Fitts v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1991
• Citation: 581 So.2d 819
• Parties: Floyd O. FITTS, as administrator ad litem of the Estate of Susan Fitts Gafford, deceased, et al. v. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation. 89-1415.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 819

581 So.2d 819

Floyd O. FITTS, as administrator ad litem of the Estate of Susan Fitts Gafford, deceased, et al. v. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation.

89-1415.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 24, 1991.

W. Ryan deGraffenried, Jr. of deGraffenried, Tipton & Donaldson, Tuscaloosa, James J. Thompson, Jr. and Bruce J. McKee of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton and Mark Stephens of Emond & Vines, Birmingham, for appellants.

Hobart A. McWhorter, Jr. and Norman Jetmundsen, Jr. of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellee Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co.

LaBella S. Alvis of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

SHORES, Justice.

Dr. William Gafford, his wife Susan, and their three children were killed in August 1983 when the plane he was piloting crashed shortly after takeoff near Ebro, Florida. All five family members were residents of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and were returning home from a Florida vacation.

Two separate wrongful death/product liability actions were filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, in 1985. One was brought by William F. Gafford, Sr., as administrator of the estate of Dr. Gafford, and one was brought by Floyd O. Fitts, the father of Susan Fitts Gafford, on behalf of her and the children. Both suits were against Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (formerly North American Rockwell) as the designer and manufacturer of the plane, and Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company ("3M") as the designer and manufacturer of a flight instrument called a "Stormscope."

Gulfstream and 3M maintain that their products were not defectively designed and were not causally related to the crash. They contend that Dr. Gafford was contributorily negligent in flying into known adverse weather conditions. They assert that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

On the eve of trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the trial court make a pretrial determination that Alabama's substantive law (rather than Florida's) applied to this case, or, in the alternative, to certify the choice-of-law issue for an appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 5, A.R.App.P.

The appeal on behalf of the estate of Dr. William F. Gafford, Jr. (89-1416), was dismissed upon the motion of the administrator. Apparently, he was satisfied with the trial court's choice of Florida law for Dr. Gafford's case. This leaves the wife and children's case before us on appeal. Apparently, Alabama law was preferred for their case.

Lex loci delicti has been the rule in Alabama for almost 100 years. Under this principle, an Alabama court will determine the substantive rights of an injured party according to the law of the state where the injury occurred. Norris v. Taylor, 460 So.2d 151, 153 (Ala.1984); Mullins v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 239 Ala. 608, 195 So. 866 (1940); Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). The plaintiff contends that the doctrine of lex loci delicti is outmoded and unfair. ¹ He urges Alabama to adopt the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).

We therefore consider the question of whether Alabama should retain the traditional conflict of laws principle of lex loci delicti in tort cases or embrace the "most significant relationship" approach of §§ 6, 145, 146, and 175 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which read as follows:

" § 6. Choice-of-Law Principles

"(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

"(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:

"(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

"(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

"(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

"(d) the protection of justified expectations,

"(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

"(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

"(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied."

" § 145. The General Principle

"(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state, which with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

"(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

"(a) the place where the injury occurred,

"(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

"(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

"(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties centered.

"These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

" § 146. Personal Injuries

"In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied."

" § 175. Right of Action for Death

"In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied."

Our review of the state of the law today shows us that a change in our choice of law rules is not the simple decision that the plaintiff would have us believe. Professor Herma Hill Kay of the University of California at Berkeley, has noted: "Courts willing to consider the adoption of new choice of law theory in the United States today are faced with a bewildering array of academic theories, many with loyal judicial adherents." ² The approach of the Restatement (Second), which the plaintiffs urge us to adopt, is only one of many.

The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws in 1934 required the application of the law of the place where the key event occurred by which the plaintiff became possessed of a cause of action. Under this traditional vested rights theory, the state in which the events giving rise to a tort or contract obligation occurred, and only that state, had the power to create such an obligation and define its scope and content. ³ Professor Harold L. Korn of Columbia University notes that the place of contracting rule "never came close to banishing various other approaches to choice of law in the contract conflicts field." Professor Korn adds: "The lex loci delicti rule, in contrast, had been universally accepted by American courts. At least in the personal injury cases that make up the great bulk of tort litigation, the lex loci rule was free of most of the intrinsic weaknesses of its kindred contract rule." Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Col.L.Rev. 722, at 804-05 (1983).

The traditional vested rights theory was first challenged in 1933 by Professor David F. Cavers in an article in the Harvard Law Review ⁴ in which he suggested that in determining a choice-of-law question the court should routinely take account of the substantive tenor of the competing local rules and the desirability of the results they would produce. ⁵ Professor Brainerd Currie of Duke University published a series of articles between 1958 and 1965 in which he proposed a governmental interest analysis approach. ⁶ Professor Robert Leflar announced his five "choice-influencing considerations" in 1966. ⁷ The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts was published in 1971.

The first total break with the traditional approach to tort conflicts came with the New York Court of Appeals decision in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). This decision is considered the watershed decision that "at last moved the modern choice-of-law revolution out of the academic journals and into the courts." ⁸

Since Babcock, the rule of lex loci has been abandoned in favor of a "modern approach" in many jurisdictions. However, those jurisdictions are not unanimous as to what this "modern approach" should be. One commentator notes at least six separate approaches in jurisdictions that have departed from the rule of lex loci. ⁹

Some states have adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) in tort cases. First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1979); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss.1968); Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985); Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 703 P.2d 1190 (1985); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla.1980); Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 700 P.2d 19 (1985); Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So.2d 193 (La.Ct.App.) cert. denied, 461 So.2d 319 (La.1984); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me.1982); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.1969); Morgan v. Biro Manufacturing Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla.1974); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967). Nebraska appears to follow the Restatement (Second), as does Oregon. Harper v. Silva, 224 Neb. 645, 399 N.W.2d 826 (1987); Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976). North Dakota has a...