Fisher v. Winston-Salem Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 27 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1:12CV868.,1:12CV868.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: William Ray FISHER, Plaintiff, v. WINSTON–SALEM POLICE DEPARTMENT, Sergeant Tony Perkins, Scott Cunningham, Chief of Police for the Winston–Salem Police Department, and Cliff Cranford, Investigator for the Winston–Salem Police Department, Defendants.

28 F.Supp.3d 526

William Ray FISHER, Plaintiff

v.WINSTON–SALEM POLICE DEPARTMENT, Sergeant Tony Perkins, Scott Cunningham, Chief of Police for the Winston–Salem Police Department, and Cliff Cranford, Investigator for the Winston–Salem Police Department, Defendants.

No. 1:12CV868.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed June 27, 2014.

William Ray Fisher, Clemmons, NC, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BEATY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge that this action filed by Plaintiff William Ray Fisher (“Plaintiff”) be dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Amend [Doc. # 23], grant the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 8] filed by Defendants Cliff Cranford, Scott Cunningham, and Tony Perkins in their individual capacities (“Individual Defendants”), and grant the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 14] filed by the Winston–Salem Police Department and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities (“Official Defendants”). The Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation [Doc. # 26] was filed on March 28, 2014, 2014 WL 1322708, and notice was served on the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

On April 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed timely Objections [Doc. # 28] to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation, to which Individual Defendants filed a Response [Doc. # 29] and Official Defendants filed a Response [Doc. # 30]. The Court has now reviewed de novo the Objections and the portions of the Recommendation to which Objections were made. For the reasons explained herein, this Court adopts in part, and modifies in part, the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings claims of age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants hired younger and less qualified applicants instead of Plaintiff, due to his age. Individual Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 8], seeking dismissal based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies against them. Official Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 14], seeking dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6).

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting both Motions to Dismiss. (Mem. Op. & Order [Doc. # 26].) Specifically, he recommends granting Individual Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 8], because Plaintiff does not dispute that Individual Defendants were not named in his EEOC charge, and therefore, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over them. (Id. at 11.) The Magistrate Judge also recommends granting Individual Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 8], because these individuals do not qualify as “employers,” as required to be liable under the ADEA. (Id. at 11–12.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting Official Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 14], because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 4–11.) Because the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds, he did not address Official Defendants' other alleged bases for dismissal. This Court will first consider the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation as to Official Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, followed by Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Fourth Circuit has directed that courts “ ‘take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ but ‘[they] need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts,’ and ‘[they] need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.’ ” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008) (quoting Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.2000) ). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (citations omitted). Thus, dismissal of a complaint is proper where a plaintiff's factual allegations fail to “produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge the plaintiff's claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

Furthermore, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court “may not be an advocate for a pro se plaintiff and must hold the complaint to certain minimal pleading standards.” Hongan Lai v. Dep't of Justice, No. 5:13cv00033, 2013 WL 3923506, at *3 (W.D.Va. July 29, 2013) (citing Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir.1985) ; Switzer v. Town of Stanley, No. 5:10cv00128, 2010 WL 4961912, at *2–3 (W.D.Va. December 1, 2010) ; Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D.Md.1981) ).

Additionally, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents attached to the Complaint, as long as those documents are integral to the Complaint and authentic. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009) ; Bala v. Va. Dept. of Conservation and Recreation, 532 Fed.Appx. 332, 334 (4th Cir.2013) (“In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [the Court] ‘may consider documents attached to the complaint[,] so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.’ ”) (quoting Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.2007) ). However, the Court may not consider Plaintiff's new allegations raised in his Response, or the attachments to his Response, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Bailey v. Va. High School League, Inc., 488 Fed.Appx. 714, 715–16 (4th Cir.2012) (“In deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint and any documents attached or incorporated by reference[; h]owever, the district cannot go beyond these documents on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)); see Bala, 532 Fed.Appx. at 334 (“The district court may go beyond the complaint and attached documents, which constitute ‘the pleadings,’ in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding if the court converts the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) )). The Court will therefore consider the documents attached to Plaintiff's Complaint in evaluating the Motions to Dismiss, but not the attachments to Plaintiff's Response or the more detailed allegations raised in Plaintiff's Response.

III. OFFICIAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

a. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

i. Age Discrimination Claim

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire any individual because of the individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012). “Age must be the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's action for the action to violate the ADEA.” Buchhagen v. ICF Intern., Inc., 545 Fed.Appx. 217, 220 (4th Cir.2013) (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ). A plaintiff can prove an ADEA discrimination claim in either of two ways: (1) through presentation of direct evidence of intentional discrimination; or (2) through the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc); Lovelace v. Sherwin–Williams Co.,

681 F.2d 230, 238 (4th Cir.1982) (adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework for use in ADEA cases). In order to prove a prima facie claim of age discrimination in a refusal-to-hire context, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he is at least 40 years old; (2) that he was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) that the position remained open and the employer continued to seek or accept applications from persons with his qualifications outside the protected class. Henson v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir.1995) (citations omitted); Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 814 F.Supp.2d 500, 512 (D.Md.2011) (citing Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir.2006) ); see Jordan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 134 (4th Cir.1997) (applying the same prima facie elements to both Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims).

However, the prima facie case operates as a “flexible evidentiary standard that should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for...