Fisher v. Ventura Cnty. Sheriffs Narcotics Agency

• Decision Date: 18 June 2014
• Docket Number: NO. CV 14-04494-VBF-MAN,CV 14-04494-VBF-MAN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: GARY FRANCIS FISHER, Petitioner, v. VENTURA COUNTY SHERIFFS NARCOTICS AGENCY, Respondent.

GARY FRANCIS FISHER, Petitioner,
v.
VENTURA COUNTY SHERIFFS NARCOTICS AGENCY, Respondent.

NO. CV 14-04494-VBF-MAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: June 18, 2014

OPINION AND ORDER
Dismissing Habeas Petition without Prejudice due to Petitioner's Failure to Name a Proper Respondent, Failure to Establish Exhaustion of State-Court Remedies, and Failure to Satisfy the "In Custody" Requirement
Advising Petitioner that Monetary Damages are Not Available in Federal Habeas Corpus
Denying a Certificate of Appealability ("COA")

Proceeding pro se, California state prisoner Gary Fisher ("petitioner") filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California ("the Northern District") on June 2, 2014.¹ On June 6, 2014, the Northern District transferred the

Page 2

petition to this district. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus "must" be summarily dismissed "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." First, it plainly appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this petition, because, as the petition is currently written, petitioner has not provided allegations sufficient to establish the AEDPA requirement that he be "in custody." Second, the petition does not establish that petitioner exhausted his state-court remedies with regard to each of his claims. Third, the petition fails to name a proper respondent. Each of these provides an independent basis for dismissing the petition without prejudice. Finally, the petition seeks monetary damages, which are not an available remedy on federal habeas review.

Therefore, the Court will not require the respondent to file an answer or dispositive motion in response to the habeas petition at this juncture.² Instead, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice, deny a COA, and enter a separate judgment against petitioner.

ANALYSIS

The Petition suffers from at least four readily apparent jurisdictional and substantive defects. First, pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in U.S. District Courts, a state

Page 3

prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must name as respondent the person having custody of him. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 333, 130 S. Ct. 2788, 2797 (2010) (referring to § 2254's "requirement of custody pursuant to a state-court judgment") (emphasis omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained,

The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is "the person who has custody over [the petitioner]." 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also [28 U.S.C.] § 2243 ("The writ, or order to show cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained."). The consistent use of the definite article ["the"] in reference to the custodian indicates that there is generally only one proper respondent to a given prisoner's habeas petition. This custodian, moreover, is "the person" with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court. * * *
In accord with the statutory language . . . , longstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement - "core challenges" - the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2717-18 (2004); see, e.g., Ellis v. Hill, 2014 WL 1910815, *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) ("The correct respondent is the warden of Folsom State Prison, where petitioner is presently incarcerated."). Petitioner is incarcerated in a California state prison pursuant to a Kern County Superior Court conviction which he sustained in February 2012. (Pet. at 2.)

The petition, however, names as respondent the Ventura County Sheriffs Narcotics Agency, an entity that, if it exists, does not have custody of petitioner. That alone is a basis for dismissing the habeas petition without prejudice, i.e., with leave to amend. See, e.g., Dotson v. Perez, 2014 WL 2452901, *1 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (John McDermott, M.J.) ("Respondent filed a Motion To Dismiss the Petition on the ground that Petitioner failed to name a proper respondent. The District Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and dismissing the Petition with leave to amend . . . ."); Tillman v. Board of Parole Hearings, 2014 WL 1347408, *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014) ("Petitioner has named the Board of Parole Hearings . . . . The BPH is not the proper respondent. Instead, petitioner must name as respondent the warden of the prison where he is incarcerated. Therefore, the amended petition will be dismissed with leave to amend.").

Page 4

The second facial defect of this purported habeas petition is that it seeks relief that is not cognizable in a section 2254 habeas action, namely, monetary damages. (Pet. at 34.) "[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1973). "The power of a federal habeas court 'lies to enforce the right of personal liberty' [and] . . . [a]s such, a habeas court 'has the power to release' a prisoner, but 'has no other power.' " Douglas v. Jacquez, 626 F.3d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained,

If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release - the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy.

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 493, 93 S. Ct. at 1838; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646, 124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004) ("[D]amages are not an available habeas remedy . . . ."); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) (referring to "relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages").

If petitioner is not challenging the fact or length of his present confinement and instead is seeking damages, then, this action is not one that can be considered on federal habeas review. Accord Duncan v. Greystone Park Psych. Hosp., 2014 WL 2472144, *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2014) ("To the extent that Ms. Duncan seeks damages in this habeas petition, this Court will dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.") (citing Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (since "[f]ederal habeas power is limited . . . to a determination of whether there has been an improper detention by virtue of the state-court judgment", any claim for damages must be brought in a separate, non-habeas action)).

The third facial defect of this habeas petition is that all of its claims may be unexhausted. "'Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents them to a federal court in a habeas petition.'" Avila v. Superior Ct. of Calif., 2014 WL 1512191, *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728

Page 5

(1999)). As in pre-AEDPA habeas practice,³ a petitioner who seeks to challenge the lawfulness of his state-court conviction or sentence under AEDPA bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that he has exhausted his state-court remedies. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981); accord Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The habeas petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.") (citation omitted)); Barresi v. Maloney, 296 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The petitioner bears the heavy burden of demonstrating satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement.") (citation omitted); see, e.g., Morales v. Long, 2013 WL 8291412, *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013) ("[T]he petition is subject to dismissal without prejudice because petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proving that he exhausted state-court remedies.") (emphasis added). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he "fairly presents" his federal claims to the state's highest court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995) (per curiam).

The state prisoner must show that his prior filing in the state supreme court described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory underlying his claim. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. "As the Supreme Court has put it, 'for purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee.'" Jenkins v. Biter, 2014 WL 1352247, *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)). The federal claim

Page 6

is fairly presented to the state court if it was raised in the petition itself, in an accompanying brief, or in some...