Fisher v. Wainwright

• Citation: 435 F. Supp. 253
• Decision Date: 01 August 1977
• Docket Number: 74-703 Civ. T-K.
• Parties: Ronald Lee FISHER, # 049939, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

435 F. Supp. 253

Ronald Lee FISHER, # 049939, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Respondent.

74-703 Civ. T-K.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Tampa Division.

August 1, 1977.

Charles H. Livingston, Sarasota, Fla., for petitioner.

William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Fla., Tampa, Fla., for respondent.

OPINION

KRENTZMAN, District Judge.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, wherein the petitioner seeks release from confinement in accordance with his plea of nolo contendere in Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida. The petitioner, Ronald Lee Fisher, pled nolo contendere and was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, and a concurrent fifteen year sentence for kidnapping. On direct appeal to the Florida District Court of Appeals, petitioner's conviction was affirmed per curiam and without opinion. Fisher v. State, 302 So.2d 219 (2d DCA Fla. 1974).

The essence of petitioner's habeas corpus claim is premised on his allegation that his plea of nolo contendere was neither intelligent nor voluntary because he was presented with a Hobson's choice¹ of entering into a plea arrangement or going forward to trial represented by ineffective and unwilling counsel.

The United States Magistrate, pursuant to a general order of assignment, submitted a report recommending an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's claim and appointed counsel to represent the petitioner. Such an evidentiary hearing was held before the Court on June 23, 1976.

The Record Before the State Court

The record in this matter indicates that two informations were filed against the petitioner in July, 1973, charging him with rape and kidnapping. Counsel for petitioner was appointed soon after the first information was filed, but said counsel moved to withdraw when the petitioner retained his own attorney. Retained counsel moved to withdraw representation on August 14, 1973, citing a canon of professional responsibility as grounds for his motion. Soon thereafter the petitioner retained the services of Mr. John Edman who continued to represent the petitioner throughout the remainder of the state court proceedings.

On September 19, 1973 petitioner moved for and was granted a continuance of the trial which was then rescheduled for November 6, 1973. Several days prior to the November trial date, the parties stipulated to a continuance until December 3, 1973.

On December 3, 1973 petitioner again moved for a continuance of the trial, but this request was denied by the trial judge. Thereupon counsel for the petitioner stated on the record:

Counsel: I feel that the Court's motions—or denial of my motions up-to-date have denied me the opportunity to effectively defend the defendant in the case, and I have asked to withdraw as counsel of record. It is my understanding the Court has denied that motion, and has directed the trial to proceed today.

The Court: That is correct.

The colloquy between the trial judge and counsel which followed these statements resulted in the court's ruling that the denial of the petitioner's substantive motions would be preserved for appellate review.

Next the court turned to the petitioner and questioned him regarding the nature of his desire to plead nolo contendere. The court inquired as to the petitioner's age and marital status and whether he was under the influence of any drug or alcohol. The court explained to the petitioner the possible sentences for the two charges and also questioned him whether any promises were made in connection with the plea arrangement. Also, the court inquired of the petitioner whether he was apprised of his right to a jury trial. Upon an affirmative answer, the Court informed the petitioner a jury could be selected and the trial could start on that same day.

The trial judge then inquired:

The Court: You have been represented right along in these cases by Mr. Edman, is that correct?

Petitioner: That's right.

The Court: Are you satisfied with that representation?

Petitioner: No.

The Court: You're not. In what manner are you not satisfied?

Petitioner: Well, mainly because he says he can't, you know, continue representing me in the trial. Well, he didn't want to go to trial with it. And so I know I wouldn't have a chance in there, as it is.

The Court: Mr. Fisher, other than a disagreement with a judgment decision on the part of your attorney, which that is, do you have any other complaints with the representation?

Petitioner: No, I don't.

The District Court Evidentiary Hearing

Pursuant to this Court's order, an evidentiary hearing was held at which time the petitioner was present with his court appointed counsel. A record of the proceedings was made and is available for transcription. Petitioner and his former attorney, John Edman (hereinafter in the finding of facts referred to as attorney) were the only two witnesses who testified at the hearing. The only other evidence received was the transcript of the state change of plea hearing. Based upon the evidence received at the hearing the Court enters the following findings of fact:

1. The petitioner and his attorney had on numerous occasions discussed the trial, the possible defenses, and alternative pleas.

2. The attorney upon consideration of multiple factors (the denial of the motion to suppress, the denial of the motion for continuance, the denial of the motion to withdraw, the time to prepare for a new defense strategy after discussions with the petitioner regarding the defense of drunkenness, the report of the psychiatrist, the plea agreement offered by the prosecutor to concurrent terms and a nolo contendere plea, and the opportunity to present the denial of the motions to an appellate court) advised his client, the petitioner, that the best alternative in the present instance was to plead nolo contendere.

3. The attorney, although he was of the opinion the plea of nolo contendere was the best alternative and had so advised his client, would have gone to trial had the petitioner decided he wanted a trial. The attorney did not threaten to remain mute during the trial had the petitioner demanded a trial.

4. The petitioner knew at the time of the change of plea hearing that by pleading nolo contendere he was waiving his right to a jury trial, to testify on his own behalf, and to cross examine his accusers.

5. The petitioner during the change of plea hearing expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney. After characterizing petitioner's complaint as a disagreement with counsel over a judgment decision, the state judge inquired whether petitioner had any other complaints. Petitioner responded in the negative.

6. The petitioner was neither threatened or coerced into pleading nolo contendere, nor were any promises made in exchange for his plea. The plea of nolo contendere entered by the petitioner on December 3, 1973 was voluntary and knowing.

Conclusions of Law

At the outset of consideration of this petition for habeas corpus relief, the Court was presented with the multi-faceted question of whether petitioner's plea of nolo contendere was voluntary and knowing because of the denial of petitioner's motion for continuance and because petitioner was represented by ineffective and unwilling counsel. At the conclusion of argument following the evidentiary hearing, counsel for petitioner had reduced his claim to the sole issue of whether petitioner's plea was voluntary and knowing. Rather than fail to consider any issue raised and subsequently abandoned, the Court will consider the effect of the denial of the petitioner's December 3, 1973 motion for continuance, the effective assistance of counsel, and the voluntariness of petitioner's plea. The Court will consider these issues in light of the transcript of the state court hearing, the testimony of the two witnesses and the evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing before this Court, and the court file. McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1973)².

(A) The Motion for Continuance

Although tangentially presented, the denial of petitioner's motion for continuance on December 3, 1973 and its effect on the effective assistance of counsel rendered by petitioner's attorney warrants consideration. In Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, (5th Cir. 1967) the Fifth Circuit found that the right to counsel afforded under "the Sixth Amendment means the effective assistance of counsel and effective assistance requires time for preparation."³ Rather than a mechanical application of a rigid standard, the review of whether the denial of a motion for continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process or to deny petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel rests with an analysis of the facts and arguments presented at the time the motion is denied. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), and Davis v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1977).

At the time of the denial of petitioner's last motion for continuance on December 3, 1973, the state court had previously granted one two month long continuance, the parties had stipulated to another month long continuance, and petitioner's attorney had been involved in the case for over three months. The final motion for continuance was presented to the state court on the date on which the trial was to commence. Additionally, all substantive motions and requested examinations had been ruled upon and or completed.

Thus, the facts reflect that the attorney for petitioner had ample time to prepare and was in fact prepared to represent the petitioner. The denial of the motion for continuance presented at the final hour was within the discretion of the trial judge and cannot be considered either a fifth or sixth amendment violation.

(B) Effective Assistance of Counsel

It is well established that a petitioner may attack the voluntary and knowing character of his...