time of receiving the injury, was comparatively restored to his former health. The evidence shows the character of the injuries, and that appellee had paid about $1,000, for nursing, physician's bills, etc., in consequence of these injuries.

It is manifest that it would have been incompetent to have proved what he has made in business prior to his injuries, since that was the result of circumstances that might never be repeated. He had no employment at fixed wages for the future, and he is not shown to have possessed peculiar skill or knowledge having a definite pecuniary value, which was destroyed or affected by his injuries. What he, or any other business man, however competent and skilled, might make in the future, in any line of trade, is too much a matter of speculation and contingency to be susceptible of direct evidence. It follows, therefore, that appellee gave all the evidence of the damages he has sustained on account of his permanent disability, and consequent future inability to labor or transact business, of which that question is susceptible.

The inquiry, then, must be whether, under such circumstances, a person is entitled to recover any damages because of inability to labor or transact business in the future resulting from his injuries. We think, very clearly, that he is entitled to recover; that it can, upon no principle, make any difference whether a person is, at the time he is injured, engaged in a business paying a definite amount, or is then not engaged in business, but is, by the act of injury, prevented from engaging in business in the future in which he might reasonably expect, but not be entirely certain, that he would have success. In City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, action was brought against the city for negligence resulting in the death of a child four years...