Fisk Tire Co., Inc. v. Hood Coach Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1936
• Docket Number: 25520.
• Citation: 188 S.E. 57,54 Ga.App. 401
• Parties: FISK TIRE CO., Inc., v. HOOD COACH LINES, Inc.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

188 S.E. 57

54 Ga.App. 401

FISK TIRE CO., Inc., v. HOOD COACH LINES, Inc.

No. 25520.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division

October 23, 1936

Syllabus by the Court.

Under the laws of Massachusetts, a contract of indemnity will not be considered as indemnifying one against his own negligence unless such an intent unequivocally appears from the express language of the contract.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

Application by the Hood Coach Lines, Incorporated, for surrender of its charter and for dissolution of the corporation, wherein the Fisk Tire Company, Incorporated, intervened. To review a judgment allowing the surrender of the charter and dissolving the corporation, intervener brings error.

Affirmed.

Evins Quillian & Evins, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Martin Martin & Snow, of Macon, for defendant in error.

BROYLES Chief Judge.

Hood Coach Lines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Hood), filed an application for surrender of its charter and for dissolution of the corporation. Fisk Tire Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Fisk), intervened and filed its objections to the application, and attached thereto, as Exhibit A, a certain contract entered into and signed by Hood and Fisk. It was stipulated in the contract that it should be construed according to the laws of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The case was heard by the judge, without the intervention of a jury, upon an agreed statement of facts, and a judgment was rendered, allowing the surrender of the charter, and dissolving the corporation. To that judgment the intervener excepted.

The agreed statement of facts, material to a decision of this case recites: That the contract attached to Fisk's intervention as Exhibit A was a true copy of the contract executed by the parties; that Fisk incurred a liability in the nature of counsel fees and expenses in defending certain suits wherein the plaintiffs sought to recover damages from Fisk, because of the blowout of a tire on Hood's bus which caused the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs, and that the tire which blew out was a tire furnished by Fisk to Hood under the aforesaid contract. It was stipulated that the sole question for determination of the court was whether the contract created an obligation on the part of Hood to pay Fisk for counsel fees and expenses incurred in defending a suit of the nature described above. To determine this question it is necessary to refer to the law of Massachusetts pertinent thereto, as enunciated by the court of last resort of that state, and to consider the language of that part of paragraph 8 a of the contract which the plaintiff in error contends obligated Hood to pay Fisk for said counsel fees and expenses. That portion of the contract reads as follows "Operator [Hood] further agrees to pay Fisk for all injury or damage to Fisk caused by reason of any claim, action, or causes of action arising out of the use, service,...