Fitzgerald v. Com.

• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Lawrence L. Koontz
• Citation: Fitzgerald v. Com., 643 S.E.2d 162, 273 Va. 596, 2007 WL 1166065 (2007)
• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 061361.
• Parties: Michael Lee FITZGERALD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

273 Va. 596

643 S.E.2d 162

MICHAEL LEE FITZGERALD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 061361

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

April 20, 2007, Decided

JUDGES: OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.

OPINION BY: LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ

OPINION

Present: All the Justices

OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.

In a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Michael Lee Fitzgerald was convicted on two counts of indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or supervisory relationship, Code § 18.2-370.1, and one count of object sexual penetration, Code § 18.2-67.2. In this appeal, the sole issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in permitting a licensed professional counselor to testify as an expert witness that the alleged victim suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). 1

BACKGROUND

To resolve the limited issue presented in this appeal, we need not recite the trial evidence that led to Fitzgerald's criminal convictions. The case arises from allegations, supported by the Commonwealth's evidence, that Fitzgerald engaged in unlawful sexual acts with his stepdaughter ("the victim"), who was under the age of thirteen years at the time. The focus of our analysis in resolving the issue presented is upon the challenged testimony of the Commonwealth's expert witness, Linda Giles.

At trial, the Commonwealth called Giles, a licensed professional counselor, 2 to testify as an expert witness. Giles testified that she held a master's degree in counseling in addition to a bachelor's degree. Additionally, Giles testified that she had completed three years of clinical training, which involves supervision by a licensed psychologist or a licensed professional counselor. Giles related that, at the time of trial, she had practiced as a licensed professional counselor for nine years and that her "primary background" involved working with children who were victims of abuse.

Giles testified that she first met with the victim and her mother through a referral by Child Protective Services. Giles explained that at that time her objective as a clinician was to "determine symptomology and treat the symptoms." She further explained that "[w]hat I would do with someone with [the victim's] background would be to try and make her feel safe in the world again . . . based on the symptoms that I was seeing with her."

Giles testified that she conducted six counseling sessions with the victim after the initial meeting, and had an ongoing professional relationship with her at the time of trial. During the counseling sessions, Giles determined from the victim and her mother that Fitzgerald "[a]llegedly . . . had an inappropriate sexual penetration with [the victim] on her living room floor when her mother was not there."

Giles then testified that the victim "experiences moderately severe symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder," which she defined as "a collection of symptoms that happen after a traumatic event that has occurred that has made someone feel horror, helplessness." She stated that "any kind of inappropriate sexual contact with a . . . child qualifies and they relive the experience in all of their senses."

At this point, Fitzgerald objected, stating that Giles was not "clinically qualified to make that diagnosis." Fitzgerald asserted that a diagnosis of PTSD "has to be made by a doctor and cannot be made by a licensed professional counselor." The trial court overruled Fitzgerald's objection.

Continuing her testimony, Giles stated that she uses the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders ("DSM") as her standard for looking for symptoms and making a diagnosis. She testified that the DSM "is the standard printed by the American Psychiatric Association and [is] used by psychologists, licensed professional counselors, [and] licensed clinical social workers." Giles explained that the DSM "is an effort to organize symptoms and organize thoughts in such a way that we can effect a treatment."

Giles testified that she first encountered PTSD, which she characterized as a "psychiatric diagnosis," in her master's degree program but encountered it in "much more detail" during her clinical training. She listed numerous symptoms characteristic of PTSD, and stated that the victim reported or displayed "most" of those symptoms. Giles testified that under the specific diagnostic scoring system set forth in the DSM for PTSD, the victim clearly met the criteria for PTSD and it was "[n]owhere near" a close call.

On cross-examination, Giles reiterated that PTSD is a "psychiatric diagnosis." However, she did not agree that psychiatric diagnoses are usually made by psychiatrists, again stating that psychologists, licensed professional counselors, and licensed clinical social workers are trained to use the DSM.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Fitzgerald guilty of the charged offenses. 3 Fitzgerald perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Giles' testimony because "Virginia law expressly permits professional counselors to diagnose . . . mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders" and "the evidence adduced at trial supported a finding that Giles was, in fact, qualified to exercise that diagnostic authority in this case." Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 271, 276, 630 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2006). This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Fitzgerald's principal basis for making the assertion that the trial court erred in permitting Giles to testify as an expert that the victim suffered with PTSD is that a diagnosis of PTSD is a "psychiatric diagnosis" and Giles is not a psychiatrist. According to Fitzgerald, only a psychiatrist or psychologist 4 may qualify to give expert testimony regarding a diagnosis based on the mental disorders identified in the DSM and, thus, licensed professional counselors, including Giles, are categorically unqualified to give such testimony.

To support his contentions, Fitzgerald asserts that no provision in Title 54.1, Chapter 35 of the Code, which is entitled "Professional Counseling," Code §§ 54.1-3500 through - 3515, enables a licensed professional counselor to engage in the practice of psychiatry or psychology. Furthermore, Fitzgerald notes that Title 54.1, Chapter 36 of the Code, which is entitled "Psychology," Code §§ 54.1-3600 through -3616, contains "no mention of a licensed professional counselor or anyone other than a psychologist." Thus, Fitzgerald maintains that the organization of the Code in this manner supports the conclusion that psychology, and making related diagnoses, is a field of expertise limited to psychiatrists and psychologists. We disagree with Fitzgerald's contentions.

It is axiomatic that in order to qualify to give expert testimony a witness must possess sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience regarding the subject matter of the testimony to assist the trier of fact in the search for truth. See Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 95, 103, 557 S.E.2d 213, 218 (2002) (quoting Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339-40, 150 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1966)); Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 284, 535 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2000); Combs v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 256 Va. 490, 496, 507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1998). Generally, a witness possesses sufficient expertise when, through experience, study or observation the witness acquires "knowledge of a subject beyond that of persons of common intelligence and ordinary experience." Velazquez, 263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218; see also Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 631 (1966). "[A]ll that is necessary for a witness to qualify as an expert is that the witness have sufficient knowledge of the subject to give value to the witness's opinion." Velazquez, 263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218. Notwithstanding these general principles, we have concluded that certain subject matter is exclusive to a particular field of expertise such that only witnesses trained as professionals in that field of expertise are qualified to render expert opinions regarding that subject matter. See Combs, 256 Va. at 496-98, 507 S.E.2d at 358-59 (holding that only a medical doctor may testify as to the causation of a human physical injury); John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 321, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2002) (following Combs). But see Velazquez, 263 Va. at 104, 557 S.E.2d at 218 (sexual assault nurse examiner may testify as to cause of sexual assault related physical injury).

In resolving the issue presented, Conley v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 554, 643 S.E.2d 131 (this day decided), is instructive. In Conley, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a licensed...