Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp..

• Decision Date: 16 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–cv–1865.,10–cv–1865.
• Citation: 764 F.Supp.2d 700
• Parties: James FISHER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,v.RITE AID CORPORATION and Eckerd Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

764 F.Supp.2d 700

James FISHER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.RITE AID CORPORATION and Eckerd Corporation, Defendants.

No. 10–cv–1865.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Feb. 16, 2011.

Patrick G. Brady and Clara Rho, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Brian Downey, Pepper Hamilton, for Rite Aid.Seth Lesser and Fran Rudich, Klafter Olsen, Peter D. Winebrake and R. Andrew Santillo, Winebrake Law, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM

JOHN E. JONES III, District Judge.I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court in this diversity action asserted under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law is Defendants Rite Aid Corporation and Eckerd Corporation's (collectively, “Defendants” or “Rite Aid”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff James Fisher's (“Plaintiff” or “Fisher”) Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (“the Motion”). (Doc. 25.) The Motion has been fully briefed and thus is ripe for disposition. ( See Doc. 26 (Defendants' Brief in Support); Doc. 33 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition); Doc. 39 (Defendants' Reply); Doc. 40 (Defendants' Supplement).) For the reasons articulated in this Memorandum, the Court shall grant the Motion and dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” ¹ A “ Rule 12(c) motion is little more than a relic of the common law and code era, and it only has utility when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. Granting a Rule 12(c) motion results in a determination on the merits at an early stage in the litigation, and thus this court requires the movant to clearly establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Inst. for Sci. Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir.1991) (citing Jablonski, 863 F.2d at 290–91, punctuation omitted). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991).

As in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), when considering a motion to dismiss under 12(c) courts “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002)). In resolving a motion to dismiss under 12(c), a court generally should consider only the allegations in the complaint, as well as “documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, ... and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.2006).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, “in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). While a complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that defendant's liability is more than “a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 120 S.Ct. at 1949. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing more than “legal conclusions” or “naked assertions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Such allegations are “not entitled to the assumption of truth” and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Next, the district court must identify “the ‘nub’ of the ... complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s].” Id. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id.

III. BACKGROUND

Because Plaintiff fails to include a factual statement in his Brief in Opposition (Doc. 33), the following facts are derived from Plaintiff's Complaint or Defendants' Introduction (Doc. 26) but, nonetheless, are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in accordance with the standard of review.

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint on September 3, 2010 seeking damages and injunctive relief against Defendants for alleged violations of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he was formerly employed by Defendants and was misclassified as exempt for the overtime pay requirements of the MWHL, and seeks to certify a class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 of:

[A]ll individuals employed as Assistant Store Managers during any workweek since December 29, 2005 at any one of the 145 Maryland stores referenced in Defendant Rite Aid Corporation's Form 10–K, as filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2010.

(Doc. 1 ¶ 13.)

The action sub judice is not the first-filed action regarding Plaintiff's allegations, however. On June 26, 2009, Plaintiff consented to become a party-plaintiff in the Craig v. Rite–Aid Corporation, 08–cv–2317, Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“FLSA”) action before this Court, in which current and former Rite Aid assistant managers allege that they were misclassified as exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements (“the Craig action” or “the FLSA action”).

Shortly after joining the Craig action, Plaintiff filed a putative class action seeking the unpaid overtime wages under the MWHL and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“the Maryland action”). The Maryland Action asserted the same claims as Plaintiff asserts in the instant action. The Honorable Richard Bennet entered an Opinion and Order in the Maryland action on June 8, 2010 that granted Rite Aid's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's MWPCL claim with prejudice because that statute does not govern claims for overtime pay, and granted Rite Aid's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's MWHL claim without prejudice under the first-filed rule. Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 09–1909–RBD, 2010 WL 2332101 (D.Md. June 8, 2010) (attached at Doc. 26–2). Plaintiff then filed his MWHL claim in this Court on September 3, 2010.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants offer two central arguments in support of the Motion. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's MWHL claim was dismissed in the Maryland action because it is duplicative of the Craig action and that Plaintiff is impermissibly attempting to circumvent the ruling by re-filing the Complaint in this Court. Second, even if the Maryland action was dismissed so that Plaintiff could re-file it in the same district as the Craig action, Defendants maintain that the Complaint must nonetheless be dismissed on preemption principles, because of the inherent incompatibility between the two actions, and because the Rules Enabling Act renders this action incompatible with the FLSA action.

In response, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Bennet dismissed the Maryland action not because it was impermissibly raised in federal court but rather refrained from hearing the case so that this Court could decide both the Craig action and the instant action. Further, Plaintiff argues that the MWHL claims are not preempted by the FLSA and that the inherent incompatibility doctrine is invalid regardless of whether it is applied in a dual-filed action or separate actions. Finally, Plaintiff claims that the Rules Enabling Act does not bar this action because the MWHL does not abridge substantive rights conferred by the FLSA. Because we find that the Motion should be granted on inherent incompatibility grounds, we shall not address the other arguments, regarding comity, preemption, and the Rules Enabling Act, but assure the parties we have fully considered all arguments in support of or in opposition to the Motion. ²

A. FLSA and MWHL

In 1938, Congress made a finding that there were “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers ...” and thus enacted the FLSA “correct and as rapidly as practicable eliminate the [above-named conditions] without substantially curtailing employment or earning power.” 29 U.S.C. § 202. Section 216(b) of the FLSA limits the scope of class actions...