Fisk v. Fisk, 15
| Decision Date | 16 May 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 15,15 |
| Citation | 333 Mich. 513,53 N.W.2d 356 |
| Parties | FISK v. FISK. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Douglas Leo Paterson, Detroit, for appellant.
George A. Kelly, Detroit, for William F. Schuett, receiver.
Before the Entire Bench.
This case is an outgrowth of a suit brought by C. D. Fisk against W. T. Fisk to compel the transfer of a business then owned by W. T. Fisk to C. D. Fisk. Incident to the bill for specific performance C. D. Fisk and W. F. Schuett were appointed coreceivers for the business pending determination of the suit. The matter finally came to this Court. We dismissed the bill and remanded the case to the trial court for termination of the receivership. See Fisk v. Fisk, 328 Mich. 570, 44 N.W.2d 184.
On October 10, 1950, a petition for discharge of receivers was filed in the trial court by the coreceivers. This petition sets forth the fact that W. F. Schuett and C. D. Fisk had been appointed coreceivers of the Casket Hardware Manufacturing Company on December 13, 1946; that said appointment authorized them to operate the said business and account to the court for all receipts and disbursements; that they had done so from December 13, 1946, to the date of the petition. One of the petitioners, W. F. Schuett, set forth that previous to his appointment he had been a regular employee of said company as production superintendent, which duties he continued to perform while he was acting as receiver, for the same salary as he had received prior to his appointment as receiver, and that he had acted as receiver for a period of approximately 4 years, for which services he sought to be granted the sum of $4,000.
Attached to the petition was a statement and accounting of receipts and disbursements made during the receivership, and the petition prayed for allowance of the account and discharge of the receivers. W. T. Fisk filed answer and objections to this petition, alleging in substance that W. F. Schuett was not entitled to the $4,000 extra compensation because he had not performed any duties additional to those of production superintendent; and that even if Schuett did have a proper claim for compensation it was against C. D. Fisk, the party who had sought and obtained the appointment of receivers.
Hearing was had relative to discharge of the receivers and on the issue of Schuett's compensation, and at its conclusion the court ordered that the final account of the receivers be approved and that Schuett be compensated for services as a receiver in the amount of $4,000. W. T. Fisk, defendant in the original action, has appealed from that portion of the order which grants $4,000 compensation to W. F. Schuett. Appellant contends that because the original bill for specific performance, to which the appointment of receivers was incidental, was dismissed, C. D. Fisk, the party who instigated the receivership, should be responsible for the costs thereof.
In a case such as this, the primary purpose of a receivership is to preserve and protect the property involved in the controversy. This being so it logically follows that he who ultimately establishes his right to the property thus held is the one who benefits from the property having been protected and preserved. Bailey v. Bailey, 262 Mich. 215, 247 N.W. 160. For this reason the general rule followed by the courts is that 'a receiver's compensation and the expenses necessarily incurred by him in preserving and caring for the property under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction are primarily a charge on and should be paid out of the fund or property in his hands, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the principal suit * * *.' 75 C.J.S., Receivers, § 302a, p. 978. An exception to this general rule is made in cases where the court which appointed the receiver had no jurisdiction to do so, and also in some cases where although the court had jurisdiction it was improper or improvident to appoint a receiver. 1 In the instant case the parties agreed by stipulation to the appointment of C. D. Fisk and W. F. Schuett as receivers, and by doing so...
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