Fitzer v. Am. Inst. Baking

• Decision Date: 09 August 2016
• Docket Number: CV 209-169
• Parties: RICK FITZER, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BAKING; EUGENE HATFIELD; and AIB INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

RICK FITZER, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BAKING; EUGENE HATFIELD; and AIB INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants.

CV 209-169

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia Brunswick Division

August 9, 2016

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a fully briefed Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant American Institute of Baking ("AIB"), see dkt. nos. 48-49, 55, 60, and Motion Regarding the PCA Settlement Procedures filed by Defendants AIB International, Inc. ("AIBI") and Eugene Hatfield ("Hatfield"), see dkt. nos. 50-51, 56, 59. For the reasons that follow, AIB's Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 48) is GRANTED. AIBI and Hatfield's Motion Regarding the PCA Settlement Procedures (dkt. no. 50) is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part as premature: the Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on grounds of waiver and mitigation or, in the alternative, an order reducing Plaintiff's potential damages award, and it is DISMISSED as premature insofar as it requests a denial of class certification at this time.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rick Fitzer ("Plaintiff"), a resident of Chatham County, Georgia, allegedly got salmonella poisoning after ingesting food products containing peanut butter supplied by Peanut Corporation of America ("PCA"). Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A ("Pl.'s Compl."), ¶¶ 1, 5-9. AIBI had contracted to inspect PCA's food-production plants, and Hatfield, an AIBI employee, conducted the audit of the PCA facility in Blakely, Georgia, that is alleged to have produced the contaminated peanut butter. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 14. On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated persons, filed suit against AIBI and Hatfield and AIBI's affiliate, AIB (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that they negligently performed the inspection or audit at the PCA facility. Id. at ¶ 13.

Notably, Plaintiff purports to represent two classes of persons allegedly affected by Defendants' inspection: (1) "[a]11 persons who suffered personal injuries, including death, as a result of peanut products produced at the Peanut Corporation of America[] plants"; and (2) "[a]11 persons who suffered non-personal injury damages such as: a) loss of peanut products purchased because of [a] recall and costs associated withcomplying with the recall[,] and b) medical check-ups for actual and/or suspected ill health effects from the contaminated food products." Id. at p. 4. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that affiliates AIB and AIBI are foreign corporations that share a principal place of business in Manhattan, Kansas. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 13. Plaintiff also asserts that AIB "is responsible for setting out the parameters of the training and work to be done by AIBI inspectors/auditors." Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff claims that because "[t]he scope of the inspection set out for . . . Hatfield on the PCA facilities was absolutely deficient," AIB may be held liable for the damages allegedly suffered by Plaintiff and the proposed class members. Id.

In their Report filed with the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), the parties recognized that "this case will involve a class certification motion filed by the Plaintiff, which Defendants will oppose." Dkt. No. 27 ("Rule 26(f) Report"), p. 3. The parties agreed that the Court's ruling on such motion will have a "dramatic effect" on this case, and that "[t]he discovery necessary to support and oppose the class certification motion will be extensive." Id. On May 13, 2010, the Court stayed this case pending the completion of settlement procedures overseen by the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia regarding personal injury claims against PCA based on the salmonella outbreak. Dkt. No. 34. TheCourt lifted the stay on July 2, 2015, and ordered the parties to conduct discovery and file any dispositive motions concerning only the limited issues of personal jurisdiction over AIB and the effect of the PCA bankruptcy settlement on Plaintiff's and the putative class members' claims. Dkt. No. 41, p. 2. Accordingly, on November 2, 2015, AIB filed its Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (dkt. no. 48), and AIBI and Hatfield submitted their Motion Regarding the PCA Settlement Procedures (dkt. no. 50), which are now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a plaintiff's complaint contain both "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2). A responding party thus may move to dismiss the complaint based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ("Rule 12(b)(2)"), or a "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). A responding party may raise similar arguments in a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ("Rule 12(c)").

I. Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss

When a district court does not conduct an evidentiary-hearing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts in the complaint to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988); and Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988)). However, if the defendant challenges personal jurisdiction with affidavit evidence in support of his position, "the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction." Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff must "substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint." Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp. A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., 519 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D. Fla. 1981)); see also Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) ("When a defendant raises through affidavits, documents or testimony a meritorious challenge topersonal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony or documents." (quoting Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1990))).

The court, in turn, must accept the facts in the plaintiff's complaint as true, to the extent that they remain uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 902 F.2d at 855. In addition, "[w]here the plaintiff's complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)).

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint in setting forth a claim to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). To be plausible on its face, a complaint must set forth enoughfacts to "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

In evaluating a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "accept as true the facts as set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Ordinarily, a court's review on dismissal is limited to the factual allegations on the face of the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a court is presented with matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted into one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, there are certain instances in which a court may consider matters outside the pleadings without transforming a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion, see Davis v. Self, 547 F. App'x 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2013), including, for example, that a court may consider facts that are subject to judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(d); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); see also Boatenq v. InterAmerican Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (documents from court adjudications are public records subject to judicial notice).

III. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Judgment on the pleadings "is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered byconsidering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 700 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) thus applies the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "accept[ing] the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[ing] all inferences that favor the nonmovant." See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 137 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Slagle v....