Fisher v. Kahler, 21807.

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: KONENKAMP, Justice.
• Citation: 641 N.W.2d 122,2002 SD 30
• Parties: Curtis R. FISHER and Debbie G. Fisher, Plaintiffs, v. Rick KAHLER, d/b/a Kahler Realtors, Defendant and Appellee, and Arlen and Eunice Rude, Defendants and Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 21807.,21807.
• Decision Date: 27 February 2002

641 N.W.2d 122
2002 SD 30

Curtis R. FISHER and Debbie G. Fisher, Plaintiffs,
v.
Rick KAHLER, d/b/a Kahler Realtors, Defendant and Appellee, and
Arlen and Eunice Rude, Defendants and Appellants

No. 21807.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs October 1, 2001.

Decided February 27, 2002.

Rehearing Denied April 16, 2002.

641 N.W.2d 124

Gene R. Bushnell of Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp, Bushnell & Carpenter, Rapid City, Attorneys for appellees

Paul J. Gillette of Gillette, Battey & Gillette, Redfield, Attorney for appellants.

KONENKAMP, Justice.

[¶ 1.] This appeal centers on a claim of negligent misrepresentation brought by commercial property buyers against the sellers' realtor. The trial court granted summary judgment for the realtor, concluding that the realtor had no legal duty to the buyers. We reverse and remand because South Dakota's realtor licensing laws create additional duties for licensees beyond those imposed by the common law.

Background

[¶ 2.] As this case comes before us on summary judgment, we relate the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving parties. Satellite Cable Srvs., Inc. v. Northern Electric Coop., Inc., 1998 SD 67, ¶ 5, 581 N.W.2d 478, 480. Curtis and Deb Fisher owned two adjoining commercial lots in Rapid City, South Dakota. These properties, Lot O and Lot U, were leased to Federal Express. Lot U was the primary site for the Federal Express facilities, but a portion of its paved parking area extended onto Lot O. In 1993, Rick Kahler, d/b/a Kahler Realtors, contacted Curtis Fisher and requested an opportunity to sell the bare portion of Lot O. The Fishers told Kahler that they did not want to sell the paved parking lot portion. They signed an exclusive listing agreement with Kahler, giving him the right to list for sale Lot O for one year.

[¶ 3.] Arlen and Eunice Rude, the owners of Rude Transportation, were looking to buy commercial land in Rapid City for a future truck terminal. Kahler, as agent for the Fishers, represented to the Rudes that Lot O was 1.3 acres, 177 feet by 318 feet. Kahler showed them documents on the lot, including a plat, but none of these depicted a parking lot on Lot O. In conversation with the Rudes, Kahler told them that Lot O consisted entirely of vacant ground. Kahler made no independent determination of the actual dimensions of the portion of Lot O that the Fishers wanted to sell. After making a brief visual inspection, the Rudes offered to buy the lot. At that time, the Fishers reminded Kahler that they did not wish to do anything that would interfere with their lease to Federal Express. In November 1994, the Fishers and the Rudes executed a purchase agreement, one provision of which was that no survey would be required. After the sale, the Rudes ordered a survey of Lot O, which revealed its usable size to be 107 feet by 318.02 feet—not sufficient, in their view, for their planned freight terminal.

[¶ 4.] Not intending to sell the parking area on Lot O, which they leased to Federal Express, the Fishers sued Kahler for mishandling the sale. The Rudes were included in the suit because the Fishers wanted a court order to reform the deed, so that the paved portion of the lot could be returned to them. The Rudes cross-claimed against Kahler for negligent misrepresentation. After various legal maneuvers unnecessary to recount here, the parties moved for summary judgment. In granting Kahler's motion, the circuit court concluded that Kahler owed no legal duty to the Rudes. The Rudes now appeal that decision. The Fishers are not involved in this appeal.

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 5.] Summary judgment is appropriate under SDCL 15-6-56 when the entire record reveals that there is no genuine issue on any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

641 N.W.2d 125

matter of law. See Meyer v. Santema, 1997 SD 21, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 251, 254 (citations omitted). If there are genuine issues of material fact, then summary judgment is improper. Farmers Feed & Seed, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 699, 701 (S.D.1984). Disputed facts become material if they affect the outcome of a case under the law, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986). On review, we apply the same test as the trial court: we probe the record for material facts, resolve disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and decide whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Sorrels v. Queen of Peace Hosp., 1999 SD 133, ¶ 5, 601 N.W.2d 606, 608

[¶ 6.] Liability in tort depends on the existence and breach of duty, and unless a statute creates a legal obligation, ascertaining a duty and defining its limitations remain a function of the courts. Tipton v. Town of Tabor, 1997 SD 96, ¶ 12, 567 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Tipton...