Fisher v. Pace
Citation | 69 S.Ct. 425,336 U.S. 155,93 L.Ed. 569 |
Decision Date | 07 February 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 45,45 |
Parties | FISHER v. PACE, Sheriff |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
See 336 U.S. 928, 69 S.Ct. 653.
Mr. R. Dean Moorhead, of Austin, Tex., for petitioner.
Mr. Quentin Keith, of Beaumont, Tex., for respondent.
While participating as counsel in the trial of a cause the petitioner, Joe J. Fisher, was adjudged guilty of contempt committed in the presence of the court by the District Court of Jasper County, Texas. The petitioner's client was the plaintiff in an action under the state Workmen's Compensation Law. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 8306 et seq. The case was being tried before a jury and the parties had stipulated as to the average weekly wage of the claimant and the rate of compensation per week. The only remaining questions to be determined were as to the extent and duration of the incapacity resulting from an injury to the claimant's foot. Seven special issues, designed to furnish an answer to these problems and limited to them, were submitted to the jury.
Thereafter petitioner began his opening argument to the jury during which the following occurrence took place, as shown by the trial court's order of contempt and commitment:
'Opening Argument to Jury of Plaintiff's Attorney, Joe J. Fisher
'By Mr. Cox: Your Honor please—
'By the Court: Wait a minute.
'By the Court: That has all been agreed upon.
'By Mr. Fisher: I think it is material, Your Honor, to tell the jury what the average weekly compensation is of this claimant so they can tell where he is.
'By the Court: They are not interested in dollars and cents.
'By Mr. Fisher: They are interested to this extent—
'By Mr. Fisher: Note our exception.
'By the Court: All right.
'(By Mr. Fisher:) This negro, as I stated, can onl recover one hundred and twenty-five weeks compensation, at whatever compensation the rate will figure under the law.
'By Mr. Cox: I am objecting to that discussion, Your Honor, as to what the plaintiff can recover.
'By Mr. Fisher: I am asking—
'By the Court: I will declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes and a half, and fine you besides.
'By the Court: That is all right; I will fine you $25.00.
'By Mr. Fisher: If that will give you any satisfaction.
'By Mr. Fisher: You mean for trying to represent my client?
'By Mr. Fisher: I am making no effort to commit contempt, but merely trying to represent the plaintiff and stating in the argument—
'By Mr. Fisher: If that will give you any satisfaction; you know you have all the advantage by you being on the bench.
'By Mr. Fisher: I demand a right to state my position before the audience.
The sheriff held the petitioner in custody upon the verbal order of the court until an amended order in conformity with Texas law,1 setting forth in full the above proceedings together with a formal commitment, was filed later the same day. Upon his application for a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Texas to secure his release from the commitment, the judgment for contempt was upheld and the petitioner was denied any relief by that court and was remanded to the custody of the sheriff to undergo the punishment adjudged by the trial court. Ex parte Fisher, Tex.Sup., 206 S.W.2d 1000. As the application alleged a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we granted certiorari to consider its application to this conviction for contempt. 334 U.S. 827, 68 S.Ct. 1339. The claimed denial of due process consists of an alleged refusal to review the facts to ascertain whether a contempt was committed and in the alternative, if the facts were reviewed, due process was denied because no facts constituting contempt appear.
Historically and rationally the inherent power of courts to punish contempts in the face of the court without further proof of facts and without aid of jury is not open to question.2 This attribute of courts is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute. Such summary conviction and punishment accords due process of law. 3
There must be adequate facts to support an order for contempt in the face of the court. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner the state Supreme Court evaluated the facts to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court and held that there was. The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court (206 S.W.2d 1003), states that the court set out to review the facts 'for the purpose of determining whether they constituted acts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court' to enter the contempt order. 4 In other words, the highest court of the state proposed to satisfy itself that there was substantial evidence to validate the judgment of contempt and to insure that petitioner was not 'restrained of his liberty without due process of law.' After a careful analysis of the facts as disclosed by the judgment of the trial court, the conclusion was reached that the conduct of the petitioner was clearly sufficient to support the power of the court to punish summarily the contempt committed in its presence.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas must be affirmed. In a case of this type the transcript of the record cannot convey to us the complete picture of the courtroom scene. It does not depict such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking, bearing, and attitude of the petitioner. Reliance must be placed upon the fairness and objectivity of the presiding judge. The occurrence must be viewed as a unit in order to appraise properly the misconduct, and the relationship of the petitioner as an officer of the court must not be lost sight of.5
The state Supreme Court pointed out that its practice of submitting special issues to the jury was adopted in order to remove from the jury's consideration the effect on the ultimate outcome of the case of their answers to questions of disputed facts.6 In this case, the jury might be tempted to find a long incapacity or a severe injury if they knew the amount of recovery was limited by the employee's wage and rate of compensation. Counsel are required to confine their arguments to the evidence and must not touch upon matters withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.7 Yet here, petitioner, a member of the Texas bar, ignored this rule and at the outset of his address to the jury exceeded the bounds of permissible argument by trying to tell the jury the maximum compensation which their answers to the special issues would allow his client. On objection of the opposing counsel peti- tioner was stopped by the trial judge, but in the face of the court's decision he persisted in trying to tell the jury the effect of their answers. He switched his explanation of the stipulated amou t of recovery from the words 'one hundred and twenty-five weeks times the average weekly compensation rate' to 'one hundred and twenty-five weeks compensation, at whatever compensation the rate will figure under the law.' The change obviously brought before the jury information on the limitation to the amount of recovery—a factor held by the trial judge inadmissible under the special issues. In addition to this stub-born effort to bring excluded matter to the knowledge of the jury, the petitioner twice refused to heed the court's admonition not to argue the point. As the Supreme Court said, ...
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